Trevor Findlay Professor, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa Senior Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs Harvard Kennedy School
why a cultural approach? organizational culture theory defining safeguards culture creators, purveyors & guardians cultural context―IAEA, UN, national c ultural change: IAEA safeguards culture before and after Iraq (1991) safeguards sub-cultures conclusions/recommendations
‘safeguards culture’ used by IAEA, government officials, experts no IAEA study or documents or academic or other research no agreed international definition (unlike nuclear safety & security) advances in safety and security cultures suggest need for attention to safeguards culture IAEA set out to change safeguards culture along with strengthened safeguards the cultural approach is revealing
Artifacts Visible organizational structures & processes ↑↓ Espoused values Strategies, goals, philosophies ↑↓ Basic underlying assumptions Unconscious, taken-for-granted beliefs, perceptions, thoughts, feelings, habits
powerful, latent, often unconscious born of habit: ‘the way we do things around here’ affects individual & collective behaviour dysfunctional culture may cause organizational failure hard to change change easiest after crisis forced change may have unintended consequences leadership and incentives are key
Safety C Cult lture re: ‘assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority , protection and safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance’ ( IAEA Glossary ) Securit rity c cult lture re :‘assembly of characteristics, attitudes and behavior of individuals, organizations and institutions which serves as a means to support and enhance nuclear security’ (IAEA Implementing Guide , 2008) Safeguards c cult lture re: assembly of characteristics, attitudes and behavior of individuals and organizations which supports nuclear safeguards as a vital means of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons
IAEA • General Conference, Board of Governors, member states • Director General and Deputy DGs • Departm tment t of S f Safe feguards (policy, m man anag agement, an anal alys ysts, la labs bs, in inspe pectors) • other departments (Legal, Public Information) regional l non on- organi anizations ns gover ernme mental/ EURATOM, scie ientif ific ic ABACC, nuclear communi unity weapon-free e.g. INMM, zone ESARDA, VERTIC, states organizations MTA • foreign ministries • safeguards authorities (State Systems of Accounting and Control) • atomic energy authorities and labs • nuclear industry
IAEA science and technology-based in the UN system but not a UN body interacts principally with member states, not with nuclear industry ‘Spirit of Vienna’ (fading fast) stove-piping versus One House UN process-oriented (diplomatic procedures, conferences, documentation, interpretation/translation) deferential to member states geographical balance and political factors in recruitment semi-permanent international civil service National multinational individual cultures in a Western cultural framework
Pre re-1991 991 Now ow Legal artifacts IAEA Statute; NPT; + Strengthened INFCIRC/153 safeguards; Additional agreements; SQPs Protocols; revised SQPs Planning artifacts Programme and + Strategic Plan Budget Process artifacts inspectors reports; + State- Level Concept; safeguards conclusion; state evaluation special inspections groups; country officers; integrated safeguards; ‘broader conclusion’; open source information; intelligence
Pre re-1991 991 Now ow safeguards non- discriminatory; no change technically based; effective; efficient as possible diversion the most likely non- all acquisition paths worth compliance scenario considering emphasis on declared materials, emphasis on correctness and activities and facilities completeness; undeclared materials/activities/facilities important inspectors focused on nuclear inspectors expected to be more accountancy; prescriptive, inquisitive, investigatory, criteria-driven approach innovative only declarations and inspection all sources of information useful information valid for drawing to draw ‘broader conclusion’ safeguards conclusions
Pre re-1991 991 now now safeguards can only do what states the Agency has more rights allow effectiveness depends on state states have increased obligations cooperation to provide information, access, effective SSACs effectiveness depends on adequate no change funding (zero real growth a constant refrain) safeguards personnel are safeguards personnel are better professional, trained, dedicated trained than ever special inspections a right in case special inspections reaffirmed as of undeclared activities Agency right in special cases
Pre re-1991 991 now ( (de desir irable le) detecting undeclared correctness and completeness material/facilities not part of the vital (‘still no expeditions, but we job (‘we don’t go on fishing now worry about all types of fish’) expeditions’) inspectors dominate data close collaboration between collection, analysis, planning & inspectors, analysts, planners, management labs & managers; all make valuable contribution tick the boxes, replace the inquisitiveness, resourcefulness, batteries and go ; be deferential initiative will be rewarded to states; ‘don’t rock the boat’ safeguards findings not always all safeguards findings taken taken into account ‘upstairs’ seriously inspectors not always well inspectors well recruited, trained recruited, trained or dedicated and imbued with new culture
how strong and pervasive is the culture? what do people think of as right, proper, moral, and fair? what do the mission, strategy, goals, and rewards mean to people? what subcultures exist across groups or between managers and workers? what are the consistencies and contradictions in work practices, norms, rituals, role models, symbols, stories, training programs, rules, incentive plans?
Inspe pectors tra radit ditio ional ‘s l ‘star r pe perf rform rmers’ scie ientif ific ic/technic ical, f l, fact-orie iented, d, in indiv dividu idualis listic ic ‘pro ‘professio ionali lism m mark rked by d by tenacity a and d re respe pect’ ’ (ElBaradei) clo losely ly-knit it du due to share red e d expe periences & & membe ber s r states’ ’ crit ritic icis ism wis ish t to pre preserve s status and d be benefit its Analysts relatively new in safeguards; injecting themselves into a 50-year old culture also technical and fact-oriented, but desk-bound and with varied backgrounds (political science, intelligence, IT), more accustomed to collaborative work value all information, not just inspection data, including qualitative (subjective?)
Manager gers ma may not not ha have s safeguards/inspector or b backgrou ounds, b but ut ma mana nagerial or or othe other conc oncerned w with e th effectiveness, e efficiency and nd str trate tegic pla plannin ing mus must ta t take a all factor tors i into nto accoun ount i in n assessing complia pliance ope pera ratio ional div l divis isio ions m may have t their ir own cult ltures, a , as may Concepts & Planning; Information Management and Technical l & Scie ientif ific ic Serv rvic ices management le leade ders rship ( p (pe pers rsonalit lity) k key t to cult ltura ral l for orma mati tion on/change
IAEA safeguards culture is robust cultural change has undoubtedly occurred in artifacts and espoused values since 1991 current artifacts and espoused values generally consistent but are underlying assumptions consistent with artifacts and espoused values? different effects of cultural change on sub- cultures: management, analysts, inspectors
seek agreement on definition of safeguards culture commission baseline study of state of the culture, including interaction of sub-cultures monitor health of the culture periodically (as in nuclear safety and security fields) ensure artifacts, espoused values and underlying assumptions are in line
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