DCS/CSCI 2350 Social & Economic Networks How do behavior, - - PDF document

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DCS/CSCI 2350 Social & Economic Networks How do behavior, - - PDF document

10/28/19 DCS/CSCI 2350 Social & Economic Networks How do behavior, opinion, technology, etc. propagate in a network? Cascading Behavior in Networks Reading: Ch 19 of EK Mohammad T . Irfan 1 Diffusion of innovations u Studied in


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DCS/CSCI 2350 Social & Economic Networks

How do behavior, opinion, technology, etc. propagate in a network? “Cascading Behavior in Networks” Reading: Ch 19 of EK

Mohammad T . Irfan

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Diffusion of innovations

u Studied in sociology since 1940s u One’s choice influences others u Indirect/informational effects – social

learning

u Photo/video going viral

u Direct-benefit effects

u Technology adoption– Xbox/PS4, phone, fax,

email, FB

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Examples

u Adoption of hybrid seed corn in Iowa

u Ryan and Gross, 1943

u Adoption of tetracycline by US doctors

u Coleman, Katz, and Menzel, 1966

u Shared ingredients

u Indirect effects u Adoption was high-risk, high-gain u Early adopters had higher socioeconomic status u Social structure was important– visibility of

neighbors’ activity

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Success factors of diffusion

Diffusion of Innovations– Everett Rogers (1995)

u Complexity u Observability u Trialability u Compatibility

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#TheDress

(February 2015)

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Next

u Modeling diffusion u Connection with the things we know

u Homophily u Clustering u The strength of weak ties

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Threshold models for diffusion

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Precursor– Granovetter's model

u Mark Granovetter's threshold model of

collective behavior (1978)

u Side note: collective behavior vs. collective action

u Model: An individual will adopt action A if at

least a certain number (threshold) of other individuals adopt A

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Granovetter's model

u Example

u Emergence of a riot in a crowd of 100 people

(complete graph)

u Thresholds of individuals to get violent

u 0, 1, 2, ..., 99

u What will happen?

u Extensions

u General network u Distribution of thresholds

u Difference with Schelling's model: In Granovetter's

model, slight change of thresholds may lead to completely different global outcome. Extremely important that someone has a threshold

  • f 0. Why?

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Contagion Model

Stephen Morris, 2000

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Initial adopters

u Facilitates diffusion u Granovetter's model: the persons with

threshold = 0 are the initial adopters vs. We can set initial adopters without any regard for their threshold

u Modeling assumption by Kleinberg & many others

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Example: switching from B to A

u Initially everyone does B u Payoff parameters: b = 2, a = 3 u Threshold for switching from B to A, q = 2/5 u We will set two initial adopters of A and "play

  • ut" the diffusion

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Complete cascade

u Def. A set of initial adopters causes a

"complete cascade" if everyone adopts the new action at the end of diffusion.

u Always happens?

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What are the factors for a widespread diffusion?

u Initial adopters u Network structure u Threshold value q

u Quality of product– payoff parameters a and b

u Example: viral marketing

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Diffusion vs. strength of weak ties

u Weak ties are conveyors of information u But cannot “force” adoption of behavior

Would Align with own community

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Diffusion vs. clustering

u Does clustering help diffusion?

Every node in these clusters have at most 1/3 fraction

  • f friends outside.

Will they ever adopt the new behavior?

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Diffusion vs. clustering

u Assuming a threshold of q, cascade will be

incomplete if and only if there is a cluster of density > 1-q in the “remaining network”

u Cluster density: Largest fraction such that no node in

the cluster has lower than that fraction of neighbors within the cluster

density = 2/3 > 1-q for q = 2/5

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More general models

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Influence games – coming up! (Irfan & Ortiz, 2014)

u Thresholds are heterogeneous u Directed, asymmetric network u Relationships can be positive or negative

(gradation of "influence" is also allowed)

u Switching back and forth two actions are allowed

u Initial adopters or seed nodes

Granovetter: seeds must have threshold 0 Kleinberg: seeds can be externally set (their thresholds don't matter) What can go wrong? We: seeds can be externally set as long as their threshold requirements are fulfilled at the end of diffusion

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