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Why Has the Unemployment Rate Fared Better than GDP Growth? John - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Comments on Bob Hall Why Has the Unemployment Rate Fared Better than GDP Growth? John Fernald October 14, 2016 My thanks to FRBSF colleagues for helpful conversations in recent years about the issues in this discussion. But the views


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Comments on Bob Hall

“Why Has the Unemployment Rate Fared Better than GDP Growth?”

John Fernald

October 14, 2016

My thanks to FRBSF colleagues for helpful conversations in recent years about the issues in this discussion. But the views expressed here are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco or the Federal Reserve System

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Unemployment rate is where it was in 2007 …but output growth has disappointed

Paper

  • Uses Okun’s Law to control

for the cycle

  • Growth-accounting for non-

cyclical output shortfall:

– Labor (LFPR, working-age population) – TFP – Capital

0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 1947-73 1973-95 1995-04 2004-07 2007-16

Source: Fernald (2014a), BEA, BLS. Quarterly; samples end in Q4 of years shown except 1973 (end Q1) and 2016 (ends Q2). Output averages income and expend.

Average annualized growth rate

Business-sector output growth

Percent

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SLIDE 3

My take: Slow growth from demographics and productivity— not Great-Recession

  • Okun’s Law was normal (with

low potential)

  • Demographics and

productivity are slow

  • Best guess: slow growth the

new reality

0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 1947-73 1973-95 1995-04 2004-07 2007-16

Source: Fernald (2014a), BEA, BLS. Quarterly; samples end in Q4 of years shown except 1973 (end Q1) and 2016 (ends Q2). Output averages income and expend.

Average annualized growth rate

Business-sector output growth

Percent

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SLIDE 4

My take: Slow growth from demographics and productivity— not Great-Recession

  • Okun’s Law was normal (with

low potential)

  • Demographics and

productivity are slow

  • Best guess: slow growth the

new reality

0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 1947-73 1973-95 1995-04 2004-07 2007-16

Source: Fernald (2014a), BEA, BLS. Quarterly; samples end in Q4 of years shown except 1973 (end Q1) and 2016 (ends Q2). Output averages income and expend.

Average annualized growth rate

Business-sector output growth

Hours Labor Prod.

Percent

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Okun’s Law consistent with low potential

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Hall, p.2: “U.S. Experience since the crisis is a major deviation from [Okun’s] Law”

(From Daly, Fernald, Jorda, and Nechio, 2013)

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Hall, p.2: “U.S. Experience since the crisis is a major deviation from [Okun’s] Law”

(From Daly, Fernald, Jorda, and Nechio, 2013)

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Okun like previous recessions…but with low potential growth

(From Daly, Fernald, Jorda, and Nechio, 2013)

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Okun like previous recessions…but with low potential growth

(From Daly, Fernald, Jorda, and Nechio, 2013)

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Okun like previous recessions…but with low potential growth

(From Daly, Fernald, Jorda, and Nechio, 2013)

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Okun like previous recessions…but with low potential growth

(From Daly, Fernald, Jorda, and Nechio, 2013)

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Okun “loops” come from TFP

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Okun “loops” come from TFP

13

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Why has potential growth been so slow since 2007?

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Has cyclical become structural? Maybe for hours…

975 1985 1995

  • urce: BLS

975 1985 1995 2

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Has cyclical become structural? Maybe for hours…

975 1985 1995

  • urce: BLS

975 1985 1995 2

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Has cyclical become structural? Maybe for hours…

975 1985 1995

  • urce: BLS

975 1985 1995 2

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  • Oulton and Sebastia-Barriel (2013)

– For advanced economies, financial crises do not permanently affect level of TFP or labor productivity – Employment per capita is permanently lower

  • Huang, Luo, and Startz (2015)

– TFP level recovers rapidly after all U.S. recessions – Hours worked no longer recovers (L-shaped)

  • But U.S. employment growth would have slowed anyway

– Krueger (2016), Gagnon, Johannsen, and Lopez-Salido (2016)

Has cyclical become structural? Maybe for hours…

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Slowing labor-force growth not (just) the Great Recession

  • 0.5

0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 labor force

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TFP has been consistent (and slow)

  • 0.5

0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5

Source: Fernald (2014a). Quarterly; samples end in Q4 of years shown except 1973 (end Q1) and 2016 (end Q2). Capital deepening is contribution of capital relative to quality-adjusted hours. Total factor productivity measured as a residual.

Business sector, percent change, annual rate

Contributions to growth in U.S. output per hour

Percent

1947-73 1973-95 1995-04 2004-07 '07-10 '10-16

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TFP has been consistent (and slow)

  • 0.5

0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5

Source: Fernald (2014a). Quarterly; samples end in Q4 of years shown except 1973 (end Q1) and 2016 (end Q2). Capital deepening is contribution of capital relative to quality-adjusted hours. Total factor productivity measured as a residual.

Business sector, percent change, annual rate

Contributions to growth in U.S. output per hour

Percent

TFP

Capital deepening Labor quality 1947-73 1973-95 1995-04 2004-07 '07-10 '10-16

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Capital: Unwinding of dynamics of Great Recession

80 85 90 95 100 105 110 970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 Pre-Crisis Projection

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Low growth is the new normal

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  • Demographics: Slow hours growth

– Gagnon et al (2016): 1-1/4 percent slowdown since 1980

  • If GDP per hour like 1973-95: GDP growth around 1¾ %
  • Likely optimistic: Plateau in educational attainment means

less growth in labor quality (Goldin-Katz, 2009; Jorgenson)

– Bosler, Daly, Fernald, Hobijn (2016): Around ¼ pp less growth from that source, implying GDP growth around 1½ %

Demographics: Low growth the new normal

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  • Paper finds that growth in recovery exceeded (slow) potential
  • Since 2007, TFP growth at its “typical” pace of past 40 years,

plus demographics, can explain disappointing GDP growth

  • May have to accept the new reality

Takeaway: Was the Great Recovery really ‘Elusive’?

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