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Crowd-sourcing CyberSecurity through the REN- ISAC Community Chris ODonnell REN-ISAC Background MISSION Overall serve the Research and Higher Education space and promote operational security CSIRT Role Operate a trusted


  1. Crowd-sourcing CyberSecurity through the REN- ISAC Community Chris O’Donnell

  2. REN-ISAC Background

  3. MISSION ● Overall – serve the Research and Higher Education space and promote operational security ● CSIRT Role ● Operate a trusted community ● Work with other ISACs and others external parties

  4. FACTS AND FIGURES ▪ Hosted at Indiana University ▪ Board of Directors ▪ Advisory groups ▪ Ad hoc special interest groups and projects ▪ Over 500 member institutions and over 1600 member representatives

  5. Threat Landscape

  6. INFOSEC IS #1 IT ISSUE IN HIGHER ED, 2016 * AND AGAIN IN 2017* * Educause Top 10 IT Issues 2016 and 2017

  7. THREAT TRENDS § Motive? § The threat actor is external to the organization § Time to compromise is < one hour § Time to discover a breach occurred > than one day

  8. 90 85 80 82 76 70 60 62 60 57 50 51 47 40 30 33 20 22 19 16 10 0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 DATA BREACHES IN HIGHER EDUCATION Source: Privacy Rights Clearinghouse

  9. WHERE IS EDUCATION ON THE LIST?

  10. SENSITIVE DATA BREACHES

  11. RANSOMWARE

  12. What Are You Doing to Mitigate the Risk of Ransomware? (N=27) Increasing employee education and awareness efforts 19 (70%) Tightening spam filters on email systems 11 (41%) Accelerating the institutions move to cloud storage 1 (4%) Reminding system administrators to verify/test backups, check schedules 9 (33%) Updating institutional policies / standards 2 (7%) RECENT SURVEY RESULTS

  13. MOBILE § Mobile use is increasing § Lots of older unpatched OSes § 3 rd party app stores § Malicious apps on primary app stores

  14. INSIDER THREAT

  15. PHISHING § Primary attack vector for online crime § Spear-phishing / Whaling

  16. RECENT SURVEY RESULTS

  17. DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS „ Amplification via vulnerable protocols, e.g. NTP „ Increasing use of Internet connected devices (IoT)

  18. DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS

  19. COMPROMISED CREDENTIALS

  20. Crowdsourcing Cybersecurity Through the REN-ISAC Community

  21. RELATIONSHIPS § Sector ISAC § Members § 3 rd Parties

  22. CONCERNS

  23. How do we help?

  24. CSIRT for EDU Space

  25. REN-ISAC CSIRT Activity, YTD 2016 Notifications Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Compromised machines 23,943 16,911 13,589 12,661 Compromised credentials 13,162 1,037,881 5,094 1,141,653 Spam or Phish 117 86 111 1,995 Vulnerable machines 1 39 2 11 Open recursive DNS resolvers 793 713 607 655 Open mail relays 52 25 37 34 Other 1 3 5 1 Totals 38,069 1,055,658 19,445 1,157,010 SOC ACTIVITY – MOSTLY AUTOMATED

  26. REN-ISAC SOC Activity, YTD 2016 Notifications Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Notification Questions 429 626 278 194 Password resets 105 100 75 60 Notifications 51 21 50 38 Other 177 627 477 371 Totals 762 1,374 880 663 Non-interactive tickets 2,060 2,611 3,302 3,026 SOC ACTIVITY - MANUAL

  27. SHARING INTEL

  28. ALERTS, ADVISORIES, AND REPORTS § Advisories on various threats § Daily Watch

  29. COMMUNITY SHARING § Community of trusted cybersecurity staff at R&E member institutions § Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability § Sharing actionable intel for operational protection and response

  30. CIF/SES AUTOMATED THREAT INTELLIGENCE

  31. PASSIVE DNS – WHAT?

  32. My University authoritative ` ` DNS server example.com’s authoritative Global DNS DNS server recursive caching DNS www.example.com server request to resolve www.example.com Global Internet visit www.my.edu

  33. My University authoritative ` ` DNS server example.com’s authoritative where is the DNS server authoritative for example.com? recursive caching DNS www.example.com server Global Internet visit www.my.edu

  34. My University authoritative ` ` DNS server example.com’s authoritative DNS server response recursive caching DNS www.example.com server Global Internet visit www.my.edu

  35. My University authoritative ` ` DNS server example.com’s authoritative Global DNS DNS server query recursive caching DNS www.example.com server Global Internet visit www.my.edu

  36. My University authoritative ` ` DNS server example.com’s authoritative Global DNS DNS server recursive caching response DNS www.example.com server Global Internet visit www.my.edu

  37. My University authoritative ` ` DNS server example.com’s authoritative Global DNS DNS server recursive caching DNS www.example.com server response Global Internet visit www.my.edu

  38. My University authoritative ` ` DNS server example.com’s authoritative Global DNS DNS server recursive caching DNS www.example.com server Whee! Global Internet visit www.my.edu

  39. PASSIVE DNS – WHY?

  40. EDUCATION ▪ Techbursts ▪ Wikis

  41. FUTURE (NOW) THREAT VECTORS ▪ Automated Access Controls ▪ Industrial Control Systems ▪ Internet of Things

  42. Wrap up….

  43. QUESTIONS?

  44. „ REN-ISAC „ http://ren-isac.net „ soc@ren-isac.net „ (317) 274-7228

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