by Mizan R. Khan, Ph.D Professor, Dept of Env Science & Mgt - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Politics of Adaptation in the UNFCCC Negotiations – How to Change the Discourse!

by

Mizan R. Khan, Ph.D Professor, Dept of Env Science & Mgt Professor, Dept of Env Science & Mgt North South University, Dhaka mizanrk@northsouth.edu Gobeshona, NSU, 22 July 2014

Adaptation remains weak in the Climate Regime

• Beginning as an `afterthought’ in the Convention, adaptation moves

gradually onto the center stage since 2001, due mainly to non- mitigation & increasing climate disasters in recent years

• But adaptation regime lacks coherence & its legal basis continues to

remain weak; Provisions are there (Articles 3 & 4), but their subjective interpretations, thanks to `ambiguity’ in provisions intentionally constructed by Parties is holding the regime back intentionally constructed by Parties is holding the regime back

• Even the elements of the `Cancun Adaptation Framework’ including

its support program have no compulsive basis for compliance

• This weakness is reflected in extremely poor funding for adaptation
• This warrants a reframing of adaptation as a concern of universal

benefit, that commands a robust global responsibility

• I plan to share the central ideas of my book which seeks to change the

debate over adaptation in the UNFCCC negotiations

Reframing the Adaptation Framework

My Book is a pioneer attempt at answering 3 Questions: When mitigation is regarded as a Global Public Good (GPG), why are climate change impacts resulting from under supply of mitigation not recognized as a Public Bad? Hence, addressing the impacts through adaptation as a GPG? If the provision of local or national public good is not left to voluntary initiatives or market forces, why should adaptation by voluntary initiatives or market forces, why should adaptation by the poor, innocent victims be left to non-binding, voluntary contributions? If these two questions sound as rational, deserving a just treatment, then the question is: How can such a reframing of adaptation be articulated and translated into reality? My cerebral process was guided by Einstein’s advice: “No problem can be solved with the same level of consciousness that created it”

My Argument for Reframing

• The very foundation of the CC regime , i.e. Neo-liberalism &

market system inhere my proposed solution – through their application in letter & spirit But the diabolically complex political economy of CC raises a `moral storm’ due to some `theoretical ineptitude’ by major emitters in understanding CC emitters in understanding CC The neo-classical conception of `public good’ was national territory based, & so, it warrants an extra-territorial expansion in an era of Global Commons problems like climate change So an expanded interpretation of PGs and the means of its practical application form the core of my Book

Adaptation Benefits – Expanded View

Local private benefits Local/ national public benefits Direct global benefits Indirect global benefits Value of saved crops

Flood-proofed infrastructure; Afforestation Control of climate-sensitive infectious Continuation of statehood by many SIDS;

saved crops for individual farmers; Improved water storage for households

Afforestation preventing mudslides; Coastal afforestation as wind and flood breaks; Build water storage infectious diseases; Protection of climate-sensitive biodiversity; Agricultural research on flood-and saline resistant crops SIDS; Avoided international migration; Lower price volatility on climate-sensitive agricultural products; Enhanced purchasing power among the > 100 PVCs & communities

The purpose is to show a mutuality of interests with ICs in promoting adaptation

Reframing of Adaptation

A frame-bridging from theories of Int’l Relations:

Realism agrees for cooperation in adaptation only if it promotes national interest/power; Neorealists look at climate vulnerability as potential for pol & econ instability, migration & insecurity Liberalism/Neoliberalism: CC as threats to global econ, trade & security; financing adaptation will induce DCs to embrace mitigation, but adaptation is a poor candidate for market solution Regime theory looks at the UNFCCC Parties as central to solution, with overwhelming focus on mitigation Ecological Justice/Pol Ecology brings in ethical/moral optics to CC, with application of the `Global Commons’ concept Constructivism: ideas are shaped & constructed by lived experiences, new norms/values, & these are used by some

countries as new currency of national power

So a fusion of ideas, with Constructivism as my compass

A Band-wagoning with 3 Levers – to raise Adaptation onto a Higher Plane

First, double exposure of the PVCs numbering well over 100 UNFCCC Parties simultaneously to CC and uneven globalization make them double losers:

CCIs are undoing their dev efforts, condemning them to mend on their own the loss & sufferings imposed by others Continued financial crisis due to `financial globalization’ contributes to declining terms of trade,, reducing ODA & the PVCs’ income/remittance, rising unemployment, & thus, further impoverishing their econ

But strengthening adaptive capacity including econ resilience & diversification for sustaining their trade potential will contribute to stability in the global trade and financial regimes

Second, Nexus between CC & Security

Third, A Logical Marriage bet CC & Human Rights

CCIs violate vital/basic & protected human rights – loss of life is the highest form of harm, against the non-vital/non-basic rights of consumptive life The `no harm’ principle, widely recognized for long as a customary right, now codified in legal regimes of industrial countries - EU leads in this process This `no harm’ rule has been included in the Stockholm & Rio Declarations, UNCLOS-III and many other Int’l & Regional agreements UNCLOS-III and many other Int’l & Regional agreements They also have provisions of State responsibility for harm inflicted beyond

• ne’s border

The AOSIS invokes the principle of State responsibility for causing CC & hence the mechanisms of liability & compensation due to L&D Para 8 of Preamble of the Cancun Agreements recognizes this link & many Parties already are making interventions explicating this link

Effecting Adaptation as a Binding Responsibility

Polluter-Pays-Principle originated as an econ principle, both in Western & Eastern societies (Plato & Kautiliya); later it evolved as an ethical & now evolving as a legal principle OECD countries apply it in many forms as internalization of externality: EU codified PPP, not the US yet; but the US applies it under its many env legislations (Ex. the Superfund Act of 1980) Many DCs are also applying it in varied forms including the govt-PP Many DCs are also applying it in varied forms including the govt-PP Then why not its global application, when the CC regime itself is founded on the neoliberal market philosophy (Articles 3.3 & 3.5) Here lies the `moral storm’ & `theoretical ineptitude’: A truncated application goes against efficiency & cost effectiveness (the very rationale of KP market mechs) However, a poverty-sensitive application of PPP by major DC emitters for some grace period, as in the Ozone Regime

Effecting .. a Binding Responsibility through L&D

Back in 1991, AOSIS proposed for inclusion of a compensation mech in the CC regime, but Art 4.8 included only `insurance’.. UNFCCC provides a legal basis to claim support for L&D under Article 4.4, but it suffers from ambiguity & lack of teeth The Agenda of L&D agreed after long 20 yrs is argued to be the result

• f the following factors:

Increasing frequency, severity & magnitude of CC disasters in recent yrs Increasing frequency, severity & magnitude of CC disasters in recent yrs Utter lack of progress in mitigation regime Yawning gap in adaptation finance The potential of L&D agenda in germinating mechanisms of liability & compensation, & Appreciation by the ICs & corporations that a negotiated settlement might prove better & cheaper than lengthy court-based adjudications, & Realization by the DCs (as of now) of the difficulty of proving specific causation to specific CCIs, though initiatives are there (SLR, thawing of permafrost), in addition to general causation, agreed universally (IPCC)

Litigation comes to fill the Gap

• When national legislative & executive organs, $ consequentially the

UNFCCC, are failing, courts are increasingly stepping into the arena the world over

• “The entire world is at once simultaneouly both a potential plaintiff

and a defendant’ (Hunter, 2009: 358)

• In the US alone, over 400 cases are pending as statutory & common

law claims against the emitters law claims against the emitters

• Though transnational cases are yet to succeed, national cases are

increasingly being successful

• There are liability provisions in many global regimes; they work ex-

post, after the harm happens; in CC regime too, harms are already happening & courts are active in proving joint liability..

• With continued non-mitigation & procrastination, transnational law

suits is likely to succeed

Discordance bet CC Science & Politics cannot continue !

This research done not just as a cognitive interest, more so as an action interest by PVC negotiators Here is a statement of Winston Churchill in the House of Commons

• n 12 November 1936, which sounds as if it had been written for

today’s intractable climate negotiations: “So they [the Government] go on in strange paradox, decided only to be undecided, resolved to be irresolute, adamant for drift, solid for be undecided, resolved to be irresolute, adamant for drift, solid for fluidity, all-powerful to be impotent…Owing to past neglect, in the face of the plainest warnings, we have entered upon a period of danger…The era of procrastination, of half measures, of soothing and baffling expedience of delays, is coming to its close. In its place we are entering a period of consequences….We cannot avoid this period, we are in it now…”

So, instead of further procrastination, active inaction & baffling, we the PVCs have to change the discourse