SLIDE 1 Jordan Matsudaira Columbia University Lesley J. Turner Vanderbilt University
Towards a Framework for Accountability in Higher Education
September 8, 2020 | Brookings Institution Conference on Regulation & Accountability
SLIDE 2 Defining the Problem
- At some postsecondary institutions and programs, students
regularly (and predictably) experience poor outcomes
SLIDE 3 Defining the Problem
- At some postsecondary institutions and programs, students
regularly (and predictably) experience poor outcomes
– Low earnings
SLIDE 4 Defining the Problem
- At some postsecondary institutions and programs, students
regularly (and predictably) experience poor outcomes
– Low earnings – Unmanageable debt
SLIDE 5 Defining the Problem
- At some postsecondary institutions and programs, students
regularly (and predictably) experience poor outcomes
– Low earnings – Unmanageable debt
- Past higher education accountability efforts improved student
- utcomes, but old systems need to be adapted to new
realities in higher education
SLIDE 6 Defining the Problem
- At some postsecondary institutions and programs, students
regularly (and predictably) experience poor outcomes
– Low earnings – Unmanageable debt
- Past higher education accountability efforts improved student
- utcomes, but old systems need to be adapted to new
realities in higher education
- Minimum standards for outcomes that students value are not
as elusive: federal aid should “do no harm”
SLIDE 7 Principles for Accountability Metrics
1. Represent unambiguously positive outcomes for students 2. Minimum acceptable performance to set thresholds 3. Difficult to manipulate (outside of actually improving student
4. Simple and easy to understand 5. Measured over time horizon that allows action before too many students are harmed but also ensures accuracy 6. Applied to all sectors (as many as possible)
SLIDE 8
Proposed Metrics Net earnings Loan repayment rate
SLIDE 9 Net earnings premium
- Do at least half of former students earn above typical high school
graduates in their state after accounting for their education costs?
SLIDE 10 Net earnings premium
- Do at least half of former students earn above typical high school
graduates in their state after accounting for their education costs?
Net earnings premium = (median earnings | working) – (median O.O.P. costs) – (median HS earnings)
SLIDE 11 Net earnings premium
- Do at least half of former students earn above typical high school
graduates in their state after accounting for their education costs?
Net earnings premium = (median earnings | working) – (median O.O.P. costs) – (median HS earnings)
- Measured 3 years after program exit
- Includes noncompleters
SLIDE 12 Net earnings premium
- Do at least half of former students earn above typical high school
graduates in their state after accounting for their education costs?
Net earnings premium = (median earnings | working) – (median O.O.P. costs) – (median HS earnings)
- Out-of-pocket expenditures on tuition and fees net of grant aid
- Amortization period: 10 (sub-BA), 15 (BA), or 20 (post-BA) years
SLIDE 13 Net earnings premium
- Do at least half of former students earn above typical high school
graduates in their state after accounting for their education costs?
Net earnings premium = (median earnings | working) – (median O.O.P. costs) – (median HS earnings)
- State-level earnings for all high school graduates, 25-35 years old
- Automatic adjustment for business cycle, regional fluctuations
SLIDE 14 Net earnings premium
- Do at least half of former students earn above typical high school
graduates in their state after accounting for their education costs?
Net earnings premium = (median earnings | working) – (median O.O.P. costs) – (median HS earnings)
- Would require slight changes in reporting for data already collected
– Could be achieved through sharing 1098‐T data with ED
SLIDE 15 Loan repayment rate
- Can a cohort of borrowers reduce their outstanding student debt by
at least $1, three years after entering repayment?
SLIDE 16 Loan repayment rate
- Can a cohort of borrowers reduce their outstanding student debt by
at least $1, three years after entering repayment?
Loan repayment rate 1 Balance at 3 years Balance at repayment
SLIDE 17 Loan repayment rate
- Can a cohort of borrowers reduce their outstanding student debt by
at least $1, three years after entering repayment?
Loan repayment rate 1 Balance at 3 years Balance at repayment
- Principal + interest 3 years after entering repayment
- Excludes borrowers who have died, become disabled, those with in-
school or military deferments
SLIDE 18 Loan repayment rate
- Can a cohort of borrowers reduce their outstanding student debt by
at least $1, three years after entering repayment?
Loan repayment rate 1 Balance at 3 years Balance at repayment
- Principal + interest at repayment
- Excludes borrowers who died, become disabled, received in-school
- r military deferments at year 3
SLIDE 19 Loan repayment rate
- Can a cohort of borrowers reduce their outstanding student debt by
at least $1, three years after entering repayment?
Loan repayment rate 1 Balance at 3 years Balance at repayment
- Greater than 1 if balance has increased => negative loan RR
- Less than 1 if balance has decreased => positive RR
SLIDE 20 Proposed metrics
- Program versus school‐level measurement
SLIDE 21 Proposed metrics
- Program versus school‐level measurement
SLIDE 22 Proposed metrics
- Program versus school‐level measurement
- Defining programs
– 2‐digit CIP code – Allows sufficient sample sizes to cover 91% of all students (51% of programs) – Very little difference in performance with more detailed CIP
SLIDE 23 Proposed metrics
- Program versus school‐level measurement
- Defining programs
– 2‐digit CIP code – Allows sufficient sample sizes to cover 91% of all students (51% of programs) – Very little difference in performance with more detailed CIP
- Why two separate measures?
– Schools that opt‐out of loan programs remain covered – Under‐reporting of earnings in certain occupations – Incentives for programs to reduce OOP costs
SLIDE 24 Proposed metrics
- Program versus school‐level measurement
- Defining programs
– 2‐digit CIP code – Allows sufficient sample sizes to cover 91% of all students (51% of programs) – Very little difference in performance with more detailed CIP
- Why two separate measures?
– Schools that opt‐out of loan programs remain covered – Under‐reporting of earnings in certain occupations – Incentives for programs to reduce OOP costs
– College scorecard program‐level earnings + program‐level loan balances – CAVEAT: best approximation of performance with available data
SLIDE 25 Percent of students in programs with both negative earnings premia and negative repayment rates
7% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16%
SLIDE 26 Percent of students in programs with both negative earnings premia and negative repayment rates
7% 14% 12% 1% 0.5% 1% 1% 3% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16%
SLIDE 27 Percent of students in programs with both negative earnings premia and negative repayment rates
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
All programs Certificate Associate Bachelor's Graduate certificate Master's Doctoral 1st professional
Public institutions Nonprofit institutions For‐profit institutions
SLIDE 28 Percent of students in programs with both negative earnings premia and negative repayment rates
7% 14% 12% 1% 0.5% 1% 1% 3% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16%
What this means for students in these programs:
- >500,000 students per year
- $6.2b in federal student debt at exit
- $6.4b in federal loans 3 years later
- Est $6.8b in out‐of‐pocket costs
- 2 out of 3 students came from schools with alternative
programs that would provide positive net earnings and/or loan repayment
SLIDE 29
% of students in failing progs All institutions Public institutions Nonprofit institutions For‐profit institutions 0% 0.79 0.75 0.91 0.73 1‐25% 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.04 25‐75% 0.05 0.09 0.02 0.04 75‐99% 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 100% 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.18
What this means for schools
SLIDE 30
% of students in failing progs All institutions Public institutions Nonprofit institutions For‐profit institutions 0% 0.79 0.75 0.91 0.73 1‐25% 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.04 25‐75% 0.05 0.09 0.02 0.04 75‐99% 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 100% 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.18
What this means for schools
SLIDE 31
% of students in failing progs All institutions Public institutions Nonprofit institutions For‐profit institutions 0% 0.79 0.75 0.91 0.73 1‐25% 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.04 25‐75% 0.05 0.09 0.02 0.04 75‐99% 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 100% 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.18
What this means for schools
SLIDE 32
% of students in failing progs All institutions Public institutions Nonprofit institutions For‐profit institutions 0% 0.79 0.75 0.91 0.73 1‐25% 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.04 25‐75% 0.05 0.09 0.02 0.04 75‐99% 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 100% 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.18
What this means for schools
SLIDE 33 % of students in failing progs All institutions Public institutions Nonprofit institutions For‐profit institutions 0% 0.79 0.75 0.91 0.73 1‐25% 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.04 25‐75% 0.05 0.09 0.02 0.04 75‐99% 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 100% 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.18
What this means for schools
- In schools with at least 1 failing program:
– Public: only 10% of schools had more than 90% of programs fail – For‐profit: over 50% of schools had all failing programs
SLIDE 34
Coming Soon: Visualization Tool
SLIDE 35
Coming Soon: Visualization Tool
SLIDE 36
Thank you!
Jordan Matsudaira jm4763@tc.columbia.edu Lesley J. Turner lesley.j.turner@vanderbilt.edu
SLIDE 37
Bonus slides
SLIDE 38
Undergraduate Certificate Programs
SLIDE 39 Undergraduate Certificate Programs
Percent of all undergraduate certificate students in this field
SLIDE 40 Undergraduate Certificate Programs
Borrowers reduced aggregate balance by at least $1
SLIDE 41 Undergraduate Certificate Programs
Borrowers’ aggregate balances had increased
SLIDE 42 Undergraduate Certificate Programs
Distribution of repayment rates for public institution certificate programs in Allied Health fields
SLIDE 43 Undergraduate Certificate Programs
Median repayment rate => more than 50% of students formerly enrolled in Allied Health certificate programs in public schools made progress in paying down their loans within 3 years
SLIDE 44 Undergraduate Certificate Programs
75th percentile => 25% of students formerly enrolled in Allied Health certificate programs in public schools had reduced their aggregate loan balances by >7%
SLIDE 45 Undergraduate Certificate Programs
25th percentile => 25% of students formerly enrolled in Allied Health certificate programs had aggregate loan balances that had increased by >2.5%
SLIDE 46 Undergraduate Certificate Programs
Students from the program with the lowest repayment rate had balances that were ~17% higher
SLIDE 47 Undergraduate Certificate Programs
Students from the program with the highest repayment rate had balances that were ~20% lower
SLIDE 48
Undergraduate Certificate Programs
SLIDE 49 Undergraduate Certificate Programs
Higher net earnings than high school graduates
SLIDE 50 Undergraduate Certificate Programs
Lower net earnings than high school graduates
SLIDE 51 Undergraduate Certificate Programs
Median net earnings premium => more than half of all students formerly enrolled in Allied Health certificate programs in public schools earned more than the typical HS graduate (after accounting for out-of-pocket costs)
SLIDE 52 Undergraduate Certificate Programs
75th percentile => 25% of former Allied Health certificate program students earned more than $13,000 above the typical HS graduate (after accounting for costs)
SLIDE 53 Undergraduate Certificate Programs
25th percentile => 25% of former Allied Health certificate program students had a net earnings premium less than $4000
SLIDE 54 Undergraduate Certificate Programs
A small % of students had substantially lower net earnings than typical HS grad
SLIDE 55
Undergraduate Certificate Programs
SLIDE 56
Undergraduate Certificate Programs
SLIDE 57
Undergraduate Associate Degree Programs
SLIDE 58
Undergraduate Bachelor’s Degree Programs
SLIDE 59
Undergraduate Bachelor’s Degree Programs
SLIDE 60
Master’s Degree Programs
SLIDE 61
Doctoral Degree Programs
SLIDE 62
First Professional Degree Programs