cybersecurity in automotive networks
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CYBERSECURITY IN AUTOMOTIVE NETWORKS A presentation by Sebastian - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

CYBERSECURITY IN AUTOMOTIVE NETWORKS A presentation by Sebastian Wilczek & Arnold Buntsma Supervisor: Colin Schappin RP #51 Context ECUs History New attack vectors 2 How many ECUs does it take to control a modern vehicle? 3


  1. CYBERSECURITY IN AUTOMOTIVE NETWORKS A presentation by Sebastian Wilczek & Arnold Buntsma Supervisor: Colin Schappin RP #51

  2. Context ● ECUs ● History ● New attack vectors 2

  3. How many ECUs does it take to control a modern vehicle? 3

  4. At least seventy! And up to 200. 4

  5. Research Questions Which automotive communication protocols are used in production, forming the ➔ state of practice? What features are built into the protocols utilised in the automotive industry to ➔ provide security? What extensions can introduce security to the protocols? ➔ How do these extensions compare in terms of security, according to the CIA ➔ triad? 5

  6. Related Work Network Standards ➔ Different protocols for vehicle networks Thomas Nolte et al. & Navet et al. Attacks on Protocols ➔ Various attacks on different network types Nilsson et al. & Miller and Valasek Proposed Extension ➔ Introduction of Security Cros and Chênevert & Kurachi et al. 6

  7. Protocols ● CAN ● LIN ● FlexRay ● Ethernet ● MOST 7

  8. Extensions Authentication and Payload CaCAN (Kurachi, R. et al.) ➔ 8 bits for authentication 56 bits for payload Hash Auth CAN (Cros, O. and Chênevert, G) ➔ 24 bits for authentication 40 bits for payload or not CAN-compliant Hash Auth FlexRay ➔ 28 bits for authentication 228 bits for payload 8

  9. Our experiments Simulated in software CANoe ● CAN & FlexRay ● Programmable ECUs ● Hardware experiment (CAN) Arduino Microcontrollers ● CAN Bus ● CAN Shields ● 9

  10. CIA Security CAN CaCAN HashAuth FlexRay FR HashAuth Confidentiality - - - - - - - - - - Integrity + - (CRC) + (8-bit) + + (24-bit) + - (CRC) + + (28-bit) Availability - - - - - + + - 10

  11. 11

  12. Conclusion CAN and FlexRay ➔ Most used in industry Only basic integrity checks ➔ Protocols not designed with security in mind Many proposals for CAN, none ➔ for FlexRay Most behave similar Introduce Authenticity, ➔ Performance impact Change in CIA 12

  13. Discussion Real life ECUs ➔ Only tested on Arduinos Software optimization ➔ Different hashing algorithms Number of extension ➔ Scoped to two proposals FlexRay hardware ➔ Using software only 13

  14. Future Work ● Automotive Ethernet ● Proposals for FlexRay ● ECU Measurements ● Ethical Discussion 14

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