Exporting Safety Is Safety Contextually and Culturally Dependent? - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Exporting Safety Is Safety Contextually and Culturally Dependent? - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Ecole Nationale de lAviation Civile La rfrence aronautique Exporting Safety Is Safety Contextually and Culturally Dependent? 1/21 Kyla Zimmermann Corinne Bieder Ecole Nationale de lAviation Civile Toulouse, France www.enac.fr


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SLIDE 1

The French Civil Aviation University La référence aéronautique

Ecole Nationale de l’Aviation Civile

www.enac.fr

Réf: Version: Date: 1/21 1

Exporting Safety

Is Safety Contextually and Culturally Dependent?

Kyla Zimmermann Corinne Bieder Ecole Nationale de l’Aviation Civile Toulouse, France

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SLIDE 2

The French Civil Aviation University La référence aéronautique

Ecole Nationale de l’Aviation Civile

www.enac.fr

Réf: Version: Date: 2/21

The Research Project

  • ENAC-Airbus chair of safety management
  • Worldwide commercial aviation safety

– A dedicated group supports safety in the regions, helping operators and organisations – Looking for ways to support different geographical regions in a systematic way

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  • Project started

mid-February

– 3 months ago

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The French Civil Aviation University La référence aéronautique

Ecole Nationale de l’Aviation Civile

www.enac.fr

Réf: Version: Date: 3/21

Pre-Pre-Preliminary Thoughts - 1

  • High risk technologies mature over time and characteristics vary

according to their safety level and type

– Craftsmen, Equivalent Actors, etc. (Amalberti) – This maturing occurs within a context - necessarily including regulatory authorities, certification, training standards, etc.

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The French Civil Aviation University La référence aéronautique

Ecole Nationale de l’Aviation Civile

www.enac.fr

Réf: Version: Date: 4/21

Pre-Pre-Preliminary Thoughts - 3

  • Worldwide accident statistics used

to be only by continent

– National civil aviation accident rates correlate with calories consumed (?) – Much more data now, but is it useful? – Practices differ, but so do constraints, resources, weather, etc.

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The French Civil Aviation University La référence aéronautique

Ecole Nationale de l’Aviation Civile

www.enac.fr

Réf: Version: Date: 5/21

Pre-Pre-Preliminary Thoughts - 3

Anecdotes from my personal experience, n=1… but it’s a big 1! Is saying “it can’t NOT be a factor” proof that it IS a factor?

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Indonesia: Subjective truth, good vs evil Sweden: Trust and equality and rainbows and unicorns France: I don’t really know, but…

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The French Civil Aviation University La référence aéronautique

Ecole Nationale de l’Aviation Civile

www.enac.fr

Réf: Version: Date: 6/21 6

Does this suprise you?

(Photo: K. Zimmermann)

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The French Civil Aviation University La référence aéronautique

Ecole Nationale de l’Aviation Civile

www.enac.fr

Réf: Version: Date: 7/21

  • Lessons to exchange with other industries with worldwide operations

– Mineral exploration, petrochemical, shipping, finance – UN agencies such as the WHO, IAEA, or the World Bank

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Pre-Pre-Preliminary Thoughts - 4

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SLIDE 8

The French Civil Aviation University La référence aéronautique

Ecole Nationale de l’Aviation Civile

www.enac.fr

Réf: Version: Date: 8/21

Pre-Pre-Preliminary Thoughts - 5

  • Is civil aviation, and the associated operating framework, “exported” from

“The West”? (and Japan and Brazil…)

– Embraer, IAe/IPTN, Mitsubishi, many Russian manufacturers…

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The French Civil Aviation University La référence aéronautique

Ecole Nationale de l’Aviation Civile

www.enac.fr

Réf: Version: Date: 9/21

What we know so far:

  • Problems that don’t fit basic assumptions

about aviation

– Basic food and employment security, stolen equipment, food security, black market economy, armed conflicts… – “Predatory” states (vs developmental states) – Management part of government “entourage” – change overnight – Motivation for starting an airline or becoming a pilot, ATCo, Airline CEO, etc. – Planning & concepts of time, fatalism, religion – Superstitions

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(Photo: Reuters)

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The French Civil Aviation University La référence aéronautique

Ecole Nationale de l’Aviation Civile

www.enac.fr

Réf: Version: Date: 10/21

What we know so far:

  • Studies characterise national culture from an etic, Western point of view

– “Them” = collectivist; high PDI, UAI, LTO – “Us” = individualistic; low PDI, UAI, LTO – Helmreich (of LOSA fame) surveyed aviation and medicine (attitudes vs Hofstede) – Don’t many non-western countries have similar aviation safety practices and similar (or even better) safety records (Japan, Singapore, S. Korea, Taiwan, UAE...)

  • Existing culture measures are old, crude, and simplistic

– Yet have been replicated, appear stable

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The French Civil Aviation University La référence aéronautique

Ecole Nationale de l’Aviation Civile

www.enac.fr

Réf: Version: Date: 11/21

What we know so far:

  • Culture definitely matters for marketing (but not for safety?)

– Ratio of studies is 5:1

  • Recent correlation (causation?) found by Eurocontrol et al.

– Power distance and safety culture survey responses

  • Safety culture is normative: For good X, organisational culture must be Y

– E.g. for CRM and reporting one MUST have: low power distance, non-punitive, individual responsibility

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The French Civil Aviation University La référence aéronautique

Ecole Nationale de l’Aviation Civile

www.enac.fr

Réf: Version: Date: 12/21

2008 Survey of Safety I vs II in Aviation

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“Same equipment, same rules, same procedures… different heads.”

(Published results in Resilience Engineering in Practice)

Intended to compare the underlying safety assumptions across aviation professional cultures (ATCos, pilots, engineers, mechanics) Resilience vs Traditional assumptions about safety (Safety I vs II?)

  • People are the cause of accidents vs people create safety
  • Rules guarantee safety vs rules are imperfect
  • Systems (and accidents) are linear, Newtonian, Cartesian, proportional, vs

systems are complex and emergent

  • HF = Errors, errors, errors…
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The French Civil Aviation University La référence aéronautique

Ecole Nationale de l’Aviation Civile

www.enac.fr

Réf: Version: Date: 13/21

The 705 Respondents by Region

Reference for the regions: GLOBE Study (House, 2004)

Europe

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The French Civil Aviation University La référence aéronautique

Ecole Nationale de l’Aviation Civile

www.enac.fr

Réf: Version: Date: 14/21

78 21 205 178 56 70 62

The Responses by Region

Agree with the Resilience or Traditional Perspective

Traditional

Neutral

Resilience Europe

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The French Civil Aviation University La référence aéronautique

Ecole Nationale de l’Aviation Civile

www.enac.fr

Réf: Version: Date: 15/21

Questions for Discussion:

  • 1. What else do we know? Where else should we look?
  • 2. Can companies “export” safety along with their products?

Can ICAO define how to create safety in a standard way for everyone, everywhere?

– If so, how? – If the context is Safety I: (Problem = Technology, Solution = Fix) an OEM has no mandate or authority with respect to organisational factors – If not, why not? Is there necessarily a (slow, gradual) evolution of a local

  • perating context to attain safety levels similar to that of the regions where

these technologies originated?

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The French Civil Aviation University La référence aéronautique

Ecole Nationale de l’Aviation Civile

www.enac.fr

Réf: Version: Date: 16/21

More Questions for Discussion:

  • 3. Are organisations in emerging economies Safety I by default? Is anyone anywhere

really Safety II? Does everyone necessarily have to evolve from Safety I to II?

– What is the minimum required to be “mature” enough to make progress? – Relationship between education levels and basic food/job security, etc. – Is it smart to promote Safety II? Would that omit important steps and miss low-hanging fruit?

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  • 4. Is culture or region a red-herring (or codfish)?

– Motivating an organisation to “improve its safety culture” and change behaviour is a challenge even under ideal circumstances – Contextual factors:

Type of state x regulatory framework x type of operation (Legacy or state run or LCC) x ?

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The French Civil Aviation University La référence aéronautique

Ecole Nationale de l’Aviation Civile

www.enac.fr

Réf: Version: Date: 17/21 17

Obrigada!

Please email me with any suggestions, comments, insights, references, critiques, praise, tarte tatin recipes, etc.

kyla.zimmermann@enac.fr