EU -Russia/Ukraine: from Ring of Friends to Ring of Fire? The - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
EU -Russia/Ukraine: from Ring of Friends to Ring of Fire? The European Union: challenges and strategic responses Colloquium 27 October 2015 Dr. Graeme P. Herd , Professor of Transnational Security Studies, George C. Marshall
Marshall European Center for Security Studies; graeme.herd@marshallcenter.org
– Sub-optimal non-strategic foreign policy; DCFTA unrealistic, open markets before anything to sell, cumbersome, top heavy, too long term; humiliate Russia, not take into account its legitimate interests
– Status seeking foreign policy; zero sum thinking triumphs positive sum EU; negative mobilization processes around imperial revanchism
– EP US-supported Swedish-Polish buffer zone between EU and Russia; US ‘New Atlanticist’ policy to undermine EU-Russian cooperation
– Misunderstanding/mis-perperceptions, sleepwalking into tragedy, cumulative and unintended effects of policies
– Rational objective calculations of national interest; self-reliance = national survival – Statehood absolute not qualified … – Regional: uphold order; Global: voice and veto in hotspots
– Fear instability and encirclement – belief West use democracy, rule of law, HR to control weaker nations – Wounded ego, pride, dignity; conspiratorial – victim syndrome – Desire Great Power status/equality, belief that respect equals fear
– System forming: ‘No Putin; no Russia’ historical-charismatic legitimation
– Control FSB and TV: ‘the worse the better’; fear, greed, cynicism of elite
– Ukraine: any Russian president would want influence, Putin chooses invasion not energy or bribes – Syria: any Russian present would want global-player status, Putin chooses intervention in a Muslim state outside perimeter of historical empire, not trade or UNSC
2000 2008 2011-13 2014-15
Phase 1: ‘Golden Years’: 7% GDP – positive mobilization around performance legitimacy. Phase 2: ‘Moscow Maidan’ - crisis. Putin’s popularity sinks as economy rebounds . Negative long term economic trends . Need for new legitimation basis on return to power. Phase 3: ‘Great Russia Besieged Fortress’: negative mobilization - anti- Western foreign policy. Charismatic and historical legitimation. “Air in the Balloon
Problem”
Regime Consolidation and Long-Term Economic Decline: Implementing a Military-Patriotic Management Model?
Georgia Crimea “Scissors Problem”
Russia’s economic performance Putin’s popularity Putin’s popularity Russia’s economic performance
Middle Income Development Trap
Belief/ Actors Russian Perception and Understanding of Relations with EU and Ukraine EU and Ukraine Perception and Understanding of Relations with Russia EU
‘Co-equal’ status means Russia has a sphere of influence via EEU equal to EU’s sphere; EU ‘dishonest and vindictive’ (Lavrov 2014); ‘The West has greatly exaggerated the effects of the latest sanctions on the Russian economy’ (S. Ivanov, 2015); “we are willing to resume full-scale cooperation with the EU and the United States after our Western partners abandon their current stance based on a futile policy of ultimatums and illegal sanctions.” (Lavrov, 14-10-15) EU sanctions an opportunity for import substitution and industrial self-reliance. EU as ‘the other’ - decadent, dysfunctional, destabilizing, amoral space v. Russian traditional conservative, Christian family
AA/EP/DCFTA. Three tier sanctions. Hybrid war generates fear, uncertainty, disruption, anxiety. Values gap – freedom, HR, sovereignty compounded by victim
stagnation not renewal, personalized power system unsustainable; short term successes, long term costs
incompatible – either/or principle ‘is unacceptable’ (Merkel, May 2015). ‘Equal’ means equal to any
“I don’t think it’s a strategic partner anymore.’ (Mogherini, 2015). EEU-EU dialogue – about what? Liberalization?
Ukraine
“Former President Yanukovich said that he needed to think about signing the EU-Ukraine AA, maybe
with Russia, Ukraine's primary economic and trading
actively back by both our European and our US
absolutely unconstitutional act.” (Putin, 27-4-15). Official discourse: genocidal fascist Junta and neo-Nazi western supported ultra-nationalists. Russian history/identity begins in Kyiv and Crimea (Russkiy Mir). Biggest market for natural gas exports, transit route to Europe, 7.5 million ethnic Russians. Note Russian position shift: 2004 Putin states UKR- EU membership (unlike NATO) a ‘positive step’. 2014 Russia hostile, negative, confrontational. UKR as sovereign and independent state free to choose - equality, legitimacy and common European home
against propaganda and demonization of political elites and society by Russia. Post-Yanukovich elite and society focus on ‘European path’, European values and principles. EEU has symbolic political value but no economic sense without Ukraine - Russia has lost Ukraine. ‘Russia without Ukraine is a
2008 2014 2015 2016
Phase 2: Identifying and addressing the ‘Scissors Problem’ – ‘Besieged Fortress Paradigm’ Phase 3:. Putting Air into the Balloon = ‘Besieged Fortress’ charismatic and historical legitimation.
“Air in the Balloon Problem”
Phase 4: Refloating/Replacing an Exhausted Military Patriotic Management Model – after Syria – what’s next? Battle of Narratives in Elite?
Crimea
“Scissors Problem”
Russian Economy
“Great Power Strategic Renovation” – rebalance economy, pivot to Asia, foreign economic partnerships, technological sovereignty = Party of Economy (1-2% growth)
Managing Deflation
2024 “Great Power Besieged Fortress” – external (nuclear) blackmail and internal repression escalation and middle class revolts = Party of War (negative growth)
Mis-managing deflation = collapse “Dividing a Diminishing Cake Problem”
Syria as inflection point?
Issue Statements: Neutral, factual statements …. Putin/Russian Self-Perception: Consolidated state and society, on right side
genius – ‘Russia is strong’ West External Perception: Structural instabilities , personalized power system unsustainable, short term success v long term costs - ‘Russia is weak’
Political system: super presidential system, with weak PM in a technical government; popular electoral autocracy; no alternatives
Power centralized, consolidated, Putin unassailable from within; interventions in Ukraine and Syria enhance Russian power, prosperity and support for political status quo; attractive model to non-western world; nationalism and anti- liberalism pervasive Trapped by polls/popular support, instability if support falls as no alternative; more isolated, imperial nationalist, authoritarian anti-Western populist - fuelled by economic depression; delegitimise elections as vehicle for peaceful change of power; ruling party a transmission belt Economy: in decline: inflation 15%+; 10% real term wage fall/4% GDP decline 2015; 50% rouble devaluation; GDP $2.3tr at peak, now $1.2tr (1998 = $700bn); exports of goods and services decline 40% Aug 2013- Aug 2014; energy sector = 98% corporate profits and 50% state budget revenues 10% cut in government spending but economy stable, investment opportunities, ‘There is no economic crisis in Russia’ (VTB Bank chair); rebalance the economy via import substitution policies and industrial self-reliance (textiles and agricultural sectors grow); forecast inflation fall to 4% by 2017 – ‘worst is over’ (Putin) Natural resource curse (‘Dutch disease’): 70% exports energy but US shale/Saudi Arabia sets global prices; gigantic, inefficient state monopolies; ‘sistema’, corruption, red tape all torpedo structural reform efforts; growth outlook poor – no investment, ‘running economy into the ground’ (Obama); ‘when there is no bread, the circuses have to be extremely interesting’ Military: rapid modernization; DIC growth sector; more high technology; from divisions to brigades; conscript to professional; more combat ready; source of triumphalism and patriotism Deploy with efficiency and speed; pride in polite little green men and nuclear triad; Syria
prowess and utility of increased coercive (hard) power; decisive thrusts to neutralize opponents strengths and exploit weaknesses. Reassessment : no longer a ‘paper tiger’; but military and misinformation tools reflect one dimensional power; spending rise 8.1% of GDP in real terms 2014 – 15% rise 2015 with 60% increase arms procurement but weak R&D; increasing need to justify costs = Syrian quagmire; military overstretch bankrupt USSR – RF? Elite interests: those that run Russia own Russia – rich, young, pragmatic, dynastic – 110 billionaires controlled 35% GDP ($420bn) – largest inequality globally Strategic economic assets under strong managers with vested interest to protect Russian sovereignty; nationalized elites; patriotic; increased competition over power/property Vested interest in avoiding structural economic reform creates long term instability; given up on Perestroika-II; bound to Putin by cynicism, greed, fear, not loyalty or belief; uncertain Putin protect interests National security decision-making: executive: Putin, Pres. Admin., Security Council; secretive informal small groupings;
Duma /MFA explain to the world Strategic surprise: efficient/effective; can pre- empt, counter and pivot quickly - improvisation,
after action to consolidate results/achieve leverage ‘End of world’ survivalist mentality, addicted to extraordinary situations and no rules politics (destabilization and spoiler strategy); short term ad hoc, impulsive, risky; narcissism, personal drama and messaging inner circle/elite that Putin is successful Society: apolitical/apathetic; closed off from elite; relatively free if not political; state controlled media and informational regime – genuine but not deep support Trust in power institutions increase ; ‘the worse the better’ for negative mobilization and consolidation - young and elderly especially super- patriotic ; endurance capacity Negative mobilization v external/internal threats: 5th columnists, foreign agents, national traitors; destroy civil society; disintegration of institutions; demographic decline; health indices poor; creative class ‘brain drain’
Option 1: Negative Sum ‘Status Quo’
Russia’: ‘The worse the better’ – continuity of status quo mobilizes support for regime, makes it stronger - regime ‘anti-fragile’ (vulnerable to tranquility not instability)
– ‘Spoiler power’: make Russia stronger by weakening others (pain threshold is higher and power is relative); – Use maskirovka, TOC and protracted conflicts (5 of 6 in EP) to control and export instability and thereby gain negative spheres
Option 2: Positive Sum ‘Grand Bargain’
Fixed superpower distribution of spheres of influence (Russkiy Mir) where Russia make and break rules; accept a more powerful Russia as guarantor of stability at cost of EU retreat from its values
– Agreement de-escalates instability e.g. Syrian migrants to Europe; Donbass violence and creates positive spheres of influence – EU-Eurasian Economic Union co- equals – “single economic area stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok”.
– Russia to become more assertive/aggressive and unpredictable – ‘perfect storm’ of internal and external factors gathering:
extraordinary situations and survivalist mentality; lack of internal enemies
charge (but trapped by polls); basic clash of interests/divergent strategies
– Refuse and reject: binary either/or proposition of chaos/Yalta-II - short term stability at expense of values and greater long-term instability when
– Revise and realize: ENP to GEO, UKR, MOLD – stability and prosperity a positive sum proposition which can benefit Russia – though likely Russia continues to argue containment, encirclement and confrontation – Re-imagine and respect: audit relationship: how vital energy, economic links? Factor in other markets, other ‘essential partners’ and opportunity costs of focusing on failure; respect Russia’s right to undertake suicidal state-craft