Epistemic Reduction: The Case of Arth apatti Dr. Sara L. Uckelman - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

▶
epistemic reduction the case of arth apatti
SMART_READER_LITE
LIVE PREVIEW

Epistemic Reduction: The Case of Arth apatti Dr. Sara L. Uckelman - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Mar 10, 2023 333 likes •706 views

Epistemic Reduction: The Case of Arth apatti Dr. Sara L. Uckelman s.l.uckelman@durham.ac.uk @SaraLUckelman PhilSoc 30 Oct 18 Dr. Sara L. Uckelman Epistemic Reduction 30 Oct 18 1 / 31 An introduction into Hindu and Buddhist epistemology

slide-1
SLIDE 1

Epistemic Reduction: The Case of Arth¯ apatti

  • Dr. Sara L. Uckelman

s.l.uckelman@durham.ac.uk @SaraLUckelman PhilSoc 30 Oct 18

  • Dr. Sara L. Uckelman

Epistemic Reduction 30 Oct 18 1 / 31

slide-2
SLIDE 2

An introduction into Hindu and Buddhist epistemology

The three questions of epistemology. What do we know? How can we know it? What grounds what we know?

  • Dr. Sara L. Uckelman

Epistemic Reduction 30 Oct 18 2 / 31

slide-3
SLIDE 3

Pram¯ an . as: Means/instruments of knowledge

pratyaks .a (perception) anum¯ an . a (inference) upam¯ an . a (analogy/comparison) śabda (testimony) anupalabdhi (non-perception) arth¯ apatti (postulation) abh¯ ava (awareness of absence) sambhava aithiya . . . others

  • Dr. Sara L. Uckelman

Epistemic Reduction 30 Oct 18 3 / 31

slide-4
SLIDE 4

Different schools accept different pram¯ adnas

pratyaks .a anum¯ an . a śabda upam¯ an . a arth¯ apatti abh¯ ava C¯ arv¯ akas x Buddhists x x Jains x x x Naiy¯ ayikas x x x x Pr¯ abh¯ akaras x x x x x Bh¯ at .t .as x x x x x x

  • Dr. Sara L. Uckelman

Epistemic Reduction 30 Oct 18 4 / 31

slide-5
SLIDE 5

Different schools accept different pram¯ adnas

pratyaks .a anum¯ an . a śabda upam¯ an . a arth¯ apatti abh¯ ava C¯ arv¯ akas x Buddhists x x Jains x x x Naiy¯ ayikas x x x x Pr¯ abh¯ akaras x x x x x Bh¯ at .t .as x x x x x x

  • Dr. Sara L. Uckelman

Epistemic Reduction 30 Oct 18 5 / 31

slide-6
SLIDE 6

What is anum¯ an . a?

Vasubandhu, Buddhist monk, 4th–5th C An anum¯ an . a consists in three parts: a subject (paks .a) two properties (the hetu or ground property and the s¯ adhya or target property) These three parts are arranged into a three-step argument form:

1 thesis (what is to be proven): “p has S”. 2 ground (premise which grounds the thesis): “p has H”. 3 indispensability (the warrant which gets you from the ground to the

thesis): “H pervades S” (or “Whatever has H has S”).

  • Dr. Sara L. Uckelman

Epistemic Reduction 30 Oct 18 6 / 31

slide-7
SLIDE 7

Two examples of anum¯ an . a

Example

1 thesis: This chair has a color. 2 ground: This chair has the color red. 3 warrant: Whatever has the color red has a color.

Example

1 thesis: This chair has a brain. 2 ground: This chair was made in outer space. 3 warrant: Whatever was made in outer space has a brain.

  • Dr. Sara L. Uckelman

Epistemic Reduction 30 Oct 18 7 / 31

slide-8
SLIDE 8

What makes a good anum¯ an . a?

1 The hetu must occur in the paks

.a.

2 The hetu must occur in similar examples, i.e., in examples which have

the s¯ adhya.

3 The hetu must not occur in the dissimilar examples, i.e., ones without

the s¯ adhya.

  • Dr. Sara L. Uckelman

Epistemic Reduction 30 Oct 18 8 / 31

slide-9
SLIDE 9

The developments of Dign¯ aga

Dign¯ aga, Buddhist monk, c480– c540

Example

1 thesis: sound is non-eternal (sound = paks

.a; non-eternal = s¯ adhya).

2 ground: because of resulting from effort ( = hetu). 3 concomitance + example: Whatever results from effort is observed to

be non-eternal, like a pot. (pot = dr .s .t .¯ anta).

  • Dr. Sara L. Uckelman

Epistemic Reduction 30 Oct 18 9 / 31

slide-10
SLIDE 10

Another example

Example

1 thesis: “there is fire on the mountain” (mountain = paks

.a; fire = s¯ adhya).

2 ground: because there is smoke ( = hetu). 3 concomitance + example: Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, like

in a kitchen, unlike in a lake. (kitchen = positive dr .s .t .¯ anta; lake = negative dr .s .t .¯ anta) Dign¯ aga’s account of anum¯ ana was highly influential not only on later Buddhist authors but also on Hindu authors, especially in the Ny¯ aya school.

  • Dr. Sara L. Uckelman

Epistemic Reduction 30 Oct 18 10 / 31

slide-11
SLIDE 11

What is arth¯ apatti?

Usually translated “postulation” or “supposing”.

Definition (Bh¯ as .ya)

Postulation is when something which is seen or heard is incomprehensible

  • therwise, and thus there is a posited object.

Definition

Something is incongruous if it is “the contradiction between two deliverances of knowledge sources”. For example, when specific knowledge is contradicted by general knowledge.

  • Dr. Sara L. Uckelman

Epistemic Reduction 30 Oct 18 11 / 31

slide-12
SLIDE 12

Some examples of arth¯ apatti

Example (Caitra)

Caitra is a very old man, and it is known that very old people do not leave their houses. Yet you go to Caitra’s house, and he is not there! By arth¯ apatti, you conclude that he must be outside. (General knowledge-cognition: Caitra is alive somewhere; specific knowledge-cognition; Caitra is not alive in his house.)

Example (Devadatta)

Devadatta is very fat, and yet he is not observed to eat during the day. By arth¯ apatti, you conclude that he must eat at night.

Example (Door)

Several people are in a room, and a door is open. Someone says “Door! Door!” By arth¯ apatti, you conclude that that person wants the door closed.

  • Dr. Sara L. Uckelman

Epistemic Reduction 30 Oct 18 12 / 31

slide-13
SLIDE 13

Types of arth¯ apatti (1)

Experiential postulation (e.g., Caitra, Devadatta examples) Verbal postulation, “when, in order to establish linguistic connection in an incomplete sentence, words are brought in”. (e.g., “door, door!”)

  • Dr. Sara L. Uckelman

Epistemic Reduction 30 Oct 18 13 / 31

slide-14
SLIDE 14

Types of arth¯ apatti (2)

Experiential postulation can be further divided on the basis of where the experiential component comes from:

1 Postulation because of a perceived referent. 2 Postulation because of an inferred referent. 3 Postulation because of an analogical referent. 4 Postulation because of a postulated referent. 5 Postulation because of a non-present referent. 6 Postulation because of a testimonial referent.

  • Dr. Sara L. Uckelman

Epistemic Reduction 30 Oct 18 14 / 31

slide-15
SLIDE 15

Examples of these six types (1)

Example (Postulation based on perception)

Referent We perceive fire. Inconsistency Fire is concomitant with combustion. Postulation We assume the burning potency of fire.

Example (Postulation based on inference)

Referent The sun changes position. Inconsistency Whatever changes position moves. Postulation We assume the kinetic potency of the sun.

Example (Postulation based on analogy)

Referent Some analogy. Inconsistency “A particular cow qualified by similarity to a particular gayal”. Postulation We assume that potency is apprehensible.

  • Dr. Sara L. Uckelman

Epistemic Reduction 30 Oct 18 15 / 31

slide-16
SLIDE 16

Examples of these six types (2)

Example (Postulation based on (another) postulation)

Referent Testimony has a signifying potency. Inconsistency some referent produced by testimony. Postulation We assume that testimony is permanent.

Example (Postulation based on non-presence)

Referent Caitra is not in his home. Inconsistency Caitra is alive. Postulation We assume that Caitra is outside. (No example of postulation based on testimony given in the text.)

  • Dr. Sara L. Uckelman

Epistemic Reduction 30 Oct 18 16 / 31

slide-17
SLIDE 17

Just what is arth¯ apatti?

Arth¯ apatti is about resolving doubt/inconsistency through the postulation

  • f an unknown truth.
  • Dr. Sara L. Uckelman

Epistemic Reduction 30 Oct 18 17 / 31

slide-18
SLIDE 18

Just what is arth¯ apatti?

Arth¯ apatti is about resolving doubt/inconsistency through the postulation

  • f an unknown truth.

Inference to the best explanation. A method for generating hypotheses. Models of expectations/default reasoning. Epistemic luck? Understanding vs. knowledge.

  • Dr. Sara L. Uckelman

Epistemic Reduction 30 Oct 18 17 / 31

slide-19
SLIDE 19

What is the relationship between anum¯ ana and arth¯ apatti?

Buddhists: Naiy¯ ayikas: M¯ ım¯ am . sakas:

  • Dr. Sara L. Uckelman

Epistemic Reduction 30 Oct 18 18 / 31

slide-20
SLIDE 20

What is the relationship between anum¯ ana and arth¯ apatti?

Buddhists: arth¯ apatti is not a genuine pram¯ an . a. Naiy¯ ayikas: M¯ ım¯ am . sakas:

  • Dr. Sara L. Uckelman

Epistemic Reduction 30 Oct 18 18 / 31

slide-21
SLIDE 21

What is the relationship between anum¯ ana and arth¯ apatti?

Buddhists: arth¯ apatti is not a genuine pram¯ an . a. Naiy¯ ayikas: arth¯ apatti is a genuine pram¯ an . a, but it is not distinct from anum¯ ana. M¯ ım¯ am . sakas:

  • Dr. Sara L. Uckelman

Epistemic Reduction 30 Oct 18 18 / 31

slide-22
SLIDE 22

What is the relationship between anum¯ ana and arth¯ apatti?

Buddhists: arth¯ apatti is not a genuine pram¯ an . a. Naiy¯ ayikas: arth¯ apatti is a genuine pram¯ an . a, but it is not distinct from anum¯ ana. M¯ ım¯ am . sakas: arth¯ apatti is a genuine pram¯ an . a, but it is distinct from anum¯ ana.

  • Dr. Sara L. Uckelman

Epistemic Reduction 30 Oct 18 18 / 31

slide-23
SLIDE 23

Buddhists on arth¯ apatti

Arth¯ apatti cannot ever produce knowledge because: It allows us to get to things that we haven’t yet experienced. For instance, by arth¯ apatti we can postulate fire as the cause of smoke without ever having experienced the concomitance of fire/smoke.

  • Dr. Sara L. Uckelman

Epistemic Reduction 30 Oct 18 19 / 31

slide-24
SLIDE 24

Buddhists on arth¯ apatti

Arth¯ apatti cannot ever produce knowledge because: It allows us to get to things that we haven’t yet experienced. For instance, by arth¯ apatti we can postulate fire as the cause of smoke without ever having experienced the concomitance of fire/smoke. But this is just guesswork!

  • Dr. Sara L. Uckelman

Epistemic Reduction 30 Oct 18 19 / 31

slide-25
SLIDE 25

Naiy¯ ayikas on arth¯ apatti

arth¯ apatti can produce genuine knowledge but: It is not distinct from/is reducible to anum¯ ana.

  • Dr. Sara L. Uckelman

Epistemic Reduction 30 Oct 18 20 / 31

slide-26
SLIDE 26

Reducing arth¯ apatti to anum¯ ana

What does it mean for one pram¯ ana to be reducible to another? Everything you could know by arth¯ apatti you could know by anum¯ ana (but I can’t tell you how). Given a knowledge-cognition produced by arth¯ apatti I have a method by which will generate an anum¯ ana that produces the same knowledge-cognition. Knowledge-cognitions produced by arth¯ apatti and anum¯ ana are simply the same. The instruments themselves (arth¯ apatti and anum¯ ana) are simply the same.

  • Dr. Sara L. Uckelman

Epistemic Reduction 30 Oct 18 21 / 31

slide-27
SLIDE 27

Reductionism in other contexts

Logical: Everything that you can prove in intuitionistic logic I can prove in classical logic. Mathematical: Any mathematical statement can be reduced to a statement about set theory/logic. Mental: The mind is reducible to the body. Scientific: Pain is reducible to synapses firing; heat is reducible to mean molecular motion. In many cases, the reduction follows because of an identity; can also follow because of supervenience.

  • Dr. Sara L. Uckelman

Epistemic Reduction 30 Oct 18 22 / 31

slide-28
SLIDE 28

Epistemic reductionism: What is it?

Oppenheim & Putnam: epistemological reduction is a reduction that is “true in virtue of the meanings of the terms involved”. An epistemological reductionist concerning a science or theory S holds that in fact, we are (or at some point will be) able to reduce S to a more fundamental science [SEP]. This is reductionism of the epistemological outcomes, not the epistemological methods.

  • Dr. Sara L. Uckelman

Epistemic Reduction 30 Oct 18 23 / 31

slide-29
SLIDE 29

Why might we think arth¯ apatti could be reduced?

Back to the Caitra example: If Caitra is alive, he must be somewhere. He is not in the house. Therefore he is outside. This seems like it could be converted into an inference (adding in some extra premises): c → (h ∨ ¬h) c h ∨ ¬h ¬h ¬h

  • Dr. Sara L. Uckelman

Epistemic Reduction 30 Oct 18 24 / 31

slide-30
SLIDE 30

Why might we not think arth¯ apatti could be reduced?

Why do we assume Caitra is outside rather than that he is dead? Prior to grasping that someone is outside, it is not possible to recognize his not being in the house and his being alive as being combined. Because of this uncertainty, anum¯ ana is insufficient to establish that Devadatta is outside; however, one can postulate that he is, and that is how postulation differs from anum¯ ana.

  • Dr. Sara L. Uckelman

Epistemic Reduction 30 Oct 18 25 / 31

slide-31
SLIDE 31

Why arth¯ apatti can’t be anum¯ ana

The inferential causal apparatus—that is, the paks .a—is missing. The probandum (s¯ adhya) is either: Caitra, qualified by an outer presence, or The outer presence, qualified by Caitra The possible inferential signs (hetu) are: Caitra, qualified by absence in the house The house, qualified by absence of Caitra The absence of Caitra in the house The non-perception of Caitra in the house But “none of these is characterized by the property-possessor relation” (§3.6:20), because no pair of s¯ adhya and hetu satisfies the requirements of positive and negative concomitance.

  • Dr. Sara L. Uckelman

Epistemic Reduction 30 Oct 18 26 / 31

slide-32
SLIDE 32

Dead Caitra

Not even the pair “Caitra, qualified by an outer presence” and “Caitra, qualified by absence in the house” satisfies the pervasion requirements; because he could be dead and thus the hetu would be inconclusive. To draw any conclusion about Caitra’s non-presence in the house, we must both know that he is alive (e.g., via testimony), and postulate his presence outside via his absence in the house.

  • Dr. Sara L. Uckelman

Epistemic Reduction 30 Oct 18 27 / 31

slide-33
SLIDE 33

What about Devadatta?

Suppose someone says: “The fat one does not eat during the day”. When we hear this, there is an incongruity. The special cognition ‘eating-at-night’ resolves this incongruity.

  • Dr. Sara L. Uckelman

Epistemic Reduction 30 Oct 18 28 / 31

slide-34
SLIDE 34

Which pram¯ ana generates this special cognition, if not arth¯ apatti?

It is not generated by perception, because “it is beyond the reach of the senses”. It is not generated by inference, because the cognition ‘eating-at-night’ is accessible even without identifying a relevant pervasion relation (which would be required for an inference). We can’t even make sense of how it might be generated by analogy or non-presence.

  • Dr. Sara L. Uckelman

Epistemic Reduction 30 Oct 18 29 / 31

slide-35
SLIDE 35

Which pram¯ ana generates this special cognition?

Therefore it has to be generated from testimony (śabda). However, it can’t be generated by testimony alone, because: A single sentence cannot convey both an assertion and a negation. ‘Night’ is not a part of what is spoken. Given this, ‘eating-at-night’ “is caused by an assumed testimony”. What then is the cause of this assumed testimony? It cannot be perception, because assumed testimony is not manifest, and what is not manifest cannot be perceived. It cannot be an inferential sign because again it is apprehended without pervasion.

  • Dr. Sara L. Uckelman

Epistemic Reduction 30 Oct 18 30 / 31

slide-36
SLIDE 36

So where are we at?

Still work in progress. Hard to extrapolate from three examples. New volume on arth¯ apatti—translated texts, commentaries, and analytical papers—coming out next year.

  • Dr. Sara L. Uckelman

Epistemic Reduction 30 Oct 18 31 / 31