686 Explosion on Broadway PHSA Review of Lessons Learned
Overview of PHSA Provincial Health Services Authority Provincial Blood Coordination Office BC Cancer Agency Cardiac Services of BC BC Centre for Disease Control BC Children’s Hospital and Sunny Hill Health Centre for Children PHSA Laboratories The Provincial Langue Services Mental Health & Addiction Services - Riverview Hospital Psychiatric Institute BC Provincial Renal Agency BC Transplant BC Women’s Hospital and Health Center 2
Overview of 686 9 th Floor PHSA Laboratories Cervical Cancer Screening Program 8 th Floor Screening Mammography of BC 7 th Floor BCCA Multi Media Services 6 th Floor BC Cancer Foundation 5 th Floor Office Tenants Ground Floor Retail Unites and Office Tenants 3 Levels Parking 70 Parking Stalls 4
Gaining Access First Stage for IMIT and very limited Staff Fire • Police crime scene • Landlord – “release of liability and indemnity agreement” • Ministry of Finance – HPRMB approval • PHSA – Chief Financial Officer approval • OH&S • Second Stage Retrieval of Critical Equipment & Files OH&S • WorkSafe • Unions • 5
Complexity of Information � Fire / Police / City of Van / Landlord • PHSA Lab’s / Cancer Agency • Confirming or Dispelling Rumors' • Communication to Senior Leaders • Communication to Effected Staff • Communication to Media • Communication to Clients • Communications within the response team • Communication to other Staff • 6
Time-Line 2/19/2008 2/13/2008 Critical Equipm ent Retrieval 3/17/2008 Explostion M oved Back In 3/1/2008 2/13/2008 3/31/2008 2/28/2008 Staff Inform ation Session 2/14/2008 G ained Access to Building 1 8 M a rch , 2 0 0 8 P H S A R e tu rn s 1 3 F e b ru a ry, 2 0 0 8 1 3 Ju ly, 2 0 0 8 2 9 M a rch , 2 0 0 9 5 B u sin e sse s R e tu rn E xp lo stio n 2 B u sin e ss S till O u t 3 /0 8 4 /0 8 5 /0 8 6 /0 8 7 /0 8 8 /0 8 9 /0 8 1 0 /0 81 1 /0 81 2 /0 8 1 /0 9 2 /0 9 3 /0 9 4 /0 9 2 /1 3 /2 0 0 8 4 /2 9 /2 0 0 9 7
Administration Lessons Learned Don’t assume that because there are no patients, the planning • process and the Plan can wait Don’t assume that what you perceive is “small stuff” will be • Create a central dB regarding facilities, services, staff numbers • Know your Occupational Health and Safety Team • Communications, communications, communications • Ensure ‘loop closing’ on requests and expectations • 8
Cervical Cancer Screening Program / School of Cytotechnology 686 Broadway Incident February 13, 2008
9 th Floor 686 W Broadway – who are we? 9 th floor is leased space of PHSA Laboratories / BCCA site • 2 Laboratory Departments are located in this space • Cervical Cancer Screening Laboratory – analytical • (microscopic) area School of Cytotechnology • 10
Cervical Cancer Screening Laboratory Performs testing associated with the BC Provincial Cervical • Cancer Screening Program Since this is a provincial program, all the pap smears in BC • are screened at this location Approximately 600,000 smears are screened annually ≈ • 2400 per day 54 staff working in the department – cytotechnologists (52), • clerical staff (2) 11
Cervical Cancer Screening Laboratory Pap smears from all over BC arrive by courier and post at • Central Processing Laboratory (CPR) 655 W 12th Ave CPR staff unpack, data enter patient demographics into • Laboratory Information System (LIS), barcode the slides, stain the smears, coverslip slides, load slide carriers Slides are delivered by courier to 686 W Broadway for • microscopic examination 12
13 Pap Smear
School of Cytotechnology Only accredited school for cytotechnology in British Columbia • (1 of 7 in Canada) Operates as part of PHSA Laboratories in conjunction with • BCIT and teaching hospitals in BC 3 instructors in school and 7 students • Plus one fish tank! • 14
CCSL and School Both areas operate Monday to Friday excluding statutory • holidays Some flex hours – staff may start as early as 0600 hours and • premises are typically vacated by 1900 hours No staff were on site at the time of the explosion • Approximately 5000 square feet of space was vacated • 15
Day 1 – February 13 BCCA Administrator on-call notified manager / chief tech that • explosion had occurred All staff were contacted or attempt made • No operations possible – alternate arrangements examined • No staff wages lost • Contact would be made daily with staff to give status • 16
Day 1 – Options Discontinue operations until re-entry to building. Quickly • became apparent that this would not be timely Refer out slides to another province or US – no readily • available capacity for volume plus LIS barriers Re-locate operations • • Space for 60+ staff and students – environmentally and ergonomically acceptable • Computers, microscopes, barcode scanners, chairs, storage • Accessible for deliveries, staff parking, transportation etc 17
Re-locate operations We did not have formal emergency management or business • continuity plans We did have thorough knowledge of our businesses, needs and • support systems We did discover that we had networks within PHSA that were • collaborative and enabling We had some dedicated employees that would go above and • beyond 18
Re-locate operations No space was immediately available that met all our needs – • equipment, connectivity, space Laboratory space identified at Cancer Research Center – 675 W • 10 th Ave; approximately one third space Small working space identified 4 th floor BCCA • 19
CRC Re-location / CCSL Server was not located at 686 W Broadway and connectivity • could be established No microscopes available – contacted vendors, community • laboratories, conference providers – no adequate supply readily available IMIT able to provide correct version computers but not barcode • scanners 20
PHSA Laboratories Staff - not our usual labcoats! 21
These are not figure flattering outfits! 22
9 th Floor Retrieval 8 staff were fit tested and allowed to enter building • Entry through parking level • Carried out 30 microscopes, scanners, approximately 10,000 • unscreened slides Removed teaching items and fish tank from School • All items were “decontaminated” upon removal • 23
Temporary CCSL Location Setup 24
CCSL Relocation Incident occurred Feb 13, CCSL back in operation Feb 18 • Temporary space could accommodate ½ staff • Moved to 2 shifts – day, evening shifts rotated • Issues – parking, transit, personal accommodations eg. • Daycare Uncertainty how long this would last • 25
School of Cytotechnology Small space identified at 600 W 10 th (BCCA) • Students were able to be moved through Diagnostic Cytology • Lab, temporary space and BCIT Instructors were very flexible – because clinical laboratory • testing is not done, there was not the same impact on patient care 26
Financial Impact Very little had to be purchased • Much of the setup by IMIT, facilities and administration was • done at no additional cost Cost in lost time, additional shift premiums, overtime and union • contract requirements ≈ $75,000 – 3 days paid / no productivity – evening shift premium – 3 days overtime (weekends) – 1 day notification of change = 1.5X 27
Lessons Learned • Recognize, acknowledge and appreciate all those that help • Prioritize • Keep everyone up-to-date • Don’t sweat the small stuff • Be flexible • Develop emergency management and business continuity plans 28
The explosion at 686 West Broadway Response
Response-timelines 0234 explosion inside 686 West Broadway • 0237 camera on the rear of BCCRC records individual running • down the laneway 0245 individual is picked up by cab at Ash and Cambie • 0246 first responders police & fire on scene at 686 • 0445 BCCA Administrator on-call alerted by security • 0549 BCCA. Emergency Manager alerted by COO • 0623 on scene incident command post established • 0717 initial meeting of senior staff BCCA • 1030 first formal Emergency Command Center meeting held 4th • floor Boardroom Vancouver Cancer Centre. 30
Standing up the incident command post Vehicle with green lights and response kit on scene and in • place in the lane way to the rear of the building Negotiations allowed utilization of the underground parking for • setup & security By midmorning tables and set up ‘system’ obtained • Post included safety personnel, emergency management and • facilities staff as well as on scene consultants 31
Site safety Shockwave created significant quantities of dust with high • probability of asbestos content Staff entering the building fit tested for N 95 respirator and • provided with Tyvak suits, hard hats, eye protection, vests Stairwells lit with glow sticks & headlights • All staff given safety briefing prior to entry • All staff required to sign in and out from building • Congestion in the lane way required flag person • 32
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