Towards a Framework for Accountability in Higher Education Jordan - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Towards a Framework for Accountability in Higher Education Jordan - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Towards a Framework for Accountability in Higher Education Jordan Matsudaira Lesley J. Turner Columbia University Vanderbilt University September 8, 2020 | Brookings Institution Conference on Regulation & Accountability Defining the Problem


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Jordan Matsudaira Columbia University Lesley J. Turner Vanderbilt University

Towards a Framework for Accountability in Higher Education

September 8, 2020 | Brookings Institution Conference on Regulation & Accountability

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Defining the Problem

  • At some postsecondary institutions and programs, students

regularly (and predictably) experience poor outcomes

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Defining the Problem

  • At some postsecondary institutions and programs, students

regularly (and predictably) experience poor outcomes

– Low earnings

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Defining the Problem

  • At some postsecondary institutions and programs, students

regularly (and predictably) experience poor outcomes

– Low earnings – Unmanageable debt

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Defining the Problem

  • At some postsecondary institutions and programs, students

regularly (and predictably) experience poor outcomes

– Low earnings – Unmanageable debt

  • Past higher education accountability efforts improved student
  • utcomes, but old systems need to be adapted to new

realities in higher education

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Defining the Problem

  • At some postsecondary institutions and programs, students

regularly (and predictably) experience poor outcomes

– Low earnings – Unmanageable debt

  • Past higher education accountability efforts improved student
  • utcomes, but old systems need to be adapted to new

realities in higher education

  • Minimum standards for outcomes that students value are not

as elusive: federal aid should “do no harm”

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Principles for Accountability Metrics

1. Represent unambiguously positive outcomes for students 2. Minimum acceptable performance to set thresholds 3. Difficult to manipulate (outside of actually improving student

  • utcomes)

4. Simple and easy to understand 5. Measured over time horizon that allows action before too many students are harmed but also ensures accuracy 6. Applied to all sectors (as many as possible)

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Proposed Metrics Net earnings Loan repayment rate

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Net earnings premium

  • Do at least half of former students earn above typical high school

graduates in their state after accounting for their education costs?

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Net earnings premium

  • Do at least half of former students earn above typical high school

graduates in their state after accounting for their education costs?

Net earnings premium = (median earnings | working) – (median O.O.P. costs) – (median HS earnings)

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Net earnings premium

  • Do at least half of former students earn above typical high school

graduates in their state after accounting for their education costs?

Net earnings premium = (median earnings | working) – (median O.O.P. costs) – (median HS earnings)

  • Measured 3 years after program exit
  • Includes noncompleters
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Net earnings premium

  • Do at least half of former students earn above typical high school

graduates in their state after accounting for their education costs?

Net earnings premium = (median earnings | working) – (median O.O.P. costs) – (median HS earnings)

  • Out-of-pocket expenditures on tuition and fees net of grant aid
  • Amortization period: 10 (sub-BA), 15 (BA), or 20 (post-BA) years
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Net earnings premium

  • Do at least half of former students earn above typical high school

graduates in their state after accounting for their education costs?

Net earnings premium = (median earnings | working) – (median O.O.P. costs) – (median HS earnings)

  • State-level earnings for all high school graduates, 25-35 years old
  • Automatic adjustment for business cycle, regional fluctuations
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Net earnings premium

  • Do at least half of former students earn above typical high school

graduates in their state after accounting for their education costs?

Net earnings premium = (median earnings | working) – (median O.O.P. costs) – (median HS earnings)

  • Would require slight changes in reporting for data already collected

– Could be achieved through sharing 1098‐T data with ED

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Loan repayment rate

  • Can a cohort of borrowers reduce their outstanding student debt by

at least $1, three years after entering repayment?

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Loan repayment rate

  • Can a cohort of borrowers reduce their outstanding student debt by

at least $1, three years after entering repayment?

Loan repayment rate 1 Balance at 3 years Balance at repayment

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Loan repayment rate

  • Can a cohort of borrowers reduce their outstanding student debt by

at least $1, three years after entering repayment?

Loan repayment rate 1 Balance at 3 years Balance at repayment

  • Principal + interest 3 years after entering repayment
  • Excludes borrowers who have died, become disabled, those with in-

school or military deferments

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Loan repayment rate

  • Can a cohort of borrowers reduce their outstanding student debt by

at least $1, three years after entering repayment?

Loan repayment rate 1 Balance at 3 years Balance at repayment

  • Principal + interest at repayment
  • Excludes borrowers who died, become disabled, received in-school
  • r military deferments at year 3
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Loan repayment rate

  • Can a cohort of borrowers reduce their outstanding student debt by

at least $1, three years after entering repayment?

Loan repayment rate 1 Balance at 3 years Balance at repayment

  • Greater than 1 if balance has increased => negative loan RR
  • Less than 1 if balance has decreased => positive RR
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Proposed metrics

  • Program versus school‐level measurement
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Proposed metrics

  • Program versus school‐level measurement
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Proposed metrics

  • Program versus school‐level measurement
  • Defining programs

– 2‐digit CIP code – Allows sufficient sample sizes to cover 91% of all students (51% of programs) – Very little difference in performance with more detailed CIP

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Proposed metrics

  • Program versus school‐level measurement
  • Defining programs

– 2‐digit CIP code – Allows sufficient sample sizes to cover 91% of all students (51% of programs) – Very little difference in performance with more detailed CIP

  • Why two separate measures?

– Schools that opt‐out of loan programs remain covered – Under‐reporting of earnings in certain occupations – Incentives for programs to reduce OOP costs

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Proposed metrics

  • Program versus school‐level measurement
  • Defining programs

– 2‐digit CIP code – Allows sufficient sample sizes to cover 91% of all students (51% of programs) – Very little difference in performance with more detailed CIP

  • Why two separate measures?

– Schools that opt‐out of loan programs remain covered – Under‐reporting of earnings in certain occupations – Incentives for programs to reduce OOP costs

  • Modeling performance

– College scorecard program‐level earnings + program‐level loan balances – CAVEAT: best approximation of performance with available data

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Percent of students in programs with both negative earnings premia and negative repayment rates

7% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16%

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Percent of students in programs with both negative earnings premia and negative repayment rates

7% 14% 12% 1% 0.5% 1% 1% 3% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16%

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Percent of students in programs with both negative earnings premia and negative repayment rates

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%

All programs Certificate Associate Bachelor's Graduate certificate Master's Doctoral 1st professional

Public institutions Nonprofit institutions For‐profit institutions

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Percent of students in programs with both negative earnings premia and negative repayment rates

7% 14% 12% 1% 0.5% 1% 1% 3% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16%

What this means for students in these programs:

  • >500,000 students per year
  • $6.2b in federal student debt at exit
  • $6.4b in federal loans 3 years later
  • Est $6.8b in out‐of‐pocket costs
  • 2 out of 3 students came from schools with alternative

programs that would provide positive net earnings and/or loan repayment

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% of students in failing progs All institutions Public institutions Nonprofit institutions For‐profit institutions 0% 0.79 0.75 0.91 0.73 1‐25% 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.04 25‐75% 0.05 0.09 0.02 0.04 75‐99% 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 100% 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.18

What this means for schools

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% of students in failing progs All institutions Public institutions Nonprofit institutions For‐profit institutions 0% 0.79 0.75 0.91 0.73 1‐25% 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.04 25‐75% 0.05 0.09 0.02 0.04 75‐99% 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 100% 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.18

What this means for schools

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% of students in failing progs All institutions Public institutions Nonprofit institutions For‐profit institutions 0% 0.79 0.75 0.91 0.73 1‐25% 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.04 25‐75% 0.05 0.09 0.02 0.04 75‐99% 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 100% 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.18

What this means for schools

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% of students in failing progs All institutions Public institutions Nonprofit institutions For‐profit institutions 0% 0.79 0.75 0.91 0.73 1‐25% 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.04 25‐75% 0.05 0.09 0.02 0.04 75‐99% 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 100% 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.18

What this means for schools

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% of students in failing progs All institutions Public institutions Nonprofit institutions For‐profit institutions 0% 0.79 0.75 0.91 0.73 1‐25% 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.04 25‐75% 0.05 0.09 0.02 0.04 75‐99% 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 100% 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.18

What this means for schools

  • In schools with at least 1 failing program:

– Public: only 10% of schools had more than 90% of programs fail – For‐profit: over 50% of schools had all failing programs

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Coming Soon: Visualization Tool

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Coming Soon: Visualization Tool

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Thank you!

Jordan Matsudaira jm4763@tc.columbia.edu Lesley J. Turner lesley.j.turner@vanderbilt.edu

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Bonus slides

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Undergraduate Certificate Programs

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Undergraduate Certificate Programs

Percent of all undergraduate certificate students in this field

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Undergraduate Certificate Programs

Borrowers reduced aggregate balance by at least $1

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Undergraduate Certificate Programs

Borrowers’ aggregate balances had increased

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Undergraduate Certificate Programs

Distribution of repayment rates for public institution certificate programs in Allied Health fields

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Undergraduate Certificate Programs

Median repayment rate => more than 50% of students formerly enrolled in Allied Health certificate programs in public schools made progress in paying down their loans within 3 years

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Undergraduate Certificate Programs

75th percentile => 25% of students formerly enrolled in Allied Health certificate programs in public schools had reduced their aggregate loan balances by >7%

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Undergraduate Certificate Programs

25th percentile => 25% of students formerly enrolled in Allied Health certificate programs had aggregate loan balances that had increased by >2.5%

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Undergraduate Certificate Programs

Students from the program with the lowest repayment rate had balances that were ~17% higher

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Undergraduate Certificate Programs

Students from the program with the highest repayment rate had balances that were ~20% lower

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Undergraduate Certificate Programs

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Undergraduate Certificate Programs

Higher net earnings than high school graduates

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Undergraduate Certificate Programs

Lower net earnings than high school graduates

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Undergraduate Certificate Programs

Median net earnings premium => more than half of all students formerly enrolled in Allied Health certificate programs in public schools earned more than the typical HS graduate (after accounting for out-of-pocket costs)

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Undergraduate Certificate Programs

75th percentile => 25% of former Allied Health certificate program students earned more than $13,000 above the typical HS graduate (after accounting for costs)

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Undergraduate Certificate Programs

25th percentile => 25% of former Allied Health certificate program students had a net earnings premium less than $4000

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Undergraduate Certificate Programs

A small % of students had substantially lower net earnings than typical HS grad

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Undergraduate Certificate Programs

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Undergraduate Certificate Programs

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Undergraduate Associate Degree Programs

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Undergraduate Bachelor’s Degree Programs

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Undergraduate Bachelor’s Degree Programs

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Master’s Degree Programs

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Doctoral Degree Programs

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First Professional Degree Programs