The Tor Project, Inc. Our mission is to be the global resource for - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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The Tor Project, Inc. Our mission is to be the global resource for - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

May 08, 2023 354 likes •743 views

The Tor Project, Inc. Our mission is to be the global resource for technology, advocacy, research and education in the ongoing pursuit of freedom of speech, privacy rights online, and censorship circumvention. 1 Alice makes a session key with

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The Tor Project, Inc.

Our mission is to be the global resource for technology, advocacy, research and education in the ongoing pursuit of freedom

  • f speech, privacy rights online, and

censorship circumvention.

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Alice makes a session key with R1 ...And then tunnels to R2...and to R3

Bob Alice R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 Bob2

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Other components Tor

  • Directory authorities
  • Exits (and exit policies)
  • Entry guards

– Predecessor attack, DoS-as-DoA attack – raise startup cost to evil relay operator

  • Bridges (and pluggable transports)
  • Hidden services
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Other pieces of Tor

  • Load balancing

– Weight relay section by bandwidth – Avoid guards for other than first hop,

avoid exits for other than last hop

– “bandwidth authority” active testing

  • Client-side “circuit build timeout” to avoid

worst 20% of circuits

  • Various scheduling / priority decisions
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Anybody can sign up to be a relay

  • Torservers.net
  • CCC relays in Germany
  • DFRI in Sweden
  • Noisebridge in the US
  • Nos Oignons in France
  • …
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Tor aims for three anonymity properties

  • #1: A local network attacker can't learn your

destination.

  • #2: No single relay can link you to your

destination.

  • #3: The destination, or somebody watching it,

can't learn your location.

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Anonymity: the old hope

  • “Anonymity is a function of number of

concurrent messages.”

  • But, flows are much trickier: they're wildly

different sizes, and users expect them to arrive in close-to-real-time.

  • More plausible in constrained situation like

VoIP?

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Anonymity: Diversity of relays

  • “Given an attacker who can control or observe

this set of relays and/or Internet links, we can compute his chances of discovering a given Alice-Bob link.”

– AS- or IX-level attackers

  • ...Syrian Tor user visiting website in Syria?
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compass.torproject.org

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compass.torproject.org

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compass.torproject.org

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compass.torproject.org

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Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups.

Anonymity

Private citizens Governments Businesses “It's traffic-analysis resistance!” “It's network security!” “It's privacy!” Human rights activists “It's reachability!”

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Anonymity: Diversity of *users*?

  • Can't have an anonymity network for just

cancer survivors

  • 50000 daily Tor users in Iran means

almost all of them are normal citizens

  • But, the smaller the area, the smaller the

anonymity set

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Anonymity: End-to-end correlation?

  • Website fingerprinting is a real issue, and

may be amenable to partial solutions like padding

  • Can we resurrect the anonymity set?
  • “Crank up the false positives with enough

users”

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Coming soon(*)

  • Stream isolation
  • Multi-path circuits
  • Congestion-aware routing
  • Mixed-latency designs?
  • Load balancing based on link properties
  • Incentives to be a relay
  • Trust-based path selection
  • Scalable directory servires (PIRTor, etc)
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What happens to anonymity...

  • ...if we assign the Guard flag differently?
  • ...if we load balance by active

measurement rather than consensus bw?

  • ...if we cap the weights for new relays?
  • ...if we discard all relays under bw X?
  • ...if we discard X% highest-latency paths?
  • ...if Alice chooses her paths to optimize

some other network parameter like jitter?