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UPnP: Unlimited Proxies and Pwnage Waylon Grange Sr. Threat - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

UPnP: Unlimited Proxies and Pwnage Waylon Grange Sr. Threat Researcher, Symantec @professor__plum Exploits long forgotten UPnP (SSDP) DDoS P n P U Most people think of DDoS attacks when asked about UPnP abuse These attacks are


  1. UPnP: Unlimited Proxies and Pwnage Waylon Grange Sr. Threat Researcher, Symantec @professor__plum

  2. Exploits long forgotten

  3. UPnP (SSDP) DDoS P n P U • Most people think of DDoS attacks when asked about UPnP abuse • These attacks are actually SSDP P n P P n U P • Service used to discover the UPnP port U • Has roughly a 30x magnification ratio

  4. Script kiddies and DDoS

  5. in a nut shell Yo, open up port 3074 and forward it to 192.168.0.5:3074 so I can gamez! I got ya bro

  6. UPnP AddPortMapping

  7. UPnP observed Yo, open up port 3074 and… actually just give me a shell I got ya bro

  8. OSVDB-94924

  9. As if it wasn’t bad enough Yo, I want a shell too I got ya bro

  10. Doesn’t anyone notice this?

  11. Satori "awakening" • Mirai varient • Started up in early December • Exploited UPnP • > 1/2 million bots in 4 days • C2 host was null routed to kill botnet • Author Dox’ed, source code released

  12. GetGenericPortMappingEntry

  13. Router management interfaces

  14. ipTime backdoor

  15. Who’s interface is it anyway? Yo, open up port 45670 and forward it to duckduckgo.com:443 I got ya bro

  16. 4 million vulnerable devices

  17. So who’s using this? 1% • 62% were to Google DNS • Censorship avoidance? 37% • 37% were to Web Analytics servers • Mostly to *.trafficjunky.net 62% • Click fraud / Advertising? • <1% was something else… DNS Web Ads Other *data source Akamai

  18. Onion routing • One group chained together router proxies • Process of building and tearing down connections appeared automated • UPnP command packet also forwarded through routers • Each port is first connected to duckduckgo for testing before use in tunnel *Image source wikipedia

  19. Inception group • Active since 2014 or earlier • Targeting Embassies, Energy, Aerospace, Defense, Government, Media, Research • Toolset includes Windows, *nix, Android, iOS, and Blackberry • Known to insert ‘false flags’ to mislead researcher • High level of OPSEC • Makes extensive used of public infrastructure for C&C

  20. Decoy documents

  21. Recon documents

  22. Remote exploit document

  23. Inception windows core module

  24. Don’t forget to take out the trash • Malware is configured to delete plugins from cloud provider once they are downloaded • One cloud provider would send deleted files to a recycle bin • Recovered 1 years worth of victim tasking

  25. Plugins detected • Detailed survey module • Domain membership, processes/loaded modules, hardware enumeration, installed products, logical and mapped drive info • File hunting module • Can match on regex patterns • Browser history, stored passwords and session stealing module • IE, Chrome, Opera, Firefox, Torch, Yandex • File listing • Works on local or remote drives (can map additional paths given credentials)

  26. Cloud logs

  27. Example C&C channel path

  28. UPnP honey pot • Please make it a smart honey box, don’t be a blind proxy • SSL traffic can be intercepted! • Geographic region does make a difference • UPnP Commands to support • AddPortMapping • GetGenericPortMappingEntry • DeletePortMapping

  29. Acknowledgements

  30. Thank you Waylon Grange @professor__plum

  31. Inception Android C2 dead drops

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