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EU -Russia/Ukraine: from Ring of Friends to Ring of Fire? The - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

EU -Russia/Ukraine: from Ring of Friends to Ring of Fire? The European Union: challenges and strategic responses Colloquium 27 October 2015 Dr. Graeme P. Herd , Professor of Transnational Security Studies, George C. Marshall


  1. ‘EU -Russia/Ukraine: from ‘Ring of Friends’ to ‘Ring of Fire’? The European Union: challenges and strategic responses Colloquium 27 October 2015 Dr. Graeme P. Herd , Professor of Transnational Security Studies, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies; graeme.herd@marshallcenter.org

  2. Who is to blame? Four Narratives • EU to blame : – Sub-optimal non-strategic foreign policy; DCFTA unrealistic, open markets before anything to sell, cumbersome, top heavy, too long term; humiliate Russia, not take into account its legitimate interests • Russia to blame : – Status seeking foreign policy; zero sum thinking triumphs positive sum EU; negative mobilization processes around imperial revanchism • US to blame: – EP US-supported Swedish-Polish buffer zone between EU and Russia; US ‘New Atlanticist’ policy to undermine EU -Russian cooperation • Human Condition: – Misunderstanding/mis-perperceptions, sleepwalking into tragedy, cumulative and unintended effects of policies

  3. Structure- Agency and Moscow’s Motivations: Realist-Constructivist Russia and Putin The Russia Factor The Putin Factor • • Realist : Unique: – Rational objective calculations of – System forming: ‘No Putin; no Russia’ national interest; self-reliance = historical-charismatic legitimation national survival • Potent Power: – Statehood absolute not qualified … – Control FSB and TV: ‘the worse the – Regional: uphold order; Global: better’; fear, greed, cynicism of elite voice and veto in hotspots • President Putin’s Choices: • Constructivist : – Ukraine: any Russian president – Fear instability and encirclement – would want influence, Putin chooses belief West use democracy, rule of invasion not energy or bribes law, HR to control weaker nations – Syria: any Russian present would – Wounded ego, pride, dignity; want global-player status, Putin conspiratorial – victim syndrome chooses intervention in a Muslim state outside perimeter of historical – Desire Great Power status/equality, empire, not trade or UNSC belief that respect equals fear

  4. Regime Consolidation and Long-Term Economic Decline: Implementing a Military-Patriotic Management Model? Georgia Crimea Putin’s popularity Middle Income Development Trap Putin’s “ Air in the Balloon popularity Problem” “Scissors Russia’s Problem” economic Russia’s performance economic performance Phase 2: ‘ Moscow Maidan ’ - crisis. Putin’s Phase 3: ‘Great Russia popularity sinks as Phase 1: ‘Golden Besieged Fortress’: negative economy rebounds . Years’ : 7% GDP – mobilization - anti- Negative long term positive Western foreign policy. economic trends . Need mobilization around Charismatic and historical for new legitimation performance legitimation. basis on return to legitimacy. power. 2014-15 2008 2000 2011-13

  5. Belief/ Russian Perception and Understanding of EU and Ukraine Perception and Actors Relations with EU and Ukraine Understanding of Relations with Russia EU ‘Co - equal’ status means Russia has a sphere of Three tier sanctions. Hybrid war generates fear, influence via EEU equal to EU’s sphere; EU ‘dishonest uncertainty, disruption, anxiety. Values gap – and vindictive’ ( Lavrov 2014); ‘The West has greatly freedom, HR, sovereignty compounded by victim exaggerated the effects of the latest sanctions on the syndrome. No allies and sphere of influence Russian economy’ (S. Ivanov , 2015); “ we are willing to diminish. Focus on structural instabilities and resume full-scale cooperation with the EU and the stagnation not renewal, personalized power system United States after our Western partners abandon unsustainable; short term successes, long term costs their current stance based on a futile policy of - ‘Russia is weak’. EEU and EU AA/EP/DCFTA not ultimatums and illegal sanctions .” ( Lavrov, 14-10-15) incompatible – either/or principle ‘is unacceptable’ EU sanctions an opportunity for import substitution (Merkel, May 2015). ‘Equal’ means equal to any and industrial self- reliance. EU as ‘the other’ - other non-member aspiring to relationship with EU. decadent, dysfunctional, destabilizing, amoral space v. “I don’t think it’s a strategic partner anymore.’ Russian traditional conservative, Christian family (Mogherini, 2015). EEU-EU dialogue – about what? values. Zero Sum proposition – EEU or EU Liberalization? AA/EP/DCFTA. “Former President Yanukovich said that he needed to Note Russian position shift: 2004 Putin states UKR- Ukraine think about signing the EU-Ukraine AA, maybe EU membership (unlike NATO) a ‘positive step’. 2014 obtaining changes being made to it, and to consult Russia hostile, negative, confrontational. UKR as with Russia, Ukraine's primary economic and trading sovereign and independent state free to choose - partner. With that pretext, the disorders began in Kyiv, equality, legitimacy and common European home actively back by both our European and our US discourse. Generalized and enduring resentment partners. That was followed by the coup d'etat, an against propaganda and demonization of political absolutely unconstitutional act.” (Putin, 27-4-15). elites and society by Russia. Post-Yanukovich elite Official discourse: genocidal fascist Junta and neo-Nazi and society focus on ‘European path’, European western supported ultra-nationalists. Russian values and principles. EEU has symbolic political history/identity begins in Kyiv and Crimea ( Russkiy value but no economic sense without Ukraine - Mir ). Biggest market for natural gas exports, transit Russia has lost Ukraine. ‘Russia without Ukraine is a route to Europe, 7.5 million ethnic Russians. country. Russia with Ukraine is an empire.’

  6. Phase 4: Refloating/Replacing an Exhausted Military Patriotic Management Model – after Syria – what’s next? Battle of Narratives in Elite? Crimea Managing Russian Deflation Economy “Air in the Balloon Syria as inflection Problem” point? “Great Power Strategic Renovation” – “Scissors rebalance economy, pivot to Asia, foreign “Dividing a Problem” economic partnerships, technological Diminishing sovereignty = Party of Economy (1-2% Cake growth) Problem” Mis-managing deflation = collapse “Great Power Besieged Fortress” – external (nuclear) blackmail and internal Phase 3:. Putting repression escalation and middle class Phase 2: Identifying Air into the Balloon and addressing the revolts = Party of War (negative growth) = ‘Besieged ‘Scissors Problem’ – Fortress’ ‘Besieged Fortress charismatic and Paradigm’ historical legitimation. 2016 2024 2014 2015 2008

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