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CSNI Workshop on Evaluation of Uncertainties in Relation to Severe Accidents and Level II PRA Cadarache, France, November 7-9 2005 Assessment of Phenomenological Assessment of Phenomenological Uncertainties in Level 2 PRAs Uncertainties in


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Assessment of Phenomenological Assessment of Phenomenological Uncertainties in Level 2 PRAs Uncertainties in Level 2 PRAs

Hossein P. Nourbakhsh and Thomas S. Kress Hossein P. Nourbakhsh and Thomas S. Kress

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

CSNI Workshop on Evaluation of Uncertainties in Relation to Severe Accidents and Level II PRA Cadarache, France, November 7-9 2005

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“ “The value of what one knows is The value of what one knows is doubled if one confesses to not doubled if one confesses to not knowing what one does not knowing what one does not know” know” Arthur Schopenhauer Arthur Schopenhauer

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OUTLINE OUTLINE

  • Overview of PRA Process

Overview of PRA Process

  • Phenomenological Uncertainties in Severe

Phenomenological Uncertainties in Severe Accident Progression Analysis Accident Progression Analysis

  • Uncertainties Associated with Source Term

Uncertainties Associated with Source Term Analysis Analysis

  • Risk Importance Measures for

Risk Importance Measures for Phenomenological Issues Phenomenological Issues

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Elements of the PRA Analytical Elements of the PRA Analytical Process Process

Core-Damage Accident Frequency Analysis Core-Damage Accident Frequency Analysis Accident Progression and Containment Performance Analysis Accident Progression and Containment Performance Analysis Source Term Analysis Source Term Analysis

  • ---- Level 1

Plant Damage States

  • ---- Level 2

Accident Progression Bins

Offsite Consequences Analysis Offsite Consequences Analysis

Consequence Measures

Risk Integration Risk Integration

Source Term Groups

  • ---- Level 3
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Severe Accident Progression Severe Accident Progression

Phenomenological Issues & Containment Failure Mechanisms Phenomenological Issues & Containment Failure Mechanisms

Status of Containment at Onset of Core Damage Status of Containment at Onset of Core Damage

Status of RCS (pressure, …) Status of RCS (pressure, …)

Status of Containment Systems (sprays, igniters, …) Status of Containment Systems (sprays, igniters, …) Electric Power Status Electric Power Status Status of Reactor Core Cooling System Status of Reactor Core Cooling System Thermally Induced SGTR Thermally Induced SGTR Bottom Head Failure Bottom Head Failure In-Vessel Steam Explosion In-Vessel Steam Explosion Hydrogen Generation Hydrogen Generation Direct Containment Heating (DCH) Direct Containment Heating (DCH) Ex-Vessel Steam Explosion Ex-Vessel Steam Explosion Core-Concrete Interaction Core-Concrete Interaction Core Debris Coolability Core Debris Coolability Hydrogen Combustion Hydrogen Combustion Thermally Induced Hot Leg Failure Thermally Induced Hot Leg Failure Isolation Failure Isolation Failure Bypass Bypass Failure by Direct Contact with Core Debris Failure by Direct Contact with Core Debris Overpressurization Failure Overpressurization Failure Basemat Meltthrough Basemat Meltthrough

Severe Accident Recovery Actions Severe Accident Recovery Actions

Rapid Steam Pressure Rises and Missiles Rapid Steam Pressure Rises and Missiles

Plant Damage State Attributes

Phenomenological Issues

Containment Failure Mechanisms

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Conditional Probability of Accident Conditional Probability of Accident Progression Bins for Internal Events at Zion Progression Bins for Internal Events at Zion

0.001 0.01 0.1 1

Isolation Failure Early CF Late CF Bypass No CF Accident Progression Bin (APB)

Conditional Probability of APB A

Updated Evaluations NUREG-1150 Results

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Conditional Probability of Conditional Probability of Accident Progression Bins for Internal Accident Progression Bins for Internal Events at Peach Bottom Events at Peach Bottom

0.0001 0.001 0.01 0.1 1

Early WWF Early DWF Late WWF Late DWF Venting No CF Accident Progression Bin (APB)

Conditional Probability of APB A

Updated Evaluations NUREG-1150 Results

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Source Term Analysis Source Term Analysis

Source Term Issues and In Source Term Issues and In-

  • Containment Removal Mechanisms

Containment Removal Mechanisms

Core Heat Up & Fuel Cladding Failure Core Heat Up & Fuel Cladding Failure Release from Fuel into the RCS Release from Fuel into the RCS Retention in the RCS Retention in the RCS Early In-Vessel Release into the Containment (or Bypass Release) Containment Failure Mode and Mechanism Containment Failure Mode and Mechanism Gap Activity Release Gap Activity Release Release Due to HPME Release Due to HPME Release Due to Ex-Vessel SE Release Due to Ex-Vessel SE Releases Due to CCI Releases Due to CCI In-Vessel Core Degradation In-Vessel Core Degradation RPV Bottom Head Failure RPV Bottom Head Failure Core-Concrete Interactions Core-Concrete Interactions Late Revolatilization Late Revolatilization Ex-Vessel Release into the Containment Late In-Vessel Release into the Containment Status of Containment Systems (sprays, water in cavity/pedestal, …..) Status of Containment Systems (sprays, water in cavity/pedestal, …..) Scrubbing in BWR Suppression Pools Scrubbing in BWR Suppression Pools Natural Aerosol Deposition Natural Aerosol Deposition Aerosol Removal by Sprays Aerosol Removal by Sprays Scrubbing of CCI Releases by Overlaying Water Scrubbing of CCI Releases by Overlaying Water Aerosol Removal by Ice Condenser Aerosol Removal by Ice Condenser

In-Containment Removal Mechanisms

Environmental Source Term Environmental Source Term

In-Containment Source Term Issues

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Uncertainty Distributions for Early In Uncertainty Distributions for Early In-

  • Vessel

Vessel Releases into the Containment Releases into the Containment

PWR, Low RCS Pressure (NUREG/CR PWR, Low RCS Pressure (NUREG/CR-

  • 5747)

5747)

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Risk Importance Measures for Risk Importance Measures for Phenomenological Issues Phenomenological Issues

  • It is desirable to assign some ranking of “risk

It is desirable to assign some ranking of “risk importance” among various phenomenological importance” among various phenomenological issues that are considered in a plant PRA model. issues that are considered in a plant PRA model.

  • Risk importance measures for phenomenological

Risk importance measures for phenomenological issues can be useful for assessing potential issues can be useful for assessing potential accident management strategies as well as for accident management strategies as well as for developing research priorities to reduce the developing research priorities to reduce the

  • verall uncertainty.
  • verall uncertainty.
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Risk Importance Measures Commonly Risk Importance Measures Commonly Used for Ranking PRA Basic Events or SSCs Used for Ranking PRA Basic Events or SSCs

Risk Achievement Worth, RAW Risk Achievement Worth, RAW RAWi = R RAWi = Ri

i+ + / R

/ R0 Fussell Fussell – – Vesely, FV Vesely, FV FVi = (R FVi = (R0

0-

  • R

Ri

i-

  • ) / R

) / R0 Risk Reduction Worth, RRW Risk Reduction Worth, RRW RRWi = R RRWi = Ri

i-

  • / R

/ R0

where: where:

R Ri

i + + = overall risk with the probability of basic event i set to 1 (

= overall risk with the probability of basic event i set to 1 (the event the event has occurred or the equipment is failed), has occurred or the equipment is failed), R Ri

i

  • = overall risk with the probability of basic event i set to 0

= overall risk with the probability of basic event i set to 0 (the event is (the event is impossible or the equipment is totally reliable), and impossible or the equipment is totally reliable), and R R0

0 = overall base

= overall base-

  • case risk

case risk

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Risk Importance Measures for Post Core Risk Importance Measures for Post Core-

  • damage Mitigation Systems in AP1000 Design

damage Mitigation Systems in AP1000 Design

S y s t e m

R C S D e p r e s s u riz a t io n C a v it y F lo o d in g H y d r o g e n I g n it e rs C o n t a i n m e n t I s o l a t io n P C S

0 .1 1 1 0 1 0 0

R A W R R W

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Risk Importance Measures of Severe Risk Importance Measures of Severe Accident Phenomena in AP1000 Design Accident Phenomena in AP1000 Design

P h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l I s s u e

I n - V e s s e l M e l t R e te n t i o n C F b y D i ff u s i o n F l a m e C F b y E a r l y D D T C F b y H y d r o g e n D F L C F b y In t . D D T 0 . 1 1 1 0 1 0 0

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Summary Summary

  • An assessment of the phenomenological

An assessment of the phenomenological uncertainties associated with Level 2 uncertainties associated with Level 2 PRAs PRAs was presented. was presented.

  • Development of risk importance measures

Development of risk importance measures for phenomenological issues was also for phenomenological issues was also discussed. discussed.