A GGLOMERATION PAYMENTS IN THE S HIRE R IVER B ASIN A NDREW B ELL 1 , - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
A GGLOMERATION PAYMENTS IN THE S HIRE R IVER B ASIN A NDREW B ELL 1 , L AWRENCE M APEMBA 2 , G REGORY P ARKHURST 3 , T IM B ENTON 4 , K LAUS D ROPPELMANN 5 , P ATRICK T EMBO 2 , J OHN K AMANGA 2 , AND C LAUDIA R INGLER 1 1 I NTERNATIONAL F OOD P
ANDREW BELL1, LAWRENCE MAPEMBA2, GREGORY PARKHURST3, TIM BENTON4, KLAUS DROPPELMANN5, PATRICK TEMBO2, JOHN KAMANGA2, AND CLAUDIA RINGLER1
1INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE 2BUNDA COLLEGE 3WEBER STATE UNIVERSITY 4UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS 5INDEPENDENT CONSULTANT
JANUARY 15, 2014 ESPA PROJECT INCEPTION WORKSHOP LONDON, UK
reduced productivity
quality, aquatic habitat, and hydropower infrastructure
Mulching Zero (minimum) Tillage Crop rotation or intercropping (what not to do)
Mulching Minimum Tillage Crop rotation
change
pesticide loading of ground water, rivers and lakes
stream
payments, and self-policing
within Malawi’s Agriculture Sector-Wide Approach (ASWAp)
Voucher (SV)
might imply for the landscape
1. AP lead to higher levels of spatial contiguity among adopters than SV 2. AP lead to higher levels of diffusion and overall adoption rates than SV 3. AP increase contacts and interactions among neighbors, relative to SV, (potentially allowing additional benefits to accrue to the community) 4. AP lead to higher compliance (and lower cheating rates) than SV 5. Land-use patterns encouraged by AP lead to reduced sediment loading and improved runoff regulation when adopted at the landscape scale 6. Land-use patterns encouraged by AP lead to enhanced provision of natural predator and pollination services when adopted at the landscape scale 7. AP lead to more cost-effective sustainable land management improvements than SV
Women make decisions about attending school, working, or having children Population growth rate emerges from their decisions to bear children Farmers make decisions about maintaining riparian cover along watercourse Runoff rate and water quality emerge from their land-use decisions Voters discuss their preferences in government Political leaders and policy direction emerge from their voting decisions
Cooperating Cows Model
Desk Field Stakeholders
Agents in our model are provided different levels of conventional base payments (BP) and agglomeration payments (AP) to participate in the CA program. All agents make a decision on how to use their land: (Y) Participate in the CA program (N) Continue as normal, and not participate (C) Cheat – accept the incentive, but don’t participate in CA program Agents that choose (Y) or (C) then ‘encourage’ neighbors to participate.
Agents are described in a very simple way: A farm location, size, and relative yield from the land An accumulated ‘personal wealth’ or ‘capital’ A set of neighbors with whom they may interact * Agents are boundedly-rational, risk-averse, future-discounting profit maximizers ** When agents ‘encourage’ other neighbors to participate, they are offering a bit of their ‘capital’ – as if offering favors, time, or some other relationship-relevant transaction
Base Payment of 40 Base Payment of 10, Agglomeration Payment of 20
payments
field, and expand model coupling
WorldFish
Agent- based model of land-use decisions S WAT model
growth, runoff, and water quality Literature models of E S provision S cenarios for incentives, markets, and climate Behavioral data from pilot study and social research Natural systems data inputs from literature