THE GREAT PACIFIC WAR: U.S. v. JAPAN, 1940-1945 24 SEPTEMBER 2020: - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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THE GREAT PACIFIC WAR: U.S. v. JAPAN, 1940-1945 24 SEPTEMBER 2020: - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Jan 15, 2024 638 likes •1.05k views

THE GREAT PACIFIC WAR: U.S. v. JAPAN, 1940-1945 24 SEPTEMBER 2020: RISING EXPECTATIONS DENIED Dr. Joe Fitzharris Professor Emeritus of History The University of St. Thomas RISING EXPECTATIONS DENIED 24 Sept. Rising Expectations

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SLIDE 1

THE GREAT PACIFIC WAR: U.S. v. JAPAN, 1940-1945

24 SEPTEMBER 2020: RISING EXPECTATIONS DENIED

  • Dr. Joe Fitzharris

Professor Emeritus of History The University of St. Thomas

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SLIDE 2

RISING EXPECTATIONS DENIED – 24 Sept.

  • Rising Expectations
  • Rising Expectations Denied
  • Japanese Expansionism / Imperialism
  • American Responses
  • Japanese Quandary and Yamamoto’s Solution
  • Unanticipated Consequences of the Attack on Pearl Harbor
  • Conspiracy Theories
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SLIDE 3

THEORETICAL: RISING EXPECTATIONS

Time

E x p e c t a t i

  • n

s

Reality Gap Popularized by the “Kerner Commission on Civil Disorder” after the 1968 Riots 4√

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SLIDE 4

JAPAN’S RISING EXPECTATIONS

  • Rise as a Major

Regional Power

  • Rising Urban

Incomes and Well- being

Time

E x p e c t a t i

  • n

s

Reality

Japan expected greater respect as a major power. The Japanese people came to expect better times.

3√

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SLIDE 5

Japan as a Major Regional Power

  • Acquiring colonies: Korea, Taiwan
  • Role in Boxer Rebellion
  • Russo-Japanese War(1904-1905)
  • Naval Alliance with Britain (1902-1921)
  • Involvement in World War I and Economic Growth
  • 1920s Expanded Trade and industrialization
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SLIDE 6

RISING EXPECTATIONS DENIED

  • Paris Peace

Conference

  • Naval Disarmament

Treaties

  • Immigration

Restrictions

  • The Showa (Great)

Depression, 1930- 1931

Time

E x p e c t a t i

  • n

s

Reality Gap

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SLIDE 7

Racial Equality Clause (for Member Nations only) Japanese Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference

Billie Hughes

  • W. Bigot Wilson

Progressive Racism

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SLIDE 8

Naval Disarmament

  • RATIONALE: primary way of

projecting national power was naval – especially battleships

  • Washington Naval Agreement,

1920: 5:5:3 ratio (US:UK:JP), recognized as power,

  • Japanese view ratio as insult
  • Geneva and London Naval

Conferences, 1927-1936

  • World Disarmament Conference in

Geneva, 1932

  • Japan actually GAINED by these

disarmament agreements – but they did not see it that way!

Mutsu, 1920-1943

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SLIDE 9

ANTI-JAPANESE CRUSADE IN 1920s

  • Typical Immigrants
  • 1924 Immigration Act
  • Ended Asian Immigration
  • Severely Limited Immigration

from South & Central Europe

  • (Based in Eugenics -

Margaret Sanger & PP)

  • West Coast Prejudice and

Bigotry (hence 1942 removal of Japanese)

Tacoma News Tribune, 27 July 1920

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SLIDE 10

Japanese Economic Situation

  • No Resources – except people

− Despite stereotype, highly capable, imaginative (not

inventive), driven, dedicated, indoctrinated, unified,

  • militaristic. Bushido Code
  • Export Goods all luxury – Income Elastic
  • Need to Import Resources, Oil
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SLIDE 11

Japanese Economy: Urban-Industrial Recovery, Worsening Rural Depression

Trends and Break in Prices

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SLIDE 12

RISING EXPECTATIONS DENIED after 1930

Time

E x p e c t a t i

  • n

s

Reality Gap 3√

  • Rural areas hardest hit, limited

recovery more people, no land

  • Few migrated to urban areas

and got jobs - discrimination

  • IJ Army recruits heavily from

rural areas

  • IJ Navy draws from urban areas
  • IJA operates in Manchuria &

China supported by IJN airpower (lots of opportunity for Japanese in colonial areas)

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SLIDE 13

JAPANESE EXPANSIONISM OR IMPERIALISM

“Delicacies Of The Season - Yellow Bread” French Cartoon ~ 1941 on Japanese Imperialism

  • Manchuria (1931) and China -

“Marco Polo Bridge” 1937

  • “Rape of Nanking” in 1937-1938
  • Seizure of Hainan Island, 1939
  • Seizure of bases in Indi-China from

Vichy France Sept. 1940

  • Desire access to resources in

Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) and Malaya

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SLIDE 14

Manchuria, 1931

lron, Coal, Land, JOBS Army Insubordination an Issue

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SLIDE 15

Rape of Nanking

Nationalist capitol

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SLIDE 16

Rape of Nanking, 13 December 1937-30 January 1938 See: Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking (1997)

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SLIDE 17

Despite Denials, the Japanese Knew

An article on the "Contest to kill 100 people using a sword" published in the Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun. The headline reads, "'Incredible Record' (in the Contest to Cut Down 100 People) – Mukai 106–105 Noda – Both 2nd Lieutenants Go into Extra Innings"

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SLIDE 18

The Nanking Blunder

  • Prince Asaka Yasuhiko, GOC

Nanking, Royal Family

  • Taking Nanking did not end

Chinese resistance. lt effected Japan’s relations with China

  • and still does.
  • Tarnished Japan’s reputation

throughout Asia

  • Volume of killing led Adm.

Harry Yarnell, CO USN Asia Fleet, to forecast millions killed in Sino-Japanese War

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SLIDE 19

Hainan, Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies, and Malaya

1939-1940 – threatens PI

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SLIDE 20

Resource Needs

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SLIDE 21

Resource Needs

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SLIDE 22

Dependence of Japanese Economy on Foreign Imports Other Than Oil in 1941 [t-4]

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SLIDE 23

US RESPONSE: Economic Sanctions

  • Japanese gain concessions and

bases in French Indo-China in 1940

  • US closed Panama Canal to

Japanese shipping

  • Embargoed scrap metal sales
  • 74% of scrap from US
  • 93% of copper from US
  • Spring 1941 occupies all of Indo-

China

  • Summer 1941: Japanese assets in

US frozen, Sale of oil and gasoline embargoed

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SLIDE 24

JAPAN’S QUANDRY AND YAMAMOTO’S SOLUTION: The Problems:

  • Unwilling to give up gains in

China or Indo-China

  • Sanctions meant 2 years of oil in

stock for IJN

  • JPN economy needed East Asian

and Malayan resources

  • Diplomatic Question:
  • Will US support UK? Dutch?
  • Desirability of US in PI
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SLIDE 25
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SLIDE 26

Japan’s Situation 1940-1941

  • Unwilling to end war in China

and give back territories seized

  • Unable to defeat guerrillas in

China or control army units taking extra territory

  • War in Europe opened new
  • pportunities for conquest
  • Need for tin, rubber, petroleum

(from DEI and Malaya)

  • 2 July 41 Imperial Conference -

press on southward!

  • Co-Prosperity Sphere
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SLIDE 27

SEA LANES AND STRATEGY

  • South China Sea Shipping

Threatened by US Navy and AAF heavy Bombers

  • NEED East Indies Resources
  • Eliminate Singapore (Defenses

Strongest to Seaward, IJA plans to attack from land)

  • Ignore US or not?
  • Fear US come to aid of UK
  • Economic Warfare Underway
  • Maximum 2 years of supplies

B-17 Operational Range Straits of Malacca

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SLIDE 28

YAMAMOTO’S SOLUTION

Much more than Pearl Harbor

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SLIDE 29

JAPAN ASSUMED:

  • US and Japanese interests in the Pacific were asymmetric
  • Acquiring resource rich regions ensures Japanese

economy would be self-sufficient

  • US would be unwilling to pay a very high price to defeat

Japan if the costs were raised by:

  • quickly acquiring and fortifying Central and SW Pac
  • forcing US to advance by a deadly island-by-island slog

that would exhaust US will to fight

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SLIDE 30

WAR PLANS and WAR GAMES

  • US WAR PLANS (Joint Army-Navy):
  • War Plan ORANGE: IJ surprise attack PI; island bases; rescue PI, decisive

battle with IJN, blockade Japanese Home Islands. RAINBOW plans built on

  • IJN WAR PLANS (IJA not involved)
  • KANTAI KESSEN (Decisive Battle): seize PI, USN drive across PAC to rescue;

severely attrit USN in transit; superior skill and quality overcome numeric inferiority,

  • YAMAMOTO’S Plan: Shatter US morale by massive offensive on US fleet at

PH, resulting negotiated peace

  • WAR GAMES: IN COMMON – IJN attack on Pearl Harbor alone or as part of an

attack on the US West Coast

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SLIDE 31

L.A. Examiner, 7 Nov 1937

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SLIDE 32

DAWN, HAWAII, 7 DECEMBER 1941

  • NO clear warning from Washington
  • Lot of Intell, none specific to PH
  • Expected strikes in East Indias, PI (PH too far)
  • No real defensive preparations
  • Prepared for sabotage in PI and PH - planes wing tip
  • Normal Sunday shore liberty in PH
  • No torpedo nets, AAA not manned, ammo lacked
  • Carriers out delivering plans to Midway and Wake
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SLIDE 33

JAPANESE ATTACK ON US BASES ON OAHU, HAWAII

English explanations added in original

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SLIDE 34

USS Ward, DD 139: Minnesota Naval Reservists

Forward 5” gun (at State Capitol)

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SLIDE 35

ANTICIPATED CONSEQUENCES

  • Severely damage US “will to fight” and public morale by

destroying US Pacific Fleet offensive punch (BBs)

  • Buy time to build a fortress so strong the US would chose

to negotiate rather than fight

  • Open protected sea lanes to resources
  • Yamamoto warned that attacking the US was not a really

good option, but his plan was the best of the Japanese plans

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SLIDE 36

RESULTS OF THE ATTACK

  • Damage to USN negligible in longer-run - minor damage to

shore establishment, no loss of oil stocks, only 2 BBs lost, no carriers attacked.

  • Galvanized US public opinion behind a “total war” effort to

destroy Japan (raising tolerance of war costs dramaticaly).

  • Terminated the “Isolationist” opposition to FDR’s

interventionist foreign policy.

  • Japan did not eliminate USN, only partially fortified the island

barriers, and created conditions in which they could achieve their preferred “death before dishonor” on a national scale.

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SLIDE 37

UNANTICIPATED CONSEQUENCES

  • Public united in fight against Japan (Germany no so

much)

  • Business saw the “hand-writing” and was supportive

(except Henry Ford)

  • Unleashed savage warfare across the Pacific and Asia
  • Ended Japanese imperialism – and European imperialism

too’

  • Japan became the “victim” of the evil US war machine
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SLIDE 38

COMMON TO MOST “THEORIES”

  • Intelligence ignored - Japanese codes “already broken”
  • US (FDR) KNEW in advance and did not warn Hawaii
  • Did Churchill know and tell/not tell FDR who kept quiet
  • Japanese movements in West Pacific known, should

have alerted US

  • FDR deliberately provoked the Japanese to get a war so

he could fight Germany

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SLIDE 39

FDR LOVED THE NAVY

IT WAS HIS “RUBBER DUCKIE”