CS 356 Lecture 29 Wireless Security Spring 2013 Review Chapter - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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CS 356 Lecture 29 Wireless Security Spring 2013 Review Chapter - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

CS 356 Lecture 29 Wireless Security Spring 2013 Review Chapter 1: Basic Concepts and Terminology Chapter 2: Basic Cryptographic Tools Chapter 3 User Authentication Chapter 4 Access Control Lists Chapter 5


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SLIDE 1

CS 356 – Lecture 29 Wireless Security

Spring 2013

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SLIDE 2

Review

  • Chapter 1: Basic Concepts and Terminology
  • Chapter 2: Basic Cryptographic Tools
  • Chapter 3 – User Authentication
  • Chapter 4 – Access Control Lists
  • Chapter 5 – Database Security (skipped)
  • Chapter 6 – Malicious Software
  • Networking Basics (not in book)
  • Chapter 7 – Denial of Service
  • Chapter 8 – Intrusion Detection
  • Chapter 9 – Firewalls and Intrusion Prevention
  • Chapter 10 – Buffer Overflow
  • Chapter 11 – Software Security
  • Chapter 12 – OS Security
  • Chapter 22 – Internet Security Protocols
  • Chapter 23 – Internet Authentication Applications
  • Chapter 24 – Wireless Security
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SLIDE 3

Chapter 24

Wireless Network Security

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SLIDE 4

Wireless Security Overview

  • concerns for wireless security are

similar to those found in a wired environment

  • security requirements are the same:

– confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, accountability

– most significant source of risk is the underlying communications medium

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SLIDE 5

Wireless Networking Components

Figure 24.1 Wireless Networking Components

Endpoint Access point

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SLIDE 6

Wireless Network Threats

accidental association malicious association ad hoc networks nontraditional networks identity theft (MAC spoofing) man-in-the middle attacks denial of service (DoS) network injection

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SLIDE 7

Securing Wireless Transmissions

  • principal threats are eavesdropping,

altering or inserting messages, and disruption

  • countermeasures for eavesdropping:

– signal-hiding techniques – encryption

– the use of encryption and authentication protocols is the standard method of countering attempts to alter

  • r insert transmissions
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SLIDE 8

Securing Wireless Networks

  • the main threat involving wireless access points

is unauthorized access to the network

  • principal approach for preventing such access is

the IEEE 802.1X standard for port-based network access control

– the standard provides an authentication mechanism for devices wishing to attach to a LAN or wireless network

  • use of 802.1X can prevent rogue access points

and other unauthorized devices from becoming insecure backdoors

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SLIDE 9

Wireless Network Security Techniques

use encryption use anti-virus and anti-spyware software and a firewall turn off identifier broadcasting change the identifier on your router from the default change your router’s pre-set password for administration allow only specific computers to access your wireless network

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SLIDE 10

IEEE 802.11 Terminology

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SLIDE 11

Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi) Alliance

  • 802.11b

– first 802.11 standard to gain broad industry acceptance

  • Wireless Ethernet Compatibility Alliance (WECA)

– industry consortium formed in 1999 to address the concern

  • f products from different vendors successfully

interoperating – later renamed the Wi-Fi Alliance

  • term used for certified 802.11b products is Wi-Fi

– has been extended to 802.11g products

  • Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)

– Wi-Fi Alliance certification procedures for IEEE802.11 security standards – WPA2 incorporates all of the features of the IEEE802.11i WLAN security specification

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SLIDE 12

IEEE 802 Protocol Architecture

Figure 24.2 IEEE 802.11 Protocol Stack Logical Link Control Medium Access Control Physical

Encoding/decoding

  • f signals

Bit transmission/ reception Transmission medium Assemble data into frame Addressing Error detection Medium access Flow control Error control General IEEE 802 functions Specific IEEE 802.11 functions Frequency band definition Wireless signal encoding Reliable data delivery Wireless access control protocols

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SLIDE 13

General IEEE 802 MPDU Format

Figure 24.3 General IEEE 802 MPDU Format

MAC Control MAC header MAC trailer Destination MAC Address Source MAC Address MAC Service Data Unit (MSDU) CRC

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SLIDE 14

Figure 24.4 IEEE 802.11 Extended Service Set

STA 2 STA 3 STA4 STA 1 STA 6 STA 7 STA 8 AP 2 AP 1 Basic Service Set (BSS) Basic Service Set (BSS)

Distribution System

IEEE 802.11 Extended Service Set

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SLIDE 15

IEEE 802.11 Services

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SLIDE 16

Distribution of Messages Within a DS

  • the two services involved with the distribution
  • f messages within a DS are:

– distribution – integration

  • the primary service used by stations to exchange MPDUs when

the MPDUs must traverse the DS to get from a station in one BSS to a station in another BSS

distribution

  • enables transfer of data between a station on an IEEE 802.11

LAN and a station on an integrated IEEE 802x LAN

  • service enables transfer of data between a station on an IEEE

802.11 LAN and a station on an integrated IEEE 802.x LAN

integration

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SLIDE 17

Association-Related Services

  • transition types, based on mobility:

– no transition

  • a station of this type is either stationary or moves only within

the direct communication range of the communicating stations of a single BSS

– BSS transition

  • station movement from one BSS to another BSS within the

same ESS; delivery of data to the station requires that the addressing capability be able to recognize the new location

  • f the station

– ESS transition

  • station movement from a BSS in one ESS to a BSS within

another ESS; maintenance of upper-layer connections supported by 802.11 cannot be guaranteed

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SLIDE 18

Services

association

  • establishes an initial

association between a station and an AP

reassociation

  • enables an established

association to be transferred from one AP to another, allowing a mobile station to move from one BSS to another

disassociation

  • a notification from either a

station or an AP that an existing association is terminated

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SLIDE 19

Wireless LAN Security

  • Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) algorithm

– 802.11 privacy

  • Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)

– set of security mechanisms that eliminates most 802.11 security issues and was based on the current state of the 802.11i standard

  • Robust Security Network (RSN)

– final form of the 802.11i standard

– Wi-Fi Alliance certifies vendors in compliance with the full 802.11i specification under the WPA2 program

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SLIDE 20

Elements

  • f

IEEE 802.11i

Access Control Services Protocols Services Algorithms IEEE 802.1 Port-based Access Control Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Authentication and Key Generation (a) Services and Protocols

Figure 24.5 Elements of IEEE 802.11i

Confidentiality, Data Origin Authentication and Integrity and Replay Protection TKIP CCMP Robust Security Network (RSN) Confidentiality

TKIP (Michael MIC) CCM (AES- CBC- MAC) CCM (AES- CTR) NIST Key Wrap HMAC- MD5 HMAC- SHA-1

Integrity and Data Origin Authentication (b) Cryptographic Algorithms Key Generation

TKIP (RC4)

Robust Security Network (RSN)

HMAC- SHA-1 RFC 1750 CBC-MAC = Cipher Block Block Chaining Message Authentication Code (MAC) CCM = Counter Mode with Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code CCMP = Counter Mode with Cipher Block Chaining MAC Protocol TKIP = Temporal Key Integrity Protocol

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SLIDE 21

IEEE 802.11i Phases

  • f

Operation

Phase 1 - Discovery STA AP

Figure 24.6 IEEE 802.11i Phases of Operation

AS End Station Phase 5 - Connection Termination Phase 3 - Key Management Phase 4 - Protected Data Transfer Phase 2 - Authentication

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SLIDE 22

IEEE 802.11i Phases

  • f

Operation

STA AP

Figure 24.7 IEEE 802.11i Phases of Operation: Capability Discovery, Authentication, and Association

AS Probe request Station sends a request to join network AP sends possible security parameter (security capabilties set per the security policy) AP performs null authentication AP sends the associated security parameters Station sends a request to perform null authentication Station sends a request to associate with AP with security parameters Station sets selected security parameters Open system authentication request Probe response 802.1x EAP request Access request (EAP request) 802.1x EAP response Accept/EAP-success key material 802.1x EAP success Association request Association response Open system authentication response 802.1X controlled port blocked 802.1X controlled port blocked Extensible Authentication Protocol Exchange

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SLIDE 23

802.1X Access Control

Figure 24.8 802.1X Access Control

Station Access point Uncontrolled port Controlled port Controlled port To DS To other wireless stations

  • n this BSS

Authentication server

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SLIDE 24

MPDU Exchange

  • authentication phase consists of three phases:

– connect to AS

  • the STA sends a request to its AP that it has an

association with for connection to the AS; the AP acknowledges this request and sends an access request to the AS

– EAP exchange

  • authenticates the STA and AS to each other

– secure key delivery

  • once authentication is established, the AS generates a

master session key and sends it to the STA

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SLIDE 25

IEEE 802.11i Key Hierarchies

Figure 24.9 IEEE 802.11i Key Hierarchies

Out-of-band path EAP method path Pre-shared key EAPOL key confirmation key EAPOL key encryption key Temporal key

PSK 256 bits 384 bits (CCMP) 512 bits (TKIP) 128 bits (CCMP) 256 bits (TKIP) 40 bits, 104 bits (WEP) 128 bits (CCMP) 256 bits (TKIP) 256 bits 128 bits No modification Legend Possible truncation PRF (pseudo-random function) using HMAC-SHA-1 128 bits User-defined cryptoid EAP authentication following EAP authentication

  • r PSK

During 4-way handshake These keys are components of the PTK !"#$%&'() PMK KCK

PTK

KEK TK AAAK or MSK

Pairwise master key (b) Group key hierarchy (a) Pairwise key hierarchy AAA key Pairwise transient key

256 bits Changes periodically

  • r if compromised

Changes based on policy (disassociation, deauthentication) GMK (generated by AS) GTK

Group master key Group temporal key

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SLIDE 26

IEEE 802.11i Keys for Data Confidentiality and Integrity Protocols

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SLIDE 27

Phases of Operation

STA AP

Figure 24.10 IEEE 802.11i Phases of Operation: Four-Way Handshake and Group Key Handshake

Message 1 delivers a nonce to the STA so that it can generate the PTK. Message 1 delivers a new GTK to the STA. The GTK is encrypted before it is sent and the entire message is integrity protected The AP installs the GTK. Message 3 demonstrates to the STA that the authenticator is alive, ensures that the PTK is fresh (new) and that there is no man-in-the-middle. Message 2 delivers another nonce to the AP so that it can also generate the

  • PTK. It demonstrates to the AP that

the STA is alive, ensures that the PTK is fresh (new) and that there is no man-in-the-middle The STA decrypts the GTK and installs it for use. Message 2 is delivered to the

  • AP. This frame serves only as

an acknowledgment to the AP. Message 4 serves as an acknowledgement to Message 3. It serves no cryptographic

  • function. This message also ensures the

reliable start of the group key handshake. Message 2 EAPOL-key (Snonce, Unicast, MIC) Message 1 EAPOL-key (Anonce, Unicast) Message 1 EAPOL-key (GTK, MIC) Message 4 EAPOL-key (Unicast, MIC) Message 2 EAPOL-key (MIC) Message 3 EAPOL-key (Install PTK, Unicast, MIC) AP’s 802.1X controlled port blocked AP’s 802.1X controlled port unblocked for unicast traffic

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SLIDE 28

Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP)

  • designed to require only software changes to devices

that are implemented with the older wireless LAN security approach called WEP

  • provides two

services: message integrity

adds a message integrity code to the 802.11 MAC frame after the data field

data confidentiality

provided by encrypting the MPDU

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SLIDE 29

Pseudorandom Function

Figure 24.11 IEEE 802.11i Pseudorandom Function HMAC-SHA-1 | | K A B i R = HMAC-SHA-1(K, A || 0 || B || i) + 1

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SLIDE 30

Summary

  • wireless security
  • verview

– wireless network threats – wireless security measure

– IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN

  • verview

– Wi-Fi alliance – IEEE 802 protocol architecture – IEEE 802.11 network components and architectural model – IEEE 802.11 services

l IEEE 802.11i l IEEE 802.11i Services l IEEE 802.11i Phases of

Operation

l Discovery Phase l Authentication Phase l Key Management Phase l Protected Data Transfer

Phase

l the IEEE 802.11i

Pseudorandom Function