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Virtual U: Defeating Face Liveness Detection by Building Virtual Models From Your Public Photos Yi Xu, True Price, Jan-Michael Frahm, and Fabian Monrose Department of Computer Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill USENIX Security


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Virtual U: Defeating Face Liveness Detection by Building Virtual Models From Your Public Photos

Yi Xu, True Price, Jan-Michael Frahm, and Fabian Monrose

Department of Computer Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill USENIX Security August 11, 2016

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Face Authentication: Convenient Security

image source

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Evolution of Adversarial Models

  • Attack: Still-image Spoofing
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Evolution of Adversarial Models

  • Attack: Still-image Spoofing
  • Defense: Liveness Detection
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SLIDE 5

Evolution of Adversarial Models

  • Attack: Still-image Spoofing
  • Defense: Liveness Detection
  • Attack:Video Spoofing
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Evolution of Adversarial Models

  • Attack: Still-image Spoofing
  • Defense: Liveness Detection
  • Attack:Video Spoofing
  • Defense: Motion Consistency
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SLIDE 7

Evolution of Adversarial Models

  • Attack: Still-image Spoofing
  • Defense: Liveness Detection
  • Attack:Video Spoofing
  • Defense: Motion Consistency
  • Attack: 3D-Printed Masks
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Virtual U: A New Attack

We introduce a new VR-based attack on face authentication systems solely using publicly available photos of the victim

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Virtual U: A New Attack

Input Web Photos Image-based Texturing

Gaze Correction

Viewing with Virtual Reality System

Landmark Extraction

3D Model Reconstruction

Expression Animation

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Leveraging Social Media

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Landmark Extraction

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3D Face Model

Expression Variation (e.g., frowning-to-smiling) Identity Variation (e.g., thin-to-heavyset)

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3D Face Model

Expression Variation (e.g., frowning-to-smiling) Identity Variation (e.g., thin-to-heavyset)

𝑇 = 𝑇 + 𝐵𝑗𝑒𝛽𝑗𝑒 + 𝐵𝑓𝑦𝑞𝛽𝑓𝑦𝑞 𝑇 𝐵𝑗𝑒 𝐵𝑓𝑦𝑞

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𝑇

3D Face Model

𝑇 = 𝑇 + 𝐵𝑗𝑒𝛽𝑗𝑒 + 𝐵𝑓𝑦𝑞𝛽𝑓𝑦𝑞

Reprojection

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3D Face Model

𝑇 = 𝑇 + 𝐵𝑗𝑒𝛽𝑗𝑒 + 𝐵𝑓𝑦𝑞𝛽𝑓𝑦𝑞

Pose 𝛽𝑗𝑒 𝛽𝑓𝑦𝑞

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3D Face Model

𝑇 = 𝑇 + 𝐵𝑗𝑒𝛽𝑗𝑒 + 𝐵𝑓𝑦𝑞𝛽𝑓𝑦𝑞

Pose 𝛽𝑗𝑒 𝛽𝑓𝑦𝑞

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3D Face Model

𝑇 = 𝑇 + 𝐵𝑗𝑒𝛽𝑗𝑒 + 𝐵𝑓𝑦𝑞𝛽𝑓𝑦𝑞

Pose 𝛽𝑗𝑒 𝛽𝑓𝑦𝑞

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3D Face Model

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3D Face Model

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3D Face Model

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3D Face Model

Pose 𝛽𝑓𝑦𝑞 Pose 𝛽𝑓𝑦𝑞 Pose 𝛽𝑓𝑦𝑞 Pose 𝛽𝑓𝑦𝑞 𝛽𝑗𝑒

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SLIDE 22

Multi-Image Modeling

Single image Multiple images

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Texturing

Direct T exturing 2D Poisson Editing

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Texturing

Direct T exturing 2D Poisson Editing 3D Poisson Editing

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Gaze Correction

R G B G B R

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Gaze Correction

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Virtual U: A New Attack

Input Web Photos Image-based Texturing

Gaze Correction

Viewing with Virtual Reality System

Landmark Extraction

3D Model Reconstruction

Expression Animation

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SLIDE 28

Expression Animation

Smiling Laughing Blinking Raising Eyebrows 𝑇 = 𝑇 + 𝐵𝑗𝑒𝛽𝑗𝑒 + 𝐵𝑓𝑦𝑞𝛽𝑓𝑦𝑞

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SLIDE 29

VR Display

Authentication Device Printed Marker VR System

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SLIDE 30

VR Display

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SLIDE 31

Experiments

Motion-based liveness detection Interaction-based liveness detection Texture-based liveness detection BioID KeyLemon Mobius TrueKey 1U

* *

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SLIDE 32

Experiments

  • 20 participants
  • Aged 24 to 44
  • 14 males, 6 females
  • Various ethnicities
  • Two tests
  • Indoor photo of the subject in the same environment as registration
  • Publicly accessible photos
  • Anywhere from 3 to 27 photos per person
  • Low-, medium-, and high-quality
  • Potentially strong changes in appearance over time
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SLIDE 33

Experiments

BioID KeyLemon Mobius TrueKey 1U

Indoor Image (Single frontal image)

100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

Online

  • Avg. #Tries

85% 1.6 80% 1.5 70% 1.3 55% 1.7 0%

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SLIDE 34

Observations

  • Medium- and high-resolution photos work best
  • Photos from professional photographers (weddings, etc.)
  • Only a small number of photos required
  • One or two forward-facing photos
  • One or two higher-resolution photos
  • Group photos provide consistent frontal views
  • Often lower resolution
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Experiments

How does resolution affect reconstruction quality?

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Experiments

How does rotation affect reconstruction quality?

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SLIDE 37

Experiments

Combining high-res rotation with low-res front-facing? +

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Experiments

  • Virtual U is successful

against liveness detection

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SLIDE 39

Experiments

  • Virtual U is successful

against liveness detection

  • Also successful against

motion consistency

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Experiments

  • “Seeing Your Face is Not Enough: An Inertial Sensor-Based Liveness

Detection for Face Authentication” (Li et al., ACM CCS’15)

  • Device motion measured by inertial sensor data
  • Head pose estimated from input video
  • Train a classifier to identify

real data (correlated signals) versus spoofed video data

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Experiments

Training Data (Pos. Data vs. Neg. Data)

T est Result (Accept Rate)

Real Face Video Spoof

VR Spoof

Real vs. Video

98.0% 1.0% 99.5%

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SLIDE 42

Experiments

Training Data (Pos. Data vs. Neg. Data)

T est Result (Accept Rate)

Real Face Video Spoof

VR Spoof

Real vs. Video

98.0% 1.0% 99.5%

Real vs. Video +VR

67.0% 0.0% 50.0%

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Experiments

Training Data (Pos. Data vs. Neg. Data)

T est Result (Accept Rate)

Real Face Video Spoof

VR Spoof

Real vs. Video

98.0% 1.0% 99.5%

Real vs. Video +VR

67.0% 0.0% 50.0% Real vs. VR 67.0%

  • 51.0%
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Mitigations

  • Alternative/additional hardware
  • Infrared imaging (e.g. Windows Hello)
  • Random structured light projection

image source

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Mitigations

  • Alternative/additional hardware
  • Infrared imaging (e.g. Windows Hello)
  • Random structured light projection
  • Improved defense against

low-resolution synthetic textures

Original Downsized to 50px

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Conclusion

  • We introduce a new

VR-based attack on face authentication systems solely using publicly available photos of the victim

  • This attack bypasses existing defenses of liveness detection and

motion consistency

  • At a minimum, face authentication software must improve against VR-

based attacks with low-resolution textures

  • The increasing ubiquity of VR will continue to challenge computer-

vision-based authentication systems

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SLIDE 47

Thank you!

Questions?

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SLIDE 48
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SLIDE 49

Overview

  • Face Authentication
  • Virtual U: A

VR-based attack

  • Evaluation
  • Mitigations
  • Conclusion
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SLIDE 50

Evolution of Adversarial Models

  • Attack: Still-image Spoofing
  • Defense: Liveness Detection
  • Attack:Video Spoofing
  • Defense: Motion Consistency
  • Attack: 3D-Printed Masks
  • Defense: Texture Detection
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SLIDE 51

3D Face Model

Expression Variation (e.g., frowning-to-smiling) Identity Variation (e.g., thin-to-heavyset)

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SLIDE 52

3D Face Model

Expression Variation (e.g., frowning-to-smiling) Identity Variation (e.g., thin-to-heavyset)

𝑇 = 𝑇 + 𝐵𝑗𝑒𝛽𝑗𝑒 + 𝐵𝑓𝑦𝑞𝛽𝑓𝑦𝑞 𝑇 𝐵𝑗𝑒 𝐵𝑓𝑦𝑞

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𝑇

3D Face Model

𝑇 = 𝑇 + 𝐵𝑗𝑒𝛽𝑗𝑒 + 𝐵𝑓𝑦𝑞𝛽𝑓𝑦𝑞

Reprojection

min

𝑄,𝛽𝑗𝑒,𝛽𝑓𝑦𝑞 𝑗

𝑡𝑗 − 𝑄𝑇𝑗

2 + 𝛾𝑗𝑒 𝛽𝑗𝑒 2 + 𝛾𝑓𝑦𝑞 𝛽𝑓𝑦𝑞 2

Normalization Pose Summed over all landmarks

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3D Face Model

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Multi-Image Modeling

min

𝑄,𝛽𝑗𝑒,𝛽𝑓𝑦𝑞 𝑗

𝑡𝑗 − 𝑄𝑇𝑗

2 + 𝛾𝑗𝑒 𝛽𝑗𝑒 2 + 𝛾𝑓𝑦𝑞 𝛽𝑓𝑦𝑞 2

Single Image

min

𝑄,𝛽𝑗𝑒,𝛽𝑓𝑦𝑞 𝑛 𝑗

𝑡𝑛𝑗 − 𝑄

𝑛𝑇𝑛𝑗 2 + 𝛾𝑗𝑒 𝛽𝑗𝑒 2 + 𝛾𝑓𝑦𝑞 𝑛

𝛽𝑛

𝑓𝑦𝑞 2

Multiple Images

Sum over all images

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Multi-Image Modeling

Corners of the eyes and mouth are stable landmarks Contour points are variable landmarks

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Multi-Image Modeling

min

𝑄,𝛽𝑗𝑒,𝛽𝑓𝑦𝑞 𝑛 𝑗

𝑡𝑛𝑗 − 𝑄

𝑛𝑇𝑛𝑗 2 + 𝑜𝑝𝑠𝑛.

Multiple Images

min

𝑄,𝛽𝑗𝑒,𝛽𝑓𝑦𝑞 𝑛 𝑗

1 𝜏𝑗

𝑡 2 𝑡𝑛𝑗 − 𝑄 𝑛𝑇𝑛𝑗 2 + 𝑜𝑝𝑠𝑛.

Multiple Images with Landmark Weighting

Higher weighting for stable landmarks

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SLIDE 58
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SLIDE 59
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SLIDE 60

Experiments

  • 20 participants
  • Aged 24 to 44
  • 14 males, 6 females
  • Various ethnicities
  • Two tests
  • Indoor photo of the subject in the same environment as registration
  • Publicly accessible photos
  • Anywhere from 3 to 27 photos per person
  • Low-, medium-, and high-quality
  • Potentially strong changes in appearance over time
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SLIDE 61

Experiments

How does rotation affect reconstruction quality?

20 30 40 20 30 40

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SLIDE 62

Experiments

Authentication Device VR System Google Cardboard