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Assuming rational parties and watchtowers - Will a party commit - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Assuming rational parties and watchtowers - Will a party commit - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Assuming rational parties and watchtowers - Will a party commit fraud? - Will a watchtower get paid? - Will a party commit fraud? - Will a watchtower get paid? - Will a party commit fraud? ... Watchtowers Active Inactive Parties
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Assuming rational parties and watchtowers…
- Will a party commit fraud?
- Will a watchtower get paid?
- Will a party commit fraud?
- Will a watchtower get paid?
- Will a party commit fraud? ...
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Watchtowers → Parties ↓ Active Inactive Fraud No Fraud
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Premiums
Watchtowers → Parties ↓ Active Inactive Fraud No Fraud
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Collateral
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a σB ai ai+1 bi+1 a b (σA⋀Δt)⋁σAB
Commitment (1)
Published by A
Funding
On-chain
Commitment (i)
Published by A
Commitment (i+1)
Published by A
Revocation
Published by B, W
σAB #σA #σB b a+b (σA⋀Δt)⋁σAB σB (σA⋀Δt)⋁σAB σB ai σAB bi σB
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a σBW #σW c ai bi ai+1 bi+1 a b (σA⋀Δt)⋁σAW
Commitment (1)
Published by A
Funding
On-chain
Collateral
On-chain
Commitment (i)
Published by A
Commitment (i+1)
Published by A
Revocation
Published by B, W
Penalty 1
Published by B
Reclaim
Published by W
σAB #σA #σB b a+b σBW (σA⋀Δt)⋁σAW σBW (σA⋀Δt)⋁σAW σB ai +bi σB c +bi σBW c σAW
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a (σB ⋀ Δt)⋁σBW #σW c ai bi ai+1 bi+1 a b (σA⋀Δt)⋁σAW
Commitment (1)
Published by A
Funding
On-chain
Collateral
On-chain
Commitment (i)
Published by A
Commitment (i+1)
Published by A
Revocation
Published by B, W
Penalty 1
Published by B
Reclaim
Published by W
σAB #σA #σB b a+b (σA⋀Δt)⋁σAW (σA⋀Δt)⋁σAW σB ai +bi σB c +bi σBW c σAW (σB⋀Δt)⋁σBW (σB⋀Δt)⋁σBW
σB⋀Δt
σBW
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a
σB⋀Δt
(σW⋀ΔΤ)⋁σBW (σB ⋀ Δt)⋁σBW #σW c ai bi ai+1 bi+1 a b c (σA⋀Δt)⋁σAW
Commitment (1)
Published by A
Funding
On-chain
Collateral
On-chain
Commitment (i)
Published by A
Commitment (i+1)
Published by A
Revocation
Published by B, W
Penalty 1
Published by B
Penalty 2
Published by B
Reclaim
Published by W
σAB #σA #σB b a+b (σB⋀Δt)⋁σBW (σA⋀Δt)⋁σAW (σB⋀Δt)⋁σBW (σA⋀Δt)⋁σAW σB ai +bi σB c +bi σB c +bi σBW c σBW
σB⋀Δt
σBW σAW
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Funding Commitment Dispute period
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Funding Commitment Dispute period ➔ Eclipse ➔ Censor ➔ Congestion
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A s y n c h r
- n
- u
s c h a n n e l s ?
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Funding Close Signatures of Alice & Bob OR Signatures of ⅔ WT & (Alice or Bob)
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1) Consensus is costly 2) Privacy is important 3) Incentives are critical
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➔ O(n) communication complexity for state updates ➔ Verification of consensus between Alice & Bob ➔ No liveness guarantees, if Alice & Bob both misbehave ➔ Consensus needed only for closing, if there is a dispute
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H( ) H( )
➔ Privacy preserving ➔ Alice/Bob cannot publish a previous transaction
H( )
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H( ) H( )
(1) Update (2) Consistent Broadcast (2) Consistent Broadcast (3) Execute (3) Execute
H( )
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- Unilateral channel for fees:
Repeated game lifts fair exchange impossibility
- Fees for closing the channels:
Only payable in dispute → Incentive to agree
- Collateral for anti-bribing:
Reduction to fair-exchange WT Committee size ↑ → per WT collateral ↓
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- Asynchronous channels
- Security even under L1 failure
- Privacy
- Incentive-compatible
- Embarrassingly parallel
- Linear communication