Access Control Cunsheng Ding HKUST, Hong Kong, CHINA C. Ding - - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Access Control Cunsheng Ding HKUST, Hong Kong, CHINA C. Ding - - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Access Control Cunsheng Ding HKUST, Hong Kong, CHINA C. Ding - COMP4631 - L17 1 Agenda of this Lecture The basic concepts of access control, ACLs, capabilities, etc. Two approaches to access control Further reading C. Ding -


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Access Control

Cunsheng Ding HKUST, Hong Kong, CHINA

  • C. Ding - COMP4631 - L17

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Agenda of this Lecture

  • The basic concepts of access control,

ACLs, capabilities, etc.

  • Two approaches to access control
  • Further reading
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An Example

  • I, the owner of the

home directory, have total control over all files in all directories and subdirectories.

  • Everyone else can read

all files in “Public_html”, but should not do other

  • perations on the files

in this subdirectory.

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cding Public_html private Question: How do I do the access controls?

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Access Control

  • Computer security: it deals with the

prevention and detection of unauthorized actions.

  • Computer systems control access to data

and shared resources, like memory, printers, etc, primarily for reasons of integrity, not so much for confidentiality.

  • Access control is at the core of computer

security.

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Subjects and Objects

  • Terminology for access control:

à subject: active entity --- user or process à object: passive entity --- file or resource à access operation: read, write, ...

  • Subjects and objects provide a different

focus of control (first design principle)

à What is the subject allowed to do? (1st approach) à What may be done with an object? (2nd approach)

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The Two Approaches in Practice

  • Traditionally, multi-user operating systems

manage files and resources, i.e. objects.

  • Access control takes the 2nd approach.
  • Application-oriented IT systems, like

database management systems, offer services directed to the end user and may well control the actions of subjects.

  • Access control takes the 1st approach.
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The Fundamental Model of Access Control

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Subject Access request Security reference monitor Object The security reference monitor will check the access control policy and will grant or reject the request. Real World Examples ?

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Access Operations and Access Rights

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Access Operations

  • Access operations: No uniform definition. They

differ from system to system.

  • Examples: basic memory access, method calls in

an object-oriented system.

  • We will look at a few typical sets of access
  • perations. On the most elementary level, a

subject may àobserve an object or àalter an object.

  • Observe and Alter are called access modes.
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Access Rights

  • Access rights of the Bell-LaPadula Access control

model:

  • The four Bell LaPadula access rights:

à execute à read à append, also called blind write à write

  • Mapping between access rights and access modes.
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write read append execute Observe X X Alter X X

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Rationale

  • A user has to open a file to get access. Files

can be opened for read access or for write access so that the O/S can avoid potential conflicts.

  • Write access usually includes read access. A

user editing a file should not be asked to open it

  • twice. Hence, the write right includes Observe and

Alter mode.

  • Few systems actually implement append. altering

an object without observing its content is rarely useful (exception: audit log).

  • A file can be used without being opened (read).

Example: use of a cryptographic key. This motivates the execute right, which includes neither Observe nor Alter mode.

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Unix

  • Access control

policies are expressed in terms of three

  • perations:

à read: read from a file à write: write to a file à execute: execute a file

  • Applied to a directory,

the access operations take this meaning: à read: list contents à write: create or rename files in the directory à execute: search the directory

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These operations differ from the Bell-LaPadula model. E.G., Unix write access does not imply read access. Creation and deletion of files are governed by access control to the directory.

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Windows NT

à read à write à execute à delete à change permission à change ownership

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Access operations in the NTFS (New Technology File System) file system of Windows NT:

  • We no longer rely on operations on directories to

handle deletion of files or change of access rights.

  • Operations for modifying access rights are another

ingredient you may want to use when setting security policies.

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Basic Problems in Access Control

  • Who should be in charge of defining access

control policies in your security system?

  • How to express and capture your security

policies with a data structure correctly?

  • How to store your access control policies in

your security system?

  • How to retrieve security policies?
  • How to make your access control system very

efficient?

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Ownership for Manipulating Access Rights

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Ownership (1)

  • Security policies specify how subjects

are allowed to access objects.

  • Who is in charge of setting the policy?

– The owner of a resource decrees who is allowed to have access. Such a policy may be called discretionary as access control is at the owner’s discretion. – A system wide policy decrees who is allowed to have access. Such a policy may be called mandatory.

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Ownership (2)

  • Most operating systems support the

concept of ownership of a resource and consider ownership when making access control decisions.

  • Operations for manipulating access rights

are grant and revoke.

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How to Capture and Implement Access Control Policies

  • Access decision is based on a set of access control

policies

  • What data structure should be used to express the

set of policies?

  • How to make an access decision as quickly as possible?
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Access Control Structures

  • Several options for defining access control:

– The access control structure should allow you to express the access control policy you want to enforce. – You should be able to check that your policy has been captured correctly.

  • Access rights can be defined individually for each

combination of subject and object.

  • For large numbers of subjects and objects, such

structures are cumbersome to manage. Intermediate levels of control are preferable.

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Access Control Matrix

  • Notation:

– S … set of subjects – O … set of objects – A … set of access operations

  • Access control matrix: M = (Mso)sÎS,oÎO, MsoÍA.
  • The entry Mso specifies the operations subject s

may perform on object o.

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Alice Bob

  • {read,write}

bill.doc {exec} {exec} edit.exe {exec,read} {exec,read,write} fun.com

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Access Control Matrix ctd.

  • The access control matrix is

– an abstract concept – not very suitable for direct implementation – not very convenient for managing security

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Capabilities

  • Focus on the subject

– access rights are stored with the subject – capabilities º rows of the access control matrix

  • Subjects may grant rights to other subjects.

Subjects may grant the right to grant rights.

  • Problems:

– How to check who may access a specific object? – How to revoke a capability?

  • Distributed system security has created renewed

interest in capabilities.

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Alice edit.exe: {exec} fun.com: {exec,read}

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Access Control with Capability in HKUST

Room 001 Computer 111 Printer 1234 …………… TV 999 Yes No Yes ………. No

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Capability for Cunsheng Ding in HKUST

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Access Control Lists (ACLs)

  • Focus on the object

– access rights are stored with the object – ACLs º columns of the access control matrix

  • Access rights are defined for groups of users.

– Unix: owner, group, others

  • Problem: How to check access rights of a specific

subject?

  • ACLs are typical for certain secure operating

systems.

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fun.com Alice: {exec} Bill: {exec,read,write}

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Access Control with ACL in HKUST

ACL for Color Printer 111111

Cunsheng Ding Yes

John Wong No Paul Wu Yes ………. ……. Alice Fu No

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How to Make Access Control Efficiently?

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  • Groups are an intermediate layer between users & objects.
  • To deal with special cases, negative permissions withdraw rights

users groups

  • bjects

users groups

  • bjects

Intermediate Controls - Groups

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  • A partial ordering £ (`less or equal’) on a set L is

relation on L (i.e., subset of L x L) that is – reflexive: for all aÎL, a£a – transitive: for all a,b,cÎL, if a£b and b£c, then a£c – antisymmetric: for all a,bÎL, if a£b and b£a, then a=b

  • An example for a partial ordering is the subset

relation Í on a power set P(C).

  • REMARK: A partial order may be used to define an

access control policy.

Partial orderings

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Excess Control by Abilities: Example

  • An ability is a data structure of the form .i1.i2.

××× .in where i1,…,in are integers.

  • Examples for abilities: .1.2.3, .4, or .10.0.0.5 .
  • Abilities can be ordered through the prefix

relation – Ability a2 is a prefix of ability a1 if there exists another ability a3 so that a1 = a2a3. In this case, we write a2 £ a1.

  • For example: .1 £ .1.2 £ .1.2.3 but not .1 £ .4 !
  • Remark: £ is a partial order.
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Excess Control by Abilities: Example

  • With this prefix ordering, an access

control policy may be: A subject has access to an object if its ability is a prefix of the ability of the

  • bject.

The empty string e is the prefix of any ability, so a subject without an ability has access to every object.

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Access Control in UST

This is used to illustrate the access control idea and model of Windows NT security.

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The Access Token: ID Card

  • Name: Cunsheng Ding
  • ID No. 008672
  • AGroup: Academic staff
  • DGroup: Computer Science
  • SGroup: School of Engineering
  • ATitle: Associate Professor
  • MTitle: None

Photo

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Access Control in UST using ACLs

Read: all member

UST Libarary

Borrow: academic and stud. Badminton: staffs, stud. Basketball: acad. staffs, and their family memb.

UST Sport Facility CSD color printer Academic staffs Postgradautes Any other object in UST

Access Control List

Who can access? What are you allowed to do?

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Access Control on Personal Information at HKUST

  • Question: The Personnel Office of the

HKUST has personal data of each (teaching and administrative) staff, which contains salary information. What kind of access control policy would you suggest for UST?

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Further reading

  • Denning, D.E., "Cryptography and Security",

Addison-Wesley, 1982

  • Lampson, B., "Protection", ACM Operating

Systems Reviews, vol. 8, 1974

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