YANBIAN RISING Chinas Strategic Design for NE Asia XXIX ISMOR - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

YANBIAN RISING

China’s Strategic Design for NE Asia

XXIX ISMOR

Charles F. Hawkins Hawkins.CF@gmail.com

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Asia Through a Chinese Lens

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U.S. Containment: ‘Pressure from the Sea’ and ‘Pressure from the Land’

4 2 3 Chinese National Priorities

• Harmonious Development
• Counter Encirclement
• Near-sea defense
• Two-ocean navy
• Pushout areas
• Sovereignty Campaigns

Pushout Areas

1.Rason EDZ, North Korea 2.Burma (Myanmar) 3.Hambantota, Sri Lanka 4.Gwadar, Pakistan Area of Emphasis for this Briefing

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Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture and Hamgyong Bukto Province are engaged in a transformation that will fundamentally alter the relationship between China and North Korea. Changes in Yanbian and Hamgyong Bukto will improve China's strategic flexibility and extend its influence over Northeast Asia in ways that are yet to be surmised or calculated.

Hamgyong Bukto

NORTH KOREA This report is based on years of direct observation during multiple visits, interviews and discussions with local officials, businessmen, academics, and citizens in Yanbian Prefecture. Observations, findings and judgments expressed here are my own and not those of any U.S. government organization.

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Rason EDZ China Yanbian North Korea Russia East Sea

The China-North Korea Frontier

1,416 Kilometers

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North Korea China

Liaoning Province Jilin Province

Sea of Japan (East Sea)

Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture

Two Centers of Gravity

• China: Stability on Sino-North Korean frontier
• North Korea: Regime survival/perpetuation

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Chinese soldiers at a remote border checkpoint North Korean guard

PLA in Northeast China

Ground, Air, Amphibious Forces

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Why Is Yanbian So Important?

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Jilin Province

• 27 million total
• 91% Han
• 4% Korean

Yanbian Prefecture

• 2.3 million total
• 58% Han
• 39% Korean

Heilongjiang Province

• 36 million total
• 95% Han
• 1% Korean

Liaoning Province

• 42 million total
• 94% Han
• 0.5% Korean

Railway across the Tumen Dilapidated NK guard post

Reasons for Chinese Intervention in North Korea

• Restore stability
• Provide humanitarian assistance
• Secure nuclear facilities
• Prevent or neutralize Russian intervention
• Secure important infrastructure interests

– Ports in Rason (Luoxin) EDZ – economically and strategically important – Islands, ports at mouth of Yalu River – Power generation facilities on Yalu River – Frontier commercial structures, industrial/mineral assets – Communications hubs/transportation nets (within reach)

• Establish buffer zones on the frontier and present a fait accompli to

ROK-US and thereby demand a seat at the unification table

Publicly stated by state- level Chinese think tanks*

* See Bonnie Glaser, et. al., ‘Keeping and Eye on an Unruly Neighbor,’ Center for Strategic and International Studies & U.S. Institute for Peace, Washington, D.C., January 2008; position also taken by Shanghai Institutes for International Studies in January 2009. 8

First to Fight: China’s Historic Pattern of Conflict

• Realpolitik as a first principle, not

Confucian-Mencian ‘good government’ accommodation

• Ming dynasty’s grand strategy against the

Mongols (1368-1644)

– About 70 conflict initiations by China

• Communist China’s initiation of armed

conflict during crises (1949-1985):

– 8 of 11 (73%) – 10 of 13 (77%) if Spratlys and Tiananmen Square are counted for 1988 and 1989 – High value, zero sum perception

• Territorial disputes
• Political-diplomatic disputes

9 See: Cultural Realism by Alastair Iain Johnston

Rail crossing over the Tumen River near Tumen City

Constraints on Opportunism

• Opportunism will be narrowly

focused

– Korean population in Yanbian makes North Hamgyong the center of gravity; East Sea access and ports at Rajin- Sonbong provide added incentive – Infrastructure along Yalu will be protected but incursion limited

• Opportunism has its limits

– There must be instability in North Korea; refugee flow into Yanbian is the core of Chinese concerns – No direct confrontation w/ROK- US

• Three-way cooperation w/UN

mandate can save face

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Frozen Tumen near Sanhe What if “opportunism” meant the opportunity for economic development and integration instead of military adventurism?

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How can the lights be turned on in North Korea?

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Growth in Dandong spurs North Korean economic activity in Sinuiju

2009 2009 2004

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Yanbian: What kind of future? Is Dandong a good model, or a chance event?

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New Hunwu Expressway (G12) from Changchun to Yanji

A new four-lane express highway has been completed from Changchun to Tumen City and terminates at Hunchun near the Chinese-Russian-North Korean border.

DPRK-PRC Electricity Trade

15 http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/reportsElectricity Trade/DPRK_PRC_Trade_Aden

New construction activity on the North Korean side of the Tumen River near Fengchuan and the Quanhe Bridge More North Korean construction activity on the Tumen near Quanhe Bridge

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New railway trestle construction between Helong and Nanping Port border crossing.

New railways and expressways in Jilin Province will open up Yanbian’s interior and will facilitate more rapid shipment of goods, products and raw materials from both Jilin and Heilong-jiang provinces to foreign and Chinese markets via ports in Raison EDZ. They also serve as a MSR for military use.

• Economic sustainability is key to

stability

• Lower Yalu comparatively better

developed; can be a model

• ‘Economic integration’ with

Hamgyong Bukto is a ‘stability enabler’ that benefits China and North Korea

• $3 billion deal in December 2011

gives China access to East Sea

• However, Beijing must balance

interests with Pyongyang; and maintain accommodation with Moscow

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China’s Push Into Hamgyong Bukto

This may be a zero-sum game, but China will portray it as win-win.

North Korean customs at Quanhe Bridge

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Russian ships at Rajin North Korean Antonov An-12 at Yanji Bottom three: Pictures of Russian-North Korean activity at Rajin port

The Prize

Some Important OA Questions

• NK Refugees (into China)

– How many is too many? Rate of influx? Cumulative?

• Displaced persons (inside North Korea)

– What will cause North Koreans to leave their villages? What kind and size of organization is best suited to provide HA? Can the PLA do this? How?

• Instability (lack of effective governance)

– What are warnings and indicators? Are there MOEs (or MOIs)? – What is the scope of the problem? Can it be compartmented by province, township? – What resources are required to provide assistance? What are access issues and barriers to effectiveness?

• Are there historical analogs that can be examined for what worked

and what didn’t?

Discussion/Questions

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