Europes Management of Space Hybrid Threats Dr. Jana Robinson, Space - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

2018 International Astronautical Congress, Bremen, Session D5.4., October 5, 2018 Europe’s Management of Space Hybrid Threats 2018 International Astronautical Congress Session D5.4. Cyber-security threats to space missions and countermeasures to address them Bremen, October 5, 2018 Europe’s Management of Space Hybrid Threats Dr. Jana Robinson, Space Security Program Director Lisa Perrichon, Project Assistant Jakub Pražák, Project Assistant Prague Security Studies Institute October 5, 2018 PSSI 1

2018 International Astronautical Congress, Bremen, Session D5.4., October 5, 2018 Europe’s Management of Space Hybrid Threats Presentation Overview • Introduction • Space Hybrid Operations • Growing Requirement for Space Infrastructure Resiliency • Cyber as a “Go To” Counterspace Option • Europe’s Preparedness to Address Space Hybrid Threats • Policy Adjustments to Manage Evolving Space Security Environment • Conclusion October 5, 2018 PSSI 2

2018 International Astronautical Congress, Bremen, Session D5.4., October 5, 2018 Europe’s Management of Space Hybrid Threats Introduction • Space infrastructure delivers valuable, and often, indispensable, services for the European economy, society, security and defense • Counterspace threats are of much greater concern due to increased technical capabilities, worsening geopolitics and the ability of these threats to deliver asymmetric, strategic effects. • Space hybrid operations are not new, but are more publically visible as they now pose a major challenge to deterrence. October 5, 2018 PSSI 3

2018 International Astronautical Congress, Bremen, Session D5.4., October 5, 2018 Europe’s Management of Space Hybrid Threats Growing Requirement for Space Infrastructure Resiliency • Space assets have become more vulnerable to intentional attacks by Europe’s authoritarian competitors; • “Grey zone” operations permit a competitor/adversary to achieve desired objectives or effects without triggering unwanted political or military responses by other nations; • Cascading effects of purposeful disruption would cause major disruption, even paralysis, of many critical services, including transportation, banking, internet connectivity, etc. Europe’s Sentinel and Galileo satellites (source: SpaceNews) October 5, 2018 PSSI 4

2018 International Astronautical Congress, Bremen, Session D5.4., October 5, 2018 Europe’s Management of Space Hybrid Threats Space Hybrid Operations • PSSI defines as: “ intentional, temporary, mostly reversible, and often harmful space actions/activities specifically designed to exploit the links to other domains and conducted just below the threshold of requiring meaningful military or political retaliatory responses ”. • Examples: low-energy lasers, rendezvous and proximity operations, jamming/spoofing, cyber operations, economic and financial (E&F) space sector capture • Common characteristics: ambiguous attribution, temporary and reversible effects, low public profile PSSI October 5, 2018 5

2018 International Astronautical Congress, Bremen, Session D5.4., October 5, 2018 Europe’s Management of Space Hybrid Threats Cyber as a “Go To” Counterspace Option Space dependency on cyber introduces asymmetric risks of • disruption Cyber attacks on space assets have multiple advantages over • kinetic attacks (e.g. plausible deniability, time-consuming attribution, muted public reaction, etc.) Configuring adequate defenses for both military and civilian • operators complicated by continuous innovation and transformation of IT Threats include: damage or destruction of spacecraft executed • Attacks on satellite-based Internet via access to satellite’s controls; denial, degradation, or other connections, as conducted by the Turla group between 2008 and 2016, are a cheap manipulation of satellite transmissions; revealing satellite’s and efficient way to compromise foreign capabilities or information (e.g. resolution, imagery etc.); and networks or cover illegal activities. (Credit: compromising space-based networks Kaspersky Lab) October 5, 2018 PSSI 6

2018 International Astronautical Congress, Bremen, Session D5.4., October 5, 2018 Europe’s Management of Space Hybrid Threats Cyber as a “Go To” Counterspace Option - continued ● Cyberattacks against space assets often involve stealing information (e.g. data, communications) and/or disrupting space infrastructure (e.g. systems, operations, capabilities, services) ● The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) of the U.S. Department of Commerce categorizes five types of cyber threats: ○ destruction of data; modification of information; unauthorized access; disclosure of data; and denial of service Simplified matrix of cyber threat to on-orbit space infrastructure October 5, 2018 PSSI 7

2018 International Astronautical Congress, Bremen, Session D5.4., October 5, 2018 Europe’s Management of Space Hybrid Threats Europe’s Preparedness to Address Space Hybrid Threats Frameworks for collaboration to address hybrid threats • are being established, space has been considered only marginally Hybrid threats are listed as one of seven categories in a • December 2016 Joint Declaration of the EU and NATO Councils In 2016, the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell was established within • the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (EU INTCEN) of the European External Action Service (EEAS). It facilitates EU-NATO cooperation on hybrid threats. In 2017, European Commission released report on the • implementation of the “Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats – a European Union response” In October 2017, the European Centre of Excellence for • Information Flow in case of a hybrid threat (source: European Commission) Countering Hybrid Threats was established October 5, 2018 PSSI 8

2018 International Astronautical Congress, Bremen, Session D5.4., October 5, 2018 Europe’s Management of Space Hybrid Threats Europe’s Preparedness to Address Space Hybrid Threats - continued In 2004, the EU established the European Network and • Information Security Agency (ENISA) to enhance the national cyber resilience of EU member states; In 2013, EU adopted ”Cybersecurity Strategy of the European • Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace” that required a near-term update due to rapid development of cyber technology; Updated cyber package, entitled “Resilience, Deterrence and • Defence: Building Strong Cybersecurity for the EU” was released in 2017; 2016 EU “Space Strategy for Europe” considers risk of • European Union Defense Ministers taking part in the simulated cyber attack exercise EU CYBRID cyberattacks on space infrastructure; 2017 in Tallinn, Estonia. (Credit: Annika Haas, EU2017EE) In 2016, NATO decided at its Warsaw Summit that cyber should • be viewed as fifth domain in which the Alliance must defend itself. October 5, 2018 PSSI 9

2018 International Astronautical Congress, Bremen, Session D5.4., October 5, 2018 Europe’s Management of Space Hybrid Threats Policy Adjustments to Manage Evolving Space Security Environment An effort to centralize and focus deterrence, mitigation, response and • communications among relevant public authorities and private sector entities against cyber attacks already exists; Hybrid operations, including those stemming from cyber and economic and financial • (E&F) predations, need to be integrated into security architectures of individual NATO and EU member states; Inclusion of these threats will strengthen space infrastructure resiliency, deterrence, • and quick, effective responses; Failing to address the vulnerabilities at the junction of space and cyber could cause • major disruptions to not only European, but also global space security. Policies should focus on: greater awareness of the multitude of threats; resilient • architecture; creative deterrence options; response/crisis management procedures; secure incident reporting between public and private actors; capacity-building; and strong space partnerships; October 5, 2018 PSSI 10

2018 International Astronautical Congress, Bremen, Session D5.4., October 5, 2018 Europe’s Management of Space Hybrid Threats Conclusion Building agile, sophisticated, and resilient ● European space architectures will reduce vulnerabilities against cyberattacks and malevolent space-related economic and financial (E&F) operations; Accelerating inclusion of space in the category of ● hybrid threats and building space-related considerations into broader security policies – already underway – will ensure that their integration into future EU and NATO policies is bolstered by adequate funding and human resources. October 5, 2018 PSSI 11