SLIDE 2 2
B u s i n e s s C r e d i t f e B r u a r y 2 0 1 3
sold to the debtor in the ordinary course of such debtor’s business.” Debtors and trade creditors have been frequently litigating Section 503(b)(9)’s seemingly straightforward requirements. Tie stakes are huge here as debtors and their secured lenders have been litigating issues, such as what constitutes receipt of goods, in order to limit trade creditors’ recoveries in bank- ruptcy cases. Factual Background Momenta fjled for Chapter 11 on October 23, 2010 (the “peti- tion date”). Prior to the petition date, Momenta, Inc. ordered goods from Ningbo Chenglu Paper Products Manufacturing
- Co. Ltd. During the 20-day period preceding the petition
date, at Momenta’s direction (a) Ningbo delivered three ship- ments valued at approximately $23,000 to Momenta and (b) delivered four other shipments (the “drop shipped goods”) valued at in excess of $140,000, to Momenta’s customers in the United Kingdom and Canada. On December 6, 2010, Ningbo fjled a motion for relief under Bankruptcy Code Section 503(b)(9) for the allowance and payment of an administrative priority claim in the amount of $163,527.95. Ningbo’s motion included a request for payment
- f approximately $140,000 for the drop shipped goods.
Momenta conceded that all seven shipments were for goods that Ningbo had sold to Momenta in the ordinary course of
- business. Momenta also conceded that Ningbo was entitled to
Section 503(b)(9) priority status for Ningbo’s three shipments
- f goods directly to Momenta.
Momenta objected to Ningbo’s motion for Section 503(b)(9) priority status for the value of the drop shipped goods. Momenta argued that Section 503(b)(9) did not apply because Momenta had not received the drop shipped goods that were shipped directly to Momenta’s customers, which is
- ne of the prerequisites for obtaining relief under Section
503(b)(9). Ningbo disputed this, arguing that a buyer’s “receipt” of goods is not limited to goods that the buyer phys- ically possesses and includes the drop shipped goods received by the buyer’s customers. Tie bankruptcy court refused to grant Ningbo an administra- tive priority claim under Section 503(b)(9) for the balance due on the drop shipped goods. Tie bankruptcy court noted that the Bankruptcy Code does not defjne the term “received.” Tie court narrowly defjned the term “received” to have the same meaning in Section 503(b)(9) as in Section 546(c) that deals with reclamation rights.1 Tie court also relied on the meaning of the term “receipt” in determining whether and when a debtor “received” goods. While the Bankruptcy Code does not defjne “receipt,” the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) defjnes receipt of goods in UCC Section 2-103(c)(1) as taking physical possession of the goods. Tiat includes the buyer either having obtained actual physical possession of the goods or constructive possession of the goods in the posses- sion of a third party, such as a carrier. However, the court did not consider Momenta to be in constructive possession of goods that Ningbo, at the direction of Momenta, had deliv- ered to Momenta’s customers in drop shipment transactions. As such, the bankruptcy court denied Ningbo any priority status under Section 503(b)(9) for the drop shipped goods. Tie court concluded that Momenta had not received the goods that Ningbo had drop shipped directly to Momenta’s customers, and, therefore, Ningbo did not satisfy Section 503(b)(9). Ningbo appealed the bankruptcy court’s denial of Section 503(b)(9) priority status for its claim for payment of the drop shipped goods. Ningbo faulted the bankruptcy court for holding that the same defjnition of “received” is applicable to both reclamation and Section 503(b)(9) priority rights. Ningbo argued for a broad interpretation of the term “received” in Section 503(b)(9) to include a creditor’s drop shipment of goods to the debtor’s customers during the 20-day period prior to the bankruptcy fjling date. Ningbo relied on the preface to UCC Section 2-103(1) which states that its def- inition of “receipt,” taking physical possession of goods, does not apply if “the context otherwise requires.” According to Ningbo, in the typical drop shipment transaction, “received” should be defjned “in context” in a way that accounts for the commercial reality of the arrangement. Buyers and sellers fre- quently arrange for the sellers’ drop shipment of goods to the buyer’s customers and these arrangements ofuen call for fmexi-
- bility. A buyer should not be permitted to invoke its decision
to direct the seller’s delivery of goods to the buyer’s customer as the basis for opposing Section 503(b)(9) priority status for such goods because the buyer had not received the goods. Ningbo also claimed that neither Section 503(b)(9) nor Sec- tion 546(c)’s reclamation provision requires a seller to qualify for reclamation of its goods as a condition for invoking administrative expense status under Section 503(b)(9). Sec- tion 546(c) states that a seller who has not timely sent a writ- ten reclamation demand is still eligible for priority status under Section 503(b)(9). Neither Section 546(c) nor Section 503(b)(9) requires a creditor to satisfy the requirements for reclamation (such as the debtor’s continued possession of the delivered goods) as a condition for obtaining Section 503(b) (9) priority status. Momenta asserted a narrow interpretation of Section 503(b) (9). Momenta argued that Section 503(b)(9) is merely a sup- plemental remedy that is available only to reclamation credi- tors who, but for their failure to send a written reclamation notice required by Section 546(c), would be entitled to recla- mation of their goods. the District court’s Decision Tie district court agreed with Momenta’s narrow interpreta- tion of Section 503(b)(9) and denied administrative priority status for Ningbo’s drop shipped goods. Tie court found that Momenta had not received the drop shipped goods and, therefore, was not eligible for a Section 503(b)(9) priority claim for the drop shipped goods. Congress intended the