Conjectural Variations and General Oligopoly Equilibria Ludovic J - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

conjectural variations and general oligopoly equilibria
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Conjectural Variations and General Oligopoly Equilibria Ludovic J - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Conjectural Variations and General Oligopoly Equilibria Ludovic J ULIEN Introduction Motivations : (i) - Modelling expectations in GE under strategic interactions (ii) - Asymmetries in GE under SI (iii) - Foundations of perfect competition


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SLIDE 1

Conjectural Variations and General Oligopoly Equilibria

Ludovic JULIEN

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SLIDE 2

Introduction

  • Motivations:

(i) - Modelling expectations in GE under strategic

interactions (ii) - Asymmetries in GE under SI (iii) - Foundations of perfect competition (Arrow (1959), Debreu (1959)) Today (iii): Can we deduce PC from an IC framework?

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SLIDE 3
  • 1. Introduction (suite)
  • 1. Atomic approach (Aumann (1964)),
  • 2. Asymptotic approach (Codognato-Gabszewicz (1991), (1993) and

Gabzewicz-Vial (1972)),

  • 3. Game-Theoretic approach (Postlewaite-Roberts (1976), Gale (2000)).
  • Casting conjectural variations into GE
  • Idea of CV: to take into account the perceptions of each individual about his

rivals’ responses to a change in his own individual decision (Bowley (1924), Figuières et al. (2004), Julien (2006)).

  • + Locally constant conjectures (Perry (1982), Julien (2008)),
  • Idea today: intregation of CV in the asymptotic approach.
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SLIDE 4
  • 2. The model
  • Pure exchange economy:
  • L divisible goods
  • H agents, indexed h,
  • Preferences:
  • Endowments:

∏ =

= = L h h

x x U

l l l

l

1

) (

α

H h ,..., 1 = L ,..., 1 = l ) 1 , ( ∈ α ) ,..., 1 ,..., ( =

h

ω

l l

n n h ,..., 1

1 +

=

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SLIDE 5

The economy (suite)

  • Strategy sets:
  • Beliefs:

DEFINITION 1. An economy is a collection .

{ }

1 : ≤ ≤ =

l l l h h h

s s S

l l l

ν = ∂ ∂ ∑

≠ − − h h h h

s s

l l

n n h ,..., 1

1 +

=

{ }

L H h h h h

v X

,..., 1 ,..., 1

, ), ( ,

= =

=

l l l

f ω ξ

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SLIDE 6

The economy (suite)

  • DEFINITION 2. A CVGE for is given by a

vector of strategies an allocation and a vector of conjectural variations such that: (i) (ii) (iii)

( ) { }

l l l

f ν ω ξ , , , ,

h h h h

S X =

) ~ ,..., ~ ,..., ~ ( 11

HL h

s s s

l

HL

IR x

+

∈ ~

) ,..., ,..., ( 1

L

ν ν ν ν

l

=

h s s x x

h h h h

∀ =

)), ( ~ ), ( ~ (( ~

l l l l

ν ν

l

l l l l l

∀ = ∑

, )) ~ ( ~ ), ~ ( ~ ( ~

h h h h h

s s s p x ω h s s p x U s s s p x U

h h h h h h h h h

∀ ≥

− −

))), ( ~ ), ( , ( ( ))) ( ~ ), ( ~ )), ( ~ ( ~ ( ~ (

l l l l l l l l l l

ν ν ν ν ν

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SLIDE 7
  • 3. Market prices and strategic plans
  • Market clearing prices:
  • Strategic plans:

= ≠ = − − − −

⎭ ⎬ ⎫ ⎩ ⎨ ⎧ − − + − ⎟ ⎟ ⎠ ⎞ ⎜ ⎜ ⎝ ⎛ −

L k k k h h h h k k

s n n s s s s Arg

k

l l l l l l l l

l l l

1 1 1 1

] ) 1 ( [ ) ( ) 1 ( 1 max

α α α α

α α

∑ ∑

− − = ⎟ ⎟ ⎠ ⎞ ⎜ ⎜ ⎝ ⎛

h h h hk k k k

s s p p

l l l l

) 1 ( ) 1 ( α α α α

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SLIDE 8
  • 4. Equilibrium strategies & allocations

) 1 )( 1 ( )] 1 ( )[ 1 ( ~

1 1 l l l l l l l l l

ν α ν α + − − − + − − − =

− −

n n n n sh ) 1 )( 1 ( ) ( ~

1 1 l l l l l l l l

ν α α + − − − − =

− −

n n n n xh )] 1 )( 1 ( )[ )[ ( )] 1 ( )[ )( 1 ( ~

1 1 1 1 1 k k k k k k k k k k k k hk

n n n n n n n n n n x ν α α ν α α + − − − − − + − − − − =

− − − − − l l l l

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SLIDE 9
  • 5. Main results

PROPOSITION 1. When

the conjectural general equilibrium coincides with the competitive equilibrium. No replication procedure or asymptotic identification.

l

l

∀ − = , 1 ν

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SLIDE 10

Main results (suite)

DEFINITION 3. A locally consistent CGE for is a CGE for the vector of conjectures such that if is solution to then: PROPOSITION 2. The Competitive equilibrium is a locally consistent conjectural general equilibrium. ξ

) ,..., ,..., ( 1

L

ν ν ν ν

l

= ) ~ ,..., ~ ,..., ~ ( 11

HL h

s s s

l

h h

V Arg s max ∈

l

. , ) , ~ ( l

l l l l l

∀ = ∂ ∂∑

≠ − −

ν ν

h h h h h

s s s

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SLIDE 11

Perspectives

Asymmetries in GE under strategic interactions Generalization with functional forms Learning Economic Policy