Design and Implementation of Equipment for Enhanced Safeguards of a - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Design and Implementation of Equipment for Enhanced Safeguards of a - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Design and Implementation of Equipment for Enhanced Safeguards of a Plutonium Storage in a Reprocessing Plant PuO 2 STORE PROJECT www.jrc.ec.europa.eu The Unattended Combined Measurement System Serving society Stimulating innovation


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www.jrc.ec.europa.eu

Serving society Stimulating innovation Supporting legislation

The Unattended Combined Measurement System

Design and Implementation of Equipment for Enhanced Safeguards of a Plutonium Storage in a Reprocessing Plant

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European Commission Joint Research Centre Institute for Transuranium Elements Nuclear Security Unit – Ispra (It)

  • P. RICHIR, Ph. BUCHET, L. DECHAMP,
  • P. DRANSART, Z. DZBIKOWICZ, P. PEERANI

patrice.richir@jrc.ec.europa.eu

“PuO2 STORE PROJECT”

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IAEA - Oct. 2014 -P. RICHIR

  • Main store can be accessed only in presence of

a DG ENER inspector

  • In the meantime, PuO2 containers are

introduced in channels between the main and the temporary stores

  • Containers are retrieved in presence of the

inspector

EURATOM

N, gamma counters

balance

Creatjng a win-win situatjon:

  • Double laser curtain to distinct entries/exits

and to categorize them (forklift, trolley…)

  • RFID tags and reader to identify duly

authorized pieces of equipment

  • Camera to inspect “sensitive” equipment

before leaving the store

  • Neutron portal monitors

Once the procedure and equipment validated:

Main store can be accessed any time by the Operator

DG ENER manpower requirements drastically reduced

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Double Laser Curtain:

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Event detection  entry or exit  Analyse of normalized profile (parameters, neural network)  Categorization of event  Selection of events of interest for fast review Categorization:

  • Fork Lift Truck
  • FLT + charge block
  • Person
  • Person pushing a trolley
  • Stillage
  • “Others”

Courtesy of Sellafield Ltd.

2 LASER devices When an entry/exit event is completed, a profile and a video sequence are recorded

IAEA - Oct. 2014 -P. RICHIR

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Double Laser Curtain: profile examples

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“2D-profile” of a forklift truck (FLT) and its charge block Reconstructed image from the profile Associated video record “2D-profile” of a stillage Reconstructed image from the profile Associated video record

IAEA - Oct. 2014 -P. RICHIR

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Neutron portal monitors:

Located over the door to access O/N store to detect entry/exit events involving PuO2:

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2 x 3 He-3 tubes of 1 m

Courtesy of Sellafield Ltd.

IAEA - Oct. 2014 -P. RICHIR

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RFID tags and reader:

To automatically identify the authorized pieces of equipment

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Courtesy of Sellafield Ltd.

IAEA - Oct. 2014 -P. RICHIR

When leaving the store, the “sensitive” equipment has to be presented in front of a camera and a neutron counter

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Unattended Combined Measurement System:

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The UCMS and of the Operator PC – monitor used by the production staff to start the measurement

The instrumentation has been designed and characterized (HV, pre-delay, gate width…) at Ispra. For its calibration, DG ENER made use of 20 cans of 4 different batches on the basis of the operator declarations verified by the existing instrumentation

  • r validated by the on-site laboratory measurements.

IAEA - Oct. 2014 -P. RICHIR

Front and side cuts of the UCMS and its instrumentation

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Event, data and video reviewing:

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By selecting an event spotted by the DLC, the Inspector has the possibility to select cameras, to perform direct video reviewing and to visualize other relevant info: neutron count rates, tag IDs… UCMS measurements: the Inspector has the possibility to visualize the can ID and check it with the displayed picture, the weight, the raw neutron counting information and the gamma spectrum via a link

IAEA - Oct. 2014 -P. RICHIR

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Feedback: hardware

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  • Hard disk failures compromising the RAID system. Series effect: all the hard

disks were from the same (non reliable) batch. The hard disks were all replaced  OK

  • The lower hinge of the UCMS door became stiff causing difficulties to open and

to close the door. With the support of the Sellafield workshop, the hinge was dismantled to reposition the ball-bearings which were slightly displaced (transport?)  OK

  • Blockages of the UCMS balance auto calibration system causing the

impossibility to use the whole functionalities of the device. The balance and its interface were replaced  OK

Courtesy of Sellafield Ltd.

Courtesy of Sellafield Ltd.

The UCMS software was modified so that some non-crucial activities can be deactivated remotely from DG ENER Head Quarters to avoid the total blockage of the UCMS. Few hardware problems were encountered during the initial period:

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IAEA - Oct. 2014 -P. RICHIR

By now more than 70 cans from 8 different batches have been measured and the average difference with the Pu declared masses does not exceed 0.5%.

Feedback: measurement performances

Neural network classification testing: out of 2208 entry/exit events, 98.5% were properly classified. None of the events requiring “more attention” was categorized as events requiring “less attention”.