Europe and Asia Presentation 7 t h January 2013 Christina Limbourg - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Europe and Asia Presentation 7 t h January 2013 Christina Limbourg and Sebastian Scholl

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2013

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History o

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Japan’s i involvement i in As Asian r regionalism

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1957 1960’s and 1970’s 1970’s onwards

Private level initiatives. E.g. Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC)

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Fukuda Doctrine, Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo: “Japan would not become a military power, Japan would establish relationships build upon mutual trust and Japan would partner with ASEAN and would support its efforts for peace and prosperity in Southeast Asia.”

Despite these efforts, Japan’s direct role in Asian regionalism remained limited.

History o

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Japan’s i involvement i in As Asian r regionalism

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History o

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Japan’s i involvement i in As Asian r regionalism

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History o

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Japan’s i involvement i in As Asian r regionalism

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2.2

History o

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Japan’s i involvement i in As Asian r regionalism

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History o

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Japan’s i involvement i in As Asian r regionalism

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Economic c community reg region

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de F FTA/EPA fina nanc ncial a l and nd mo mone netary c y cooperation

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Sc Scep epti tics s Enthu husiasts

East Asia remains too dependent

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trans-Pacific trade and financial ties to establish a separate economic community. Acknowledge that the pace pace will will be be slo low w and that the focus will be on trade and finance. Process should NOT be abandoned because of value differences. Potential for developing a common security interest as some nations face similar threats e.g. avian influenza.

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It will be hard for Japan to find a national consensus and play an active community building role, if it cannot get the US to support its strategic approach on regionalism.

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 Deepening cultural relations my help in regional identity building.  De facto regionalisation should take priority

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industrialisation  Asian community will differ to European community.  Japan hopes that the process will help alleviate anti-Japanese sentiments in Asia.

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Asian Community

Multilateral ism Regionalism Bilateralism

6  What will newly elected Prime Minister Abe’s influence be on Japanese attitude towards an Asian Community?  How will the territorial disputes with China influence the building of an Asian Community?  How to walk the fine line between bilateralism and multilateralism given the new circumstances?  Does China even want to cooperate with Japan?  …

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Green & Gill 2009 Chapter 8 The Strong in the World of the Weak Southeast Asia in Asia’s Regional Architecture

Pr Presen esenta tati tion

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 Introduction  Evolving Perspectives  Debates about Regional Architecture  The U.S. Role and U.S. Alliances  Conclusions: Principles and Prospects

Commen Comments a ts and d discu scussi ssion

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   ✓✗  Things I didn’t understand  Discussion Points

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PART II: ASEAN’S PERSPECTIVE OF THE REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE

 Southeast Asia: influential in region despite small  ASEAN: “Asia’s first viable multilateral organisation concerned with security”- adopted by other regions “What explains ASEAN’s influence and leadership over Asian Institutions?” International-relations theory

Re Realist approach

International institutions=marginal force in world politics; only viable if backed up by powerful nations  ASEAN= group of weak and small powers, i.e. limited  Ability to attract & influence large powers questionable

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INTRODUCTION I

Ecle Eclect ctic appr ic approac

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Combines realism, liberalism and constructivism  Soft realism: individual ASEAN members vs. collective power  Why don’t powerful nations take over?  Constructivism: Importance of hanging together Regionalist norms, identity and socialisation processes Culture and identity fairly similar* Interaction and socialisation in combat against communism Conflict management (Cambodia 1980s)  Image building, “soft power” acquirement and relative credibility in the region – limited threat?? More legitimate??

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INTRODUCTION II

 Historically: Asia not big in institution building  Post-WWII: shifting… Pan-Asian… Afro-Asian… sub-regional… trans-Pacific… East Asian  Complementary  Early stages of Asian regionalism

• -- SEA: worried about being dominated by Asian powers

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EVOLVING PERSPECTIVES I

Time period Driving countries/events Driving force late 1940s India* SEA limited*; no clear separation between South Asia and SEA Pan-Asian sentiment Regionalism vs. nationalism Sovereignty Non-intervention 1950s Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung, Indonesia* SEA=Southeast Asia

 China & India not acceptable as leaders  Japan recovering & not economic power yet SEA took the lead  ASEAN: focus on domestic stability and economic growth  Highpoint: tackling Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia in the 1980s*

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EVOLVING PERSPECTIVES II

1950s SEATO: Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation Prevent the spread of communism Defence mechanism 1966 Asia and Pacific Council (Japan & Australia) Alternative to SEATO? 1967 ASEAN 5* Alternative to SEATO “indigenous” Asian forum, no dominating powers

 ASEAN: centre stage  Slow progress of regional institutions (e.g. ARF)… weak leadership?

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EVOLVING PERSPECTIVES III

1984 SAARC: South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Using ASEAN model* 1989 APEC: Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Soft institutionalism* 1994 ARF: ASEAN Regional Forum 1997 Asian financial crisis … shift to East Asian regionalism… 1997 APT: ASEAN plus 3 (China, South Korea, Japan)* 2005 EAS: East Asian Summit Aim: creating an East Asian Community

 Agreements vs. disagreements  End of Cold War seen as turning point: security dialogue with “non-Asian” countries also acceptable

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EVOLVING PERSPECTIVES IV

Disagre Disagreeme ment nts s Re Reasons Cold W War p period

• Sing Thai Phil: inclusive regionalism
• Ind Mal: more exclusionary regionalism

STP: US military presence, strategic access to their territory Necessity, p pace a and s scope o

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economic int integrat ration ion

• Singapore’s neighbours
• Rising gap post-expansion in 1990s*

Question of who benefits from economic integration Post C Cold W War p period Necessity and scope of collective regional action: peacekeeping, human rights, democracy

• Military base questions less

important

• Role of Burma

 End of Cold War seen as turning point: security dialogue with “non-Asian” countries also acceptable  However… APEC & ARF largely seen as failures:

• -- Role of the 1997 Asian financial crisis

Current issues reflect both domestic and external challenges

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EVOLVING PERSPECTIVES V

Interventionism Greater institutionalisation and legalisation Potential of security and economic communities Establishment of an ASEAN charter ASEAN’s role in East Asian regionalism: challenging ASEAN’s identity and centrality

 Southeast Asian regionalism seen as necessary and inevitable Survival of small states Reduction of intra-regional tension Means of expressing SEA identity  Two main points of debate: 1. Direction of ASEAN (including the need for reform and reinvention) 2. Role of ASEAN in the establishment of broader regional frameworks

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DEBATES ABOUT REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE I

1) Direction of ASEAN (including the need for reform and reinvention)  Post-1997: issue of non-intervention…:

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DEBATES ABOUT REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE II

Thailand “Flexible engagement” Tackling domestic issues that may have an impact on the wider region Indonesia and Singapore objected since the proposition was too vague Indonesia “ASEAN security committee” Shift of Indonesia to reformist side* Including human rights and democracy as potential ASEAN norms Burma and Vietnam main opposition Singapore “ASEAN economic community” Singapore: interested both in sovereignty and economic integration Creation of a near borderless regional economy Further institutionalisation and legalisation*

Reason for these debates: democratic transition & emerging competition

Role of ASEAN in the establishment of broader regional frameworks  Which countries should be part of Asian regionalism?

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DEBATES ABOUT REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE III

Narrow view Malaysia, China Limited to ASEAN+3

• Malaysia: reaction to emergence of trade blocs in

Europe and North America in the 1990s and the stalling of the GATT

• Post-1997: new legitimacy amongst ASEAN and

Japan, formation of APT Open view Singapore, Indonesia, Japan Evolving regional norms and practices

• Norms of open regionalism and cooperative security
• Role of strategic position, linked to US involvement

 Attitude towards other regional institutions

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DEBATES ABOUT REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE IV

APEC Issues

• US dominance
• Trade liberalisation vs. trade facilitation
• Overshadowing ASEAN? …Stalled post-1997

Advantages

• Annual summit useful tool*
• Useful for solving transnational security issues*

ARF Limitations

• Confidence building limited
• Role in handling regional conflicts limited- “China issues” avoided*, no

advances on the Korean peninsula despite “double membership” Achievements

• Involvement in transnational issue solving (crime and terrorism)

US perspective  Asian community building not as important as European case due to bilateral alliances (aimed at deterring powerful countries)  1990s~ ad hoc or a la carte multilateralism: limited number of countries involved, focusing on a specific issue SEA perspective … Limited US interest=mixed blessing…  Advantage: good for weaker countries which wants to avoid being dominated  Disadvantages: limited resources, credibility problem  Challenge: balancing US indifference and dominance*  Participation in EAS: even opposed by Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia- the latter pushing for the inclusion of NZ and Australia instead

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THE US ROLE AND US ALLIANCES I

Intra-ASEAN differences over the role of US military presence and alliances  US bilateral alliances and Asian multilateralism=basically compatible  US alliances even becoming the base of multilateral activity*  US vs. China… where do ASEAN countries fit in?*

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THE US ROLE AND US ALLIANCES II

Cold W War Post-Cold W War ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Friendship and Neutrality)

• Indonesia, Malaysia; Thailand,

Philippines

• Foreign military bases seen as

temporary “Places not bases” approach

• US strategic access to SEA remained

while problems associated with military bases could be avoided

• ASEAN internal friction regarding US

military presence removed

 Basic organising principles of Asian regionalism: limited change despite changing geopolitical and economic situation  Characteristics: conservative tendency

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CONCLUSIONS: PRINCIPLES AND PROSPECTS I

Regional level

• Preserving regional order (preventing interstate wars):

Cooperative security

• Open, non-exclusionary regionalism: initially challenged by EAS
• No regional military pacts
• ASEAN leadership in regional institutions: challenged by ARF*

Balance-of-powers o

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• Preventing a single country from dominating the region
• Yet US military dominance accepted as friendly superpower

and off-shore balancer that stays clear of politics Domestic level

• Enhancing domestic stability
• Non-interference into internal state affairs (no overarching

bureaucracy

 Future outlook: importance of ASEAN to remain cohesive

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CONCLUSIONS: PRINCIPLES AND PROSPECTS II

Non-interference principle

• Compromised: a certain degree of sovereignty has to be given

up to tackle transnational threats

• New ASEAN charter: potentially allowing increased action

against human rights violations and political affairs (time) Multi-layered

• Different and overlapping institutions likely to remain in place
• East Asian regionalism emerging but unlikely to overtake or

supplant Asia-Pacific institutions for historical reasons EAS

• Unlikely to develop institutional machinery for cooperation

unless combined with APT

• Future direction of EAS unclear: with APT exclusionary and

unlikely to be backed by Singapore and Indonesia ASEAN

• Hub of Asian regionalism
• Increasing challenge from China and India

Soft institutionalism

• Will give way to bureaucratisation and legalisation

 Slow evolution…  Change only in response to transnational threats including terrorism, pandemics and major natural disasters

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CONCLUSIONS: PRINCIPLES AND PROSPECTS III

1960s & 70s Inward looking

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survival and state- building 1980s Regional conflict in Cambodia, highpoint

• f ASEAN

21st century Transnational threats

 Current ASEAN: state-centric and inward-looking regionalism challenged by transnational threats  “Mismatch between traditional institutions” and the new challenges ASEAN faces… can ASEAN adapt to these changes?

India was brought up… new perspective.  But the text was very vague on the topic; it would be interesting to get more detailed information on the country’s role in regional integration  The use of Southeast Asian “identity” was not defined properly (main definition was that Southeast Asian countries do not want to be seen as part of India and China- but what identity makes them want to belong to ASEAN) ✗ I see identity as common norms and values. Is this really what drives ASEAN regionalism?

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WHAT I  AND  ✔ AND ✖ I

✔ I agree with the text that ASEAN has to adapt to the new environment ✔ The fact that individual ASEAN countries are pursuing bilateral trade talks emphasises the importance of ASEAN reacting ✔ I also believe that East Asian regionalism will not overtake ASEAN in the short-run; East Asian countries are also worried about falling behind, which can be seen in the proliferation of FTAs in the region

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WHAT I  AND  ✔ AND ✖ II

 ASEAN: small weak countries… still legitimate statement? Population: 690 million Impressive economic growth (GDP tripled over past 10 years)  Indonesia alone over 240 million inhabitants  P. 183: bottom part on US military dominance in the region ASEAN countries have accepted US military dominance of the Pacific (including SEA) Reason: some ASEAN countries see the US as a “benign superpower” and an “off-shore balancer” US not intruding into regional political space  China, India and Japan unlikely to be accepted for this role  If US military dominance is diluted, ASEAN can reach its goal

• f not being dominated by a single power…

Contradiction?

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THINGS I DIDN’T UNDERSTAND

 Balance-of-powers: US-China ASEAN members divided; which countries side with the US and China respectively?* Where does Malaysia fit in? Will there be a shift of alliances in the future?  Is it legitimate to assume that China will be willing to be led by ASEAN in the future?  What are the relations between China and India in terms of potentially leading Asian regionalism?  Changes since 2007 (when the article was written): Opening of Burma and TPP and the global financial crisis of 2007/8; How may these events have contributed to changes in focus of Asian regionalism?

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DISCUSSION POINTS

Tha Thank y k you f for l list sten ening! g!

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