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Changes in Aviation Organisations: Perspective and retrospective - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Changes in Aviation Organisations: Perspective and retrospective assessment for a medium size Airline P.C. Cacciabue 1 , M. Cassani 1 , I. Oddone 2 , A. Ottomaniello 2 1 KITE Solutions, Laveno Mombello (VA), Italy 2 Air Dolomiti, Safety


  1. Changes in Aviation Organisations: Perspective and retrospective assessment for a medium size Airline P.C. Cacciabue 1 , M. Cassani 1 , I. Oddone 2 , A. Ottomaniello 2 1 KITE Solutions, Laveno Mombello (VA), Italy 2 Air Dolomiti, Safety Department, Dossobuono di Villafranca, Verona, Italy 3 rd SID - 26th - 28th November 2013, Stockholm, Sweden Page 1/18

  2. Summary 1. SMS & Risk Assessment 2. Change Management Methodologies for Risk Assessment 3. Standard techniques utilised and modern methods 4. Three Case studies 3 rd SID - 26th - 28th November 2013, Stockholm, Sweden Page 2/18

  3. SMS & Risk Assessment ICAO, FAA, EASA and EC included the implementation of SMS in their strategic plans => All CAA and national organisations “have” to implement it in their everyday life SMS requires: 1. move from the concept of deterministic safety assessment 2. face risks of credible events in a probabilistic perspective. 3 rd SID - 26th - 28th November 2013, Stockholm, Sweden Page 3/18

  4. SMS & Risk Assessment Key issue in addition to standard risk analysis  Management of Change: Ability to tackle new situations in a risk based perspective MASCA (MAnaging System Change in Aviation) EU Funded Project during the 7th Framework Programme Risk Assessment Methodology for Company Operational Processes (RAMCOP) 3 rd SID - 26th - 28th November 2013, Stockholm, Sweden Page 4/18

  5. Risk Assessment for Managing Changes in Operational Processes (RAMCOP). 3 rd SID - 26th - 28th November 2013, Stockholm, Sweden Page 5/18

  6. 3 rd SID - 26th - 28th November 2013, Stockholm, Sweden Page 6/18

  7. To perform standard risk analysis is complex and time demanding 2. Available methods and reference Risk Matrix Reliability assessment Deterministic Risk Matrix (probabilities evaluation) assessment Define reference probabilities Quantify severity and values if p occ. ≤ p min then disregard occurrence from RA If Severity occ = Negligible then disregard occur. from RA 3 rd SID - 26th - 28th November 2013, Stockholm, Sweden Page 7/18

  8. Methodologies for RA Problem To perform standard risk analysis is complex and time demanding (e.g., dynamic nature of CM) Solution Recent methodologies, e.g., ARMS, too focused on Expert Judgement Risk Adapting p values or power of barriers to needed result 3 rd SID - 26th - 28th November 2013, Stockholm, Sweden Page 8/18

  9. Methodologies for RA Measures Variable use of different methods (EJ, FT, ET HRA etc.) in relation to:  Availability of data sources  Relevance of issue being tackled  Available expert information  Availability of structured/computerised tool  Requested accuracy in hazard and risk evaluation Major issue: Combination of Prospective and Retrospective analysis => validation of assessed hazards 3 rd SID - 26th - 28th November 2013, Stockholm, Sweden Page 9/18

  10. 3 rd SID - 26th - 28th November 2013, Stockholm, Sweden Page 10/18

  11. OVERALL RISK TABLE (ORAT) Phase 1 Phase 2 Threats Hazard Incident sequence Existing control Outcome UOS description (Pre-Mitigation) and probability Consequences Prob. without Description Prob. Description Prob. Barriers Severity Probab. Risk control reduction Description of α barr.1 threath 1 p th1 Cons. 1 p cons.1 /p UOS Barrier 1 A S cons.1 p cons.1 = f ( α , p cons.1 ) R cons.1 UOS and α barr.2 threath 2 p th2 Cons. 2 p cons.2 /p UOS Barrier 2 S cons.2 p cons.2 = f ( α , p cons.2 ) R cons.2 A calculation of α barr.3 threath 3 p th3 Cons. 3 p cons.3 /p UOS Barrier 3 S cons.3 p cons.3 = f ( α , p cons.3 ) R cons.3 A p UOS as a α barr.i threath i p thi Cons. i p cons.i /p UOS Barrier i p cons.i = f ( α , p cons.i ) A function of p thr. S cons.i R cons.i …… …… p UOS = f(p i ) ……….. …….. ……. …… …… ………. ……… …… …… ……….. …… …… ……… ….. ………. ………. Phase 3 e Add. Mitigation Outcome Actions & Monitoring & tion) required (Post-Mitigation) owners Review req. Type of Type of barr. Risk Severity Probab. Risk Barriers Reduction Describe actions that Describe monitoring β add. barr.1 Add. Barrier 1 p cons.1 ns.1 ) R cons.1 S cons.1 R cons.1 are planned for and auditing activity Add. Barrier 2 β add. barr.2 mitigating risk and and means of ns.2 ) R cons.2 S cons.2 p cons.2 R cons.2 identify teh actorrs complience with β add. barr.3 ns.3 ) R cons.3 Add. Barrier 3 S cons.3 p cons.3 R cons.3 involved ("who should assigned actions ("how do what") and what to monitor") Add. Barrier i β add. barr.i p cons.i ns.i ) R cons.i S cons.i R cons.i ……. …… ……… …… ……… ……… 3 rd SID - 26th - 28th November 2013, Stockholm, Sweden Page 11/18 …… …… ………. ….. ………. ……….

  12. Specific elements of AD SMS The Risk Matrix 3 rd SID - 26th - 28th November 2013, Stockholm, Sweden Page 12/18

  13. 3 Case Studies The problem of flights in airspace contaminated by volcanic ash Implementation in the Embraer 195 family of the EFB: Assessing HF risks associated to the change Change in a company fleet with reduction of crews and redundancies 3 rd SID - 26th - 28th November 2013, Stockholm, Sweden Page 13/18

  14. ORAT TABLE FOR EFB CASE 3 rd SID - 26th - 28th November 2013, Stockholm, Sweden Page 14/18

  15. RM FOR EFB CASE Severity Level Probability S5 S4 S3 S2 S1 S0 Level Extreme High Medium Low Minor None P5 Frequent P4 Likely P3 1, 3 Possible P2 15 Low P1 16 10 Unlikely P0 6, 12 Remote 7, 9, 13, 2, 4, 5, Pe Extr. Remote 14 8, 11 3 rd SID - 26th - 28th November 2013, Stockholm, Sweden Page 15/18

  16. RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS FOR REDUCTION OF CREWS Field observations: 1 &2 are related to behaviour vs crew and passengers; 3,4&5 behaviours towards flights such as the sterile cockpit; 6 & 7 concern the attitude toward the company and 8 is indicate the program to fuel saving recently introduced 3 rd SID - 26th - 28th November 2013, Stockholm, Sweden Page 16/18

  17. Conclusions 1. The basic Methodologies for Risk Assessment able to deal with Change Management exist and can be found in the variety mature and established tools 2. New methods are always possible aimed at improving results and knowledge (e.g. simulation based methods, advanced approaches combining models and hazard assessment) 3. The implementation of the practical approaches utilised can be expanded to handle the analysis and assessment required by the formal National Safety Plan of all European Authorities 3 rd SID - 26th - 28th November 2013, Stockholm, Sweden Page 17/18

  18. Thank you for your attention 3 rd SID - 26th - 28th November 2013, Stockholm, Sweden Page 18/18

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