Design for Security Serena Chen | @Sereeena | OReilly Velocity 2018 - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Design for Security Serena Chen | @Sereeena | OReilly Velocity 2018 - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Feb 22, 2024 203 likes •1.34k views

Design for Security Serena Chen | @Sereeena | OReilly Velocity 2018 Usability Security Good user experience design and good security cannot exist without each other Everyone deserves to be secure without being experts We need to

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Design for Security

Serena Chen | @Sereeena | O’Reilly Velocity 2018

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Usability Security

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Good user experience design and good security cannot exist without each

  • ther
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Everyone deserves to be secure without being experts

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We need to stop expecting people to become security experts

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–Everyone not watching Mr Robot right now

“I don’t care about security.”

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–MCGRAW, G., FELTEN, E., AND MACMICHAEL, R. 


Securing Java: getting down to business with mobile code. Wiley Computer Pub., 1999

“Given a choice between dancing pigs and security, the user will pick dancing pigs every time.”

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–Serena Chen, not allowed pets in her apartment

“Given a choice between dancing pigs and security, the user will pick dancing pigs every time.”

CATS CATS

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臘

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Shaming people is lazy

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Obligatory xkcd: https://xkcd.com/149/

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–Everyone not watching Mr Robot right now

“I don’t care about security.”

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–Serena Chen, lone nerd screaming into the void

“I care!!!”

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Design thinking is another tool in the problem solving tool belt

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For your consideration:

1. 2. 3. 4.

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For your consideration:

  • 1. Paths of Least Resistance

2. 3. 4.

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Paths of Least Resistance

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To stop internet, press firmly

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Consider the 
 “secure by default” principle

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Normalise security

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Group similar tasks

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People are lazy efficient

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Align your goals with the end user’s goals

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“I KNOW HOW TO INTERNET”

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“I KNOW HOW TO INTERNET”

—Serena Chen, 
 a Real Human Adult™

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“I KNOW HOW TO INTERNET”

—Serena Chen, 
 a Real Human Adult™

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Path of (Perceived) Least Resistance

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–S. Breznitz and C. Wolf. The psychology of false alarms. 


Lawrence Erbaum Associates, NJ, 1984

“Each false alarm reduces the credibility

  • f a warning system.”
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Anderson et al. How polymorphic warnings reduce habituation in the brain: Insights from an fMRI study. In Proceedings of CHI, 2015

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Shadow IT is a massive vulnerability

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Illustration by Megan Pendergrass

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Fixing bad paths

  • Use security tools for security concerns, not

management concerns

  • If you block enough non-threats, people

will get really good at subverting your security

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Building good paths

  • Don’t make me think!
  • Make the secure path the easiest path
  • e.g. BeyondCorp model at Google
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“We designed our tools so that the user- facing components are clear and easy to

  • use. […] For the vast majority of users,

BeyondCorp is completely invisible.

–V. M. Escobedo, F. Zyzniewski, B. (A. E.) Beyer, M. Saltonstall,

“BeyondCorp: The User Experience”, Login, 2017

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Align your goals with the end user’s goals

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For your consideration:

  • 1. Paths of Least Resistance

2. 3. 4.

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For your consideration:

  • 1. Paths of Least Resistance
  • 2. Intent

3. 4.

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Intent

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Tension between usability and security happens when we cannot accurately determine intent.

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“make it easy” “lock it down”

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It is not our job to make everything easy

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It is not our job to make everything locked down

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Our job is to make a specific action

  • that a specific user wants to take
  • at that specific time
  • in that specific place

…easy Everything else we can lock down.

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Knowing intent = usability and security without compromise

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For your consideration:

  • 1. Paths of Least Resistance
  • 2. Intent

3. 4.

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For your consideration:

  • 1. Paths of Least Resistance
  • 2. Intent
  • 3. (Mis)communication

4.

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(Mis)communication

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Wherever there is a miscommunication, there exists a human security vulnerability.

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What are you unintentionally miscommunicating?

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Wherever there is a miscommunication, there exists a human security vulnerability.

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(I didn’t actually do this)

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https://security.googleblog.com/2018/02/a-secure-web-is-here-to-stay.html

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Do your end users know 
 what you’re trying to communicate?

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What is their mental model

  • f what’s happening,

compared to yours?

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For your consideration:

  • 1. Intent
  • 2. Path of Least Resistance
  • 3. (Mis)communication

4.

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For your consideration:

  • 1. Intent
  • 2. Path of Least Resistance
  • 3. (Mis)communication
  • 4. Mental model matching
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Mental models

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It’s the user’s expectations that define whether a system is secure or not.

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–Ka-Ping Yee, “User Interaction Design for Secure Systems”, 


  • Proc. 4th Int’l Conf. Information and Communications Security, Springer-Verlag, 2002

“A system is secure from a given user’s perspective if the set of actions that each actor can do are bounded by what the user believes it can do.”

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Find their model, match to that Influence their model, match to system

+

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Find their model

  • Go to customer sessions!
  • Observe end users
  • Infer intent through context
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Influence their model

  • When we make, we teach
  • Whenever someone interacts with us / 


a thing we made, they learn.

  • Path of least resistance becomes the default

“way to do things”.

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How are we already influencing users’ models?

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https://krausefx.com/blog/ios-privacy-stealpassword-easily-get-the-users-apple-id-password-just-by-asking

iOS Phish

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What are we teaching?

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“I KNOW HOW TO INTERNET”

—Serena Chen, 
 a Real Human Adult™

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Understand end user mental models

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What are your users’ mental models?

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Review

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Takeaways

  • Cross pollination is rare. This is a missed
  • pportunity!
  • Our jobs are about outcomes based on our

specific goals

  • Align the user’s goals to your security goals
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Takeaways

  • Aim to know their intent
  • Collaborate with design to craft secure

paths of least resistance

  • Understand their mental model vs yours
  • Communicate to that model
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One final anecdote…

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Thanks!

Fight me @Sereeena