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CYBERSECURITY IN AUTOMOTIVE NETWORKS
A presentation by Sebastian Wilczek & Arnold Buntsma
Supervisor: Colin Schappin RP #51
Context
- ECUs
- History
- New attack vectors
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CYBERSECURITY IN AUTOMOTIVE NETWORKS A presentation by Sebastian - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
CYBERSECURITY IN AUTOMOTIVE NETWORKS A presentation by Sebastian - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
CYBERSECURITY IN AUTOMOTIVE NETWORKS A presentation by Sebastian Wilczek & Arnold Buntsma Supervisor: Colin Schappin RP #51 Context ECUs History New attack vectors 2 How many ECUs does it take to control a modern vehicle? 3
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How many ECUs does it take to control a modern vehicle?
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At least seventy!
And up to 200.
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Research Questions
➔ Which automotive communication protocols are used in production, forming the state of practice? ➔ What features are built into the protocols utilised in the automotive industry to provide security? ➔ What extensions can introduce security to the protocols? ➔ How do these extensions compare in terms of security, according to the CIA triad?
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Related Work
➔ Network Standards
Different protocols for vehicle networks Thomas Nolte et al. & Navet et al.
➔ Attacks on Protocols
Various attacks on different network types Nilsson et al. & Miller and Valasek ➔
Proposed Extension
Introduction of Security Cros and Chênevert & Kurachi et al.
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- CAN
- LIN
- FlexRay
- Ethernet
- MOST
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Protocols
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Extensions
Authentication and Payload
➔ CaCAN (Kurachi, R. et al.)
8 bits for authentication 56 bits for payload
➔ Hash Auth CAN (Cros, O. and Chênevert, G)
24 bits for authentication 40 bits for payload or not CAN-compliant ➔
Hash Auth FlexRay
28 bits for authentication 228 bits for payload
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Our experiments
Simulated in software
- CANoe
- CAN & FlexRay
- Programmable ECUs
Hardware experiment (CAN)
- Arduino Microcontrollers
- CAN Bus
- CAN Shields
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CIA Security
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CAN CaCAN HashAuth FlexRay FR HashAuth Confidentiality
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- -
Integrity + - (CRC) + (8-bit) + + (24-bit) + - (CRC) + + (28-bit) Availability
- -
- -
+ + -
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Conclusion
➔ CAN and FlexRay
Most used in industry
➔ Only basic integrity checks
Protocols not designed with security in mind ➔
Many proposals for CAN, none for FlexRay
Most behave similar
➔ Introduce Authenticity, Performance impact
Change in CIA
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Discussion
➔ Real life ECUs
Only tested on Arduinos
➔ Software optimization
Different hashing algorithms
➔ Number of extension
Scoped to two proposals
➔ FlexRay hardware
Using software only
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- Automotive Ethernet
- Proposals for FlexRay
- ECU Measurements
- Ethical Discussion
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