A Systemic Model of ATM Safety: The Integrated Risk Picture (IRP) - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

• A Systemic Model of ATM Safety: The

Integrated Risk Picture (IRP)

7th USA – EUROPE ATM R&D Seminar July 02-05, 2007 Barcelona, SPAIN

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• Outline of Presentation
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• Matching the safety approach to the

needs…

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• But what if multiple parallel changes? What is

the safety level of the overall system?

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• Information

Management Demand & Capacity Management Traffic Management Separation Management Airport

ATC/FMP AOC - Military CFMU - AOC - ATSP Military - Airport

Airspace Organization

20 minutes Take-off 1 year

ATC Sector Pilot

• Why do we need an Integrated Risk Picture?

• Solution – An Integrated Risk Picture

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So – what do we know now?

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ATM Direct Contribution to Accidents – 2005 (Baseline)

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Swiss Cheese Model – Runway Collisions

Visual warning RIMCAS warning Runway separation Runway configuration

Intermediate runway entry ATCO failure to recognise conflict RIMCAS not installed Operation in low visibility

Causal factors

Strategic conflict

Collision

Runway incursion

Precursors

Imminent runway collision Potentially conflicting runway approach

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Precursor Frequencies

Precursors frequencies Accident frequency Exposure frequency

RF1 Fatal runway collision involvement 3.3E-08 per flight RF2 Fatal runway collision 2.8E-08 per flight RF3 Runway collision 3.8E-08 per flight RP1 Imminent runway collision 4.3E-07 per flight RP2 Runway conflict 4.5E-07 per flight RP3A Aircraft runway incursion 2.0E-05 per flight RP4 Potentially conflicting runway approach 0.33 per flight RP5 Runway approach 1.10 per flight RB1 Ineffective collision avoidance 0.22 per imminent collision RB2 Ineffective conflict warning 0.95 per conflict RB4 Ineffective runway entry procedures 5.9E-05 per potentially conflicting approach RB5 Potentially conflicting runway configurati 0.30 per approach

Barrier failure probabilities

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• RB4.1 Operat ional

error in runway ent ry; 29.2% RB6.1 Operat ional error in t ake-of f ; 3.4% RB4.2 Pilot deviat ion in runway ent ry; 61.0% RB6.2 Pilot failure t o f ollow t ake-of f inst ructions; 6.4%

Expanded Barrier Failure Causes

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Runway entry procedures

Barrier Causes of barrier failure

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• IRP: Risk Model Overview

Taxiway collision Mid-air collision Runway collision Wake turbulence CFIT

Accident categories Causal factors (technical failures, human errors) Influences (safety management,

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environment, etc.) Risks (frequencies

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• Influence Model Structure

Task performance

Base event in fault tree

Quality of task inputs Performance of

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Performance of safety management Performance

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Performance

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Policy Planning Achievement Assurance Promotion Resources Competence HMI Reliability Procedures Teamwork Functionality Independence Transparency Redundancy Maintainability Integrity

Operating environment

Traffic Weather Terrain etc

Quality of airport/airspace design

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0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 Di r ect AT C causes RB4.1.1.1.2.2 Inadequate ai r por t AT CO coor di nati on RB4.1.1.2.2 AT CO mi sj udgement of r unway separ ati on AT C pr eventi on f ai l ur es RB4.1.1.1.1 Inef f ecti ve gr ound r adar sur vei l l ance RB4.1.2 Inadequate communi cati on wi th pi l ot RB2.3 Contr ol l er f ai l ur e to r espond to RIM CAS war ni ng RB1.1.3 Restr i cted vi ew f r om tower pr events conf l i ct detecti on RB1.1.5 AT CO f ai l ur e to r esol ve conf l i ct i n ti me AT M pr eventi on oppor tuni ti es RB5.2 Runway entr y at i nter medi ate l ocati on RB2.1 RIM CAS not pr esent RB1.1.2 Dar kness pr events conf l i ct detecti on

CONTRIBUTION (maximum potential reduct ion as fraction of f atal runway collision frequency)

ATM Contribution to Runway Collisions

Direct causes Failures to prevent accidents Opportunities to prevent accidents

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• IRP for Safety Assurance of Future

Systems

• ATM CONOPS

CONOPS assessment…

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TRANSITION TO SESAR END-STATE

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The Safety Target Achievement Roadmap (STAR)

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Safety Target Achievement Roadmap (STAR): a potential safety monitoring tool

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Summary - IRP – What it is, and what it is not

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• A coordinated & shared vision

• Development till late 07 (started 2004)

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• Conclusions

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Thank You Thank You

• The need for a safe transition…

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• Integrated Risk Picture in Practice
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0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 Airspace organisation & management Air traffic flow & capacity management ATC - traffic synchronisation ATC - traffic separation ATC - conflict resolution ATC systems Communications Surveillance ATM avionics - ACAS Airport operations Information management ATM CONTRIBUTION (maximum potential reduction / total fatal accident frequency) CFIT Mid-air collision Runway collision Taxiway collision Wake turbulence accident

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END USERS

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0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 AO&M ATFCM Traffic synchronisation Traffic separation Conflict resolution ATC systems Communications Surveillance ATM avionics Airport operations Flight planning Information management CONTRIBUTION (maximum potential reduction as fraction of fatal runway collision frequency) Direct cause Prevention failure Prevention opportunity Indirect influence

Contributions of ATM Elements to Runway accidents for Commercial Flights in 2005

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SESAR Definition Phase

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WP 2.2.2 / 2.2.4: Operational Concept WP 2.3.1 / 2.3.2: Models & Validation Needs D1 & D2: Bottlenecks & Performance Targets

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Prediction and Validation

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• EEC Objectives

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RTA

AUTHORIZED RBTA Current Pos EXECUTED RBTX PLANNED RBTP

RTA

AUTHORIZED RBTA Current Pos Current Pos EXECUTED RBTX PLANNED RBTP

• Scope of Risk Estimates

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