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Evolutionary game theory and cognition Artem Kaznatcheev School of Computer Science & Department of Psychology McGill University November 15, 2012 Artem Kaznatcheev (McGill University) Evolutionary game theory and cognition November 15,


  1. Evolutionary game theory and cognition Artem Kaznatcheev School of Computer Science & Department of Psychology McGill University November 15, 2012 Artem Kaznatcheev (McGill University) Evolutionary game theory and cognition November 15, 2012 0 / 24

  2. Two player games ◮ A game between two players (Alice and Bob) is represented by a matrix G of pairs. Example � (3 , 1) � (2 , 3) ( − 1 , 2) (3 , − 1) Artem Kaznatcheev (McGill University) Evolutionary game theory and cognition November 15, 2012 1 / 24

  3. Two player games ◮ A game between two players (Alice and Bob) is represented by a matrix G of pairs. Example � (3 , 1) � (2 , 3) ( − 1 , 2) (3 , − 1) ◮ If Alice plays strategy i and Bob plays strategy j then ( a , b ) := G ij is the outcome, where a corresponds to the change in Alice’s utility and b to Bob’s. Artem Kaznatcheev (McGill University) Evolutionary game theory and cognition November 15, 2012 1 / 24

  4. Artem Kaznatcheev (McGill University) Evolutionary game theory and cognition November 15, 2012 1 / 24

  5. Question for you! ◮ What does Wright say compassion is from a biological point of view? Do you think this is a reasonable definition? Artem Kaznatcheev (McGill University) Evolutionary game theory and cognition November 15, 2012 2 / 24

  6. Question for you! ◮ What does Wright say compassion is from a biological point of view? Do you think this is a reasonable definition? ◮ What is a zero-sum game? Does a non-zero-sum relationship guarantee that compassion will emerge? Artem Kaznatcheev (McGill University) Evolutionary game theory and cognition November 15, 2012 2 / 24

  7. Zero-sum games Definition A game G is a zero-sum game if for each ( a , b ) := G ij we have a + b = 0. Artem Kaznatcheev (McGill University) Evolutionary game theory and cognition November 15, 2012 3 / 24

  8. Zero-sum games Definition A game G is a zero-sum game if for each ( a , b ) := G ij we have a + b = 0. Example � (1 , − 1) � ( − 1 , 1) ( − 1 , 1) (1 , − 1) Artem Kaznatcheev (McGill University) Evolutionary game theory and cognition November 15, 2012 3 / 24

  9. Zero-sum games Definition A game G is a zero-sum game if for each ( a , b ) := G ij we have a + b = 0. Example � (1 , − 1) � ( − 1 , 1) ( − 1 , 1) (1 , − 1) ◮ Zero-sum games are the epitome of competition. Any gain for Alice is a loss for Bob, and vice-versa. Artem Kaznatcheev (McGill University) Evolutionary game theory and cognition November 15, 2012 3 / 24

  10. Coordination games Definition A two-strategy game G is a coordination game if we have � ( a 1 , b 1 ) � ( c 2 , d 1 ) G = ( c 1 , d 2 ) ( a 2 , b 2 ) And a 1 > c 1 , a 2 > c 2 , b 1 > d 1 , b 2 > d 2 . Artem Kaznatcheev (McGill University) Evolutionary game theory and cognition November 15, 2012 4 / 24

  11. Coordination games Definition A two-strategy game G is a coordination game if we have � ( a 1 , b 1 ) � ( c 2 , d 1 ) G = ( c 1 , d 2 ) ( a 2 , b 2 ) And a 1 > c 1 , a 2 > c 2 , b 1 > d 1 , b 2 > d 2 . Examples � (1 , 1) � � (2 , 1) � � (4 , 4) � ( − 1 , − 1) (0 , 0) (0 , 2) , , ( − 1 , − 1) (1 , 1) (0 , 0) (1 , 2) (2 , 0) (3 , 3) Artem Kaznatcheev (McGill University) Evolutionary game theory and cognition November 15, 2012 4 / 24

  12. Coordination games Definition A two-strategy game G is a coordination game if we have � ( a 1 , b 1 ) � ( c 2 , d 1 ) G = ( c 1 , d 2 ) ( a 2 , b 2 ) And a 1 > c 1 , a 2 > c 2 , b 1 > d 1 , b 2 > d 2 . Examples � (1 , 1) � � (2 , 1) � � (4 , 4) � ( − 1 , − 1) (0 , 0) (0 , 2) , , ( − 1 , − 1) (1 , 1) (0 , 0) (1 , 2) (2 , 0) (3 , 3) ◮ The diagonals are always better for both players, they just have to figure out how to pick the same strategy. ◮ Captures the idea of win-win, lose-lose situations. Artem Kaznatcheev (McGill University) Evolutionary game theory and cognition November 15, 2012 4 / 24

  13. What do these two types of games tell us? ◮ Zero-sum and coordination games are mutually exclusive: there is no game that is both zero-sum and a coordination game. Artem Kaznatcheev (McGill University) Evolutionary game theory and cognition November 15, 2012 5 / 24

  14. What do these two types of games tell us? ◮ Zero-sum and coordination games are mutually exclusive: there is no game that is both zero-sum and a coordination game. ◮ Upside: zero-sum and coordination provide a good duality between impossibility of cooperation and obvious cooperation. Artem Kaznatcheev (McGill University) Evolutionary game theory and cognition November 15, 2012 5 / 24

  15. What do these two types of games tell us? ◮ Zero-sum and coordination games are mutually exclusive: there is no game that is both zero-sum and a coordination game. ◮ Upside: zero-sum and coordination provide a good duality between impossibility of cooperation and obvious cooperation. ◮ Downside: both types of games are really boring. The most interesting games (from a mathematical and modeling point of view) are neither zero-sum nor coordination. ◮ Being non-zero-sum does not ensure cooperation. Artem Kaznatcheev (McGill University) Evolutionary game theory and cognition November 15, 2012 5 / 24

  16. Question for you! ◮ Is the Prisoner’s dilemma a zero-sum game? Can you have a competitive environment that is non-zero sum? Artem Kaznatcheev (McGill University) Evolutionary game theory and cognition November 15, 2012 6 / 24

  17. What do these two types of games tell us? ◮ Zero-sum and coordination games are mutually exclusive: there is no game that is both zero-sum and a coordination game. ◮ Upside: zero-sum and coordination provide a good duality between impossibility of cooperation and obvious cooperation. Artem Kaznatcheev (McGill University) Evolutionary game theory and cognition November 15, 2012 7 / 24

  18. What do these two types of games tell us? ◮ Zero-sum and coordination games are mutually exclusive: there is no game that is both zero-sum and a coordination game. ◮ Upside: zero-sum and coordination provide a good duality between impossibility of cooperation and obvious cooperation. ◮ Downside: both types of games are really boring. The most interesting games (from a mathematical and modeling point of view) are neither zero-sum nor coordination. ◮ Being non-zero-sum does not ensure cooperation. Artem Kaznatcheev (McGill University) Evolutionary game theory and cognition November 15, 2012 7 / 24

  19. Prisoner’s dilemma � ( b − c , b − c ) � ( − c , b ) ( b , − c ) (0 , 0) ◮ b is the benefit of receiving and c is the cost of giving. ◮ Strategy 1 is called cooperate or C and strategy 2 is called defect or D . Artem Kaznatcheev (McGill University) Evolutionary game theory and cognition November 15, 2012 8 / 24

  20. Prisoner’s dilemma � ( b − c , b − c ) � ( − c , b ) ( b , − c ) (0 , 0) ◮ b is the benefit of receiving and c is the cost of giving. ◮ Strategy 1 is called cooperate or C and strategy 2 is called defect or D . ◮ The rational strategy (or Nash equilibrium) is mutual defection. Artem Kaznatcheev (McGill University) Evolutionary game theory and cognition November 15, 2012 8 / 24

  21. Prisoner’s dilemma � ( b − c , b − c ) � ( − c , b ) ( b , − c ) (0 , 0) ◮ b is the benefit of receiving and c is the cost of giving. ◮ Strategy 1 is called cooperate or C and strategy 2 is called defect or D . ◮ The rational strategy (or Nash equilibrium) is mutual defection. ◮ The best for the players taken together (or Pareto optimum) is mutual cooperation. Artem Kaznatcheev (McGill University) Evolutionary game theory and cognition November 15, 2012 8 / 24

  22. Nash equilibrium Definition A strategy pair ( p , q ) is a Nash equilibrium of a game G if for all other strategies r we have: fst ( G ( p , q )) ≥ fst ( G ( r , q )) and snd ( G ( p , q )) ≥ snd ( G ( p , r )) Artem Kaznatcheev (McGill University) Evolutionary game theory and cognition November 15, 2012 9 / 24

  23. Nash equilibrium Definition A strategy pair ( p , q ) is a Nash equilibrium of a game G if for all other strategies r we have: fst ( G ( p , q )) ≥ fst ( G ( r , q )) and snd ( G ( p , q )) ≥ snd ( G ( p , r )) ◮ Informally: neither Alice nor Bob can improve their payoff by unilateral change of strategy. Artem Kaznatcheev (McGill University) Evolutionary game theory and cognition November 15, 2012 9 / 24

  24. Nash equilibrium Definition A strategy pair ( p , q ) is a Nash equilibrium of a game G if for all other strategies r we have: fst ( G ( p , q )) ≥ fst ( G ( r , q )) and snd ( G ( p , q )) ≥ snd ( G ( p , r )) ◮ Informally: neither Alice nor Bob can improve their payoff by unilateral change of strategy. ◮ If we only allow pure strategies then replace G ( i , j ) by G ij ◮ If we allow mixed strategies, then every game has at least one Nash equilibrium Artem Kaznatcheev (McGill University) Evolutionary game theory and cognition November 15, 2012 9 / 24

  25. Pareto optimum Definition A strategy pair ( p , q ) is a Pareto optimum of a game G is there is no other strategy pair ( p ′ , q ′ ) such that G ( p ′ , q ′ ) > G ( p , q ) Artem Kaznatcheev (McGill University) Evolutionary game theory and cognition November 15, 2012 10 / 24

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