When personalization meets direct democracy An analysis of the - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

When personalization meets direct democracy

An analysis of the determinants of voting in the Italian Constitutional referendum

Diego Garzia (University of Lucerne) Paolo Bellucci (University of Siena) Andrea De Angelis (University of Lucerne & EUI) Università di Roma “Sapienza” 10 Febbraio 2017

Point of departure

• Opinion formation in direct democratic

decisions (Kriesi, 2005)

• Systematic path (based on arguments)
• Heuristic path (parties, governments, etc.)

The legacy of the 2nd Italian Republic

• Pervasive personalization of politics

– Political communication in old and new media – Personal parties and personal leaders – Growing leader effects on political attitudes (partisanship) and voting behaviour – The “primacy of the political supply” hypothesis

Research Question

• What is the factor(s) that best explain the

reason why Italian voters voted in favor (or against) the reform?

Qual è la principale ragione per cui ha votato SI?

0,0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 perche' approvo il contenuto della riforma costituzionale per esprimere sostegno al Presidente del consiglio Renzi e al suo governo perche' ho seguito le indicazione del partito a cui mi sento piu' vicino perche' temevo le conseguenza economiche di una vittoria del No

Fonte: Inchiesta Post-Elettorale ITANES, Dicembre 2016

Qual è la principale ragione per cui ha votato NO?

0,0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 perche' non approvo il contenuto della riforma costituzionale perche' non sono d'accordo con la nuova legge elettorale (Italicum) per oppormi al Presidente del consiglio Renzi e al suo governo perche' ho seguito le indicazione del partito a cui mi sento piu' vicino

Fonte: Inchiesta Post-Elettorale ITANES, Dicembre 2016

End of the story?

• No… we suspect that social desirability bias is

playing a role

End of the story?

• Indeed… social desirability bias is playing a

role

• We move from self-assessments to actual

relationships between explanatory factors

Research Hypotheses

• H1: Voting choice is better explained by reliance
• n decisional shortcuts as compared to (cognitive

more demanding) evaluations of the actual contents of the Constitutional reform.

• H2: Based on the “personalization of politics”

theory, we expect that – among all decisional shortcuts – voters’ approval of the prime minister is the best predictor of their vote choice in the referendum

Operational Measures

• Systematic path

– Evaluation of Italicum – Evaluation of Constitutional Reform’s main features (reduction number senators, end of symmetric bicameralism, centralization, reduced quorum for referendums)

• Heuristic path

– Evaluation of national economic conditions (retro/socio) – Evaluation of government’s action on selected issues (economy, Jobs Act reform, immigration, school system's reform, tax reductions) – Strength of (PD) partisanship – Evaluation of Matteo Renzi (Thermometer)

From bivariate to multivariate evidence

• Every single measured taken into account is

significantly related to vote choice

• Strong patterns of covariance, to be ruled out

in a multivariate setting

• What is the model that best explains vote

choice in the 2016 referendum?

Modeling Strategy

• Multinomial logistic regression: base category

abstention Vs. YES / NO in turn

• Coefficients are odds ratios
• All models (including baseline model M0)

control for age, gender and education level

Model fit statistics

50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% baseline systematic heuristic composite economy partisanship government leader

% of correctly predicted cases by each model

Model fit statistics

50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% baseline systematic heuristic composite economy partisanship government leader

H1 CONFIRMED H2 CONFIRMED % of correctly predicted cases by each model

Le Ragioni del NO

(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Evaluation of Italicum 0.91 0.92 Evaluation of the Constitutional Reform Reduction number senators 1.02 1.02 End symmetric bicameralism 0.90* 0.91 Centralization 0.90* 0.94 Reduced quorum for referendums 1.04 1.07 Retro/Socio Economic Evaluation 0.92 0.76** 0.92 Assessment of Renzi Government Economy of R's local area 1.07 1.05 1.04 Jobs Act reform 0.95 0.94 0.98 Immigration 1.00 0.97 1.00 School system's reform 0.94 0.91 0.98 Tax reductions 0.97 0.95 0.99 Closeness to PD 0.81 0.62** 0.75 Thermometer Evaluation: Renzi 0.89* 0.84** 0.85** Pseudo R-Squared (Nagelkerke) .04 .51 .52 .24 .43 .27 .47 .62 % Correctly Predicted 55% 77% 78% 65% 75% 69% 76% 81% N 3027 2313 2666 2988 2725 3027 2918 2151

Le Ragioni del SI

(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Evaluation of Italicum 1.69** 1.46* Evaluation of the Constitutional Reform Reduction number senators 1.05 1.07 End symmetric bicameralism 1.31** 1.24** Centralization 1.18** 1.09 Reduced quorum for referendums 1.09 1.05 Retro/Socio Economic Evaluation 1.09 2.74** 1.03 Assessment of Renzi Government Economy of R's local area 1.05 1.10 0.99 Jobs Act reform 1.22** 1.33** 1.13 Immigration 0.91 0.94 0.95 School system's reform 0.97 1.03 0.94 Tax reductions 1.03 1.11 1.08 Closeness to PD 1.83** 3.18** 1.62* Thermometer Evaluation: Renzi 1.26** 1.57** 1.15* Pseudo R-Squared (Nagelkerke) .04 .51 .52 .24 .43 .27 .47 .62 % Correctly Predicted 55% 77% 78% 65% 75% 69% 76% 81% N 3027 2313 2666 2988 2725 3027 2918 2151

Conclusions

• Heuristics mattered more than content

– Inner complexity of the reform or response to the personalization imposed by the supply side?

• NO voters just disliked Renzi
• YES voters liked Renzi, but also Italicum, certain

features of the reform (and PD)

• Can we single out a single factor? And if yes, how???