2 Increase of AF RF task force near Ukrainian border Smolensk - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Strategic goal of Russian Federation Belarus Kaliningrad Arctic region 474 th separate EW center (Baranovichi); command of 11 th А C; Northern fleet/OSC “North” : 43 rd naval communication center (Vileyka) 14 th А C (80 SepMRBde, 200 th SepMRBde, 61 st motor-rifle brigade and marine SepMarineBde, 536 th SepMisArtyBde); Are planned to deploy: brigade; units of missile troops and artillery 45 th Air and Air Defense Army military base of AF RF; fighting aviation regiment Russia “DPR/LPR” AF RF formation 35 500 personnel Equipment: tanks- 480, AFV’s - 860, artillery systems - 940 Transnistrian region of Moldova Russian AF operative group 1 300 personnel Equipment: AFV’s - 60, Tajikistan ATGM’s - 80 201 st military base of AF RF (Dushanbe). 5 000 personnel Equipment: tanks - 56, AFV’s - 300, artillery systems - 80 Crimea Southern Osetia Abkhazia Armenia Russian AF joint task force 4 th military base of AF RF (Dzhava). 7 th military base of AF RF 31 5 00 personnel 102 nd military base of AF RF 4 500 personnel (Gudauta). Equipment: tanks - 40, (Gyumri). Equipment: tanks - 40, AFV’s - 175, 4 500 personnel AFV’s - 583, artillery systems - 5 000 personnel artillery systems - 118 Equipment: tanks - 49, 162, combat planes - 113, Equipment: tanks - 39, AFV’s - AFV’s - 122, artillery systems - 97 ships - 30, submarines - 7 238, artillery systems - 28 Assessment:  Russia considers Ukraine as key element in building of strategic confrontation line with Western nations, and keeping it’s ascendancy over post-Soviet states. 2

Increase of AF RF task force near Ukrainian border Smolensk operational RUSSIA Smolensk direction BELARUS 20 144 3 20 237 752 Klintsy Orel-Voronezh 488 operational direction ЗВО 20 Operational 237 752 directions Voronezh Total 28 BTGr’s 5100 40 135 50 25 Smolensk OD 488 8750 160 310 70 30 Orel-Voronezh OD Valuyki 54200 770 1525 960 280 Don OD 252 252 10830 30 370 90 50 Crimean OD Boguchar 20 8 1200 - 35 - - Transnistrian OD Volgograd 150 8 82780 1000 2420 1170 385 TOTAL KAZAKHSTAN 2 Luhansk 1 102 102 102 Transnistrian OGRF WMD Novocherkassk Donetsk operational UKRAINE direction Rostov-on-Don 103 103 103 Legend * 8 SMD 1 st echelon/ 810 68 68 68 126 queue BTG’s Perevalne Temryuk 22 BSF Simferopol SMD 49 2 nd echelon/ 163 163 163 Sevastopol Stavropol queue BTG’s 126 Don operational direction Crimean 3 rd echelon/ 3 SMD 58 operational queue BTG’s 810 810 Vladikavkaz 42 58 direction

Combat range of Russian “Iskander-M”-type missile systems deployed near the border of Ukraine Belarus Durnevo Russia 100 km to Ukrainian border KYIV Ukraine Dnipro 50 km to Ukrainian border “Kadamovskiy Kryvyi Rih ” range Kherson 240 km to Ukrainian border Krasnodar 4

Russian JTF in the Don Operational Direction (South-Western strategic direction) XX RUSSIA UKRAINE X XXXX ENY HQ of Russian JTF XX 2 8A on the base of 8 th А rmy Luhansk (Novocherkassk) 20 8A Volgograd 8A SOUTH 1 8A Donetsk XXX XXX XX XXXX 2 nd А C 150 th MR Div 1 st А C (Luhansk) (Persiyanovskiy) (Donetsk) BTG TG since 2016 since 2014 since 2014 150 8A/SOUTH 1 8A 2 8A SOUTH 8A XX BTG TG X 20 th SepMRBde Logistics units of 8 th А rmy (Volgograd) 150 8A/SOUTH TGs TG 8A 20 8A Persianovskiy TG TGs I I I I Novocherkassk Special I I I I Battalion Arty Task AD Task operations tactical BTG TGs Group Group SOF forcesBat groups (4-5) (3-4) (2-3) (3-4) ENY 43 600 645 1 300 760 2016 55 000 790 1 590 1 350 2018 5 58 000 850 1 700 1 450 2020

Militarization of Azov-Black Sea region FSB Coast Guard division 27 Taganrog Goals of Russia: Melitopol Ukraine  Overhaul of Ukrainian- Berdyansk Russian state border Yeysk considering Annexation of FSB Coast Guard Group 28 Crimea and partial occupation of Donetsk region Primorsko-Akhtarsk  Seizing control over the Sea FSB Coast Guard Group 6 of Azov and Kerch strait FSB Coast Guard Group 21 Russia  Blocking of Ukraine’s economic activity N G 382 810 FSB Coast Guard Group 33 Temryuk  Creating a depressive zone 2018 2019 Number of ships and special boats 171 79 2013 in Ukrainian Azov coastal in the Sea of Azov Feodosia April January region 41 84 115 Russian FSB Coast Guard 0 0 10 Black Sea fleet 0 0 3 Caspian flotilla Assessment:  Russia is trying to exhaust economic potential of Ukraine and to feed 6 tension within Ukrainian security and defense sector.

Increase of Russian AF task forces in temporary occupied Crimea GOAL: XXXX Debarment of return of UKRAINE Crimea under Ukrainian jurisdiction BSF XXX X X Gaining full control over the Black Sea with the goal to 127 22 126 22 68 22 22 AC BSF influence the states of the region Sea of Azov Creation of the 1096 22 8 22 counterbalance to US/NATO actions in the Alliance’s RUSSIA Yevpatoria Eastern flank 4 22 Extension of constant Russian Simferopol Perevalne military presence in the Mediterranean Sevastopol The Black Sea Before 12500 - 92 24 22 26 2 annexation 7 31500 40 583 162 122 71 7 2018 43000 100 1150 400 213 91 6 2022

Anticipated activity of Russia in south-western part of the Black Sea Drilling platform Drilling platform UKRAINE “Syvash” “Tavryda” MYKOLAYIV KHERSON МО LDOVA ODESA CHORNOMORSK Russian “Neva-BS” radars deployed on the gas platforms (range up to 55.5 km) “Holitsynske” gas condensate field “Odeske” gas Tarkhankut Cape field Drilling platform “Petro Drilling platform “Ukrayina” Hodovanets” “Arkhanhelske” gas field 8 Exercises areas near international shipping routes

Consequences of Russia’s militarization of the Azov-Black Sea region Shift of the balance of force in the Black Sea in advantage of Russia Creation of preconditions for increasing the scale of the armed aggression against Ukraine and use of the armed forces against other nations Fueling frozen conflicts in Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan Increasing number of dangerous incidents in air and at sea Militarization of other regions including the Baltic Sea and the Mediterranean Sea Russian economic activity blockade of other ports in the region growing in scale 9

Key accomplishments: Growth of Defence Budgeting The Law of Ukraine on National Strategy enacting security and (12) defence spending on the level of at least 5 % GDP, including 3 % GDP for defence forces GDP +18% 10

Perspectives Five fundamental components of defence reform development: 1) Effective defence management, including integrated civil democratic control and a new command and control system functioning in accordance with NATO principles 2) Capability based defence planning corresponding with med-term State`s budgetary procedures 3) Defence procurements: by import – abroad due to new authorities of the Defence Ministry, in Ukraine – in line with European regulations 4) Perspective forces structure designed based on an optimal set of capability owners 5) Integrated civil-military capabilities system defending the national interests with involvement of political, diplomatic and military means (“Soft and Hard”) 11

Expectations constant strong pressure on Russia increased presence in the Black Sea-Azov Region deployment of a constant international mission for monitoring of security situation supporting the efforts aimed at release of imprisoned sailors supporting of Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine enhancement of bilateral defence cooperation 12

Directions continues Canadian advisory support in accordance with defence reform tasks transition to the operational level of training in the framework of Operation “UNIFIER” invigoration of the military-technical cooperation, signing up respective arrangement participation in the investments and infrastructure projects military training and education 13