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Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations March 11, 2013 1/38 Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The

  1. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Questions What determines the optimal size and number of nations? Are the countries we see optimal? If the countries we see are not optimal why not? If countries break up, why do they do so? Possible answers 4/38

  2. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Questions What determines the optimal size and number of nations? Are the countries we see optimal? If the countries we see are not optimal why not? If countries break up, why do they do so? Possible answers Countries exist to share the costs of public good provision 4/38

  3. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Questions What determines the optimal size and number of nations? Are the countries we see optimal? If the countries we see are not optimal why not? If countries break up, why do they do so? Possible answers Countries exist to share the costs of public good provision Whether or not a country is optimal depends on the political process that determines its borders 4/38

  4. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Questions What determines the optimal size and number of nations? Are the countries we see optimal? If the countries we see are not optimal why not? If countries break up, why do they do so? Possible answers Countries exist to share the costs of public good provision Whether or not a country is optimal depends on the political process that determines its borders Countries break up because of the threat of internal conflict 4/38

  5. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Public Good Provision and the Optimal Number of Countries 5/38

  6. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Public Good Provision and the Optimal Number of Countries To find the optimal size of a country and therefore the optimal number we need to look at the costs and benefits of making a country larger 5/38

  7. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Public Good Provision and the Optimal Number of Countries To find the optimal size of a country and therefore the optimal number we need to look at the costs and benefits of making a country larger Benefits - fixed cost such as the provision of public goods like defense are shared between more individuals 5/38

  8. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Public Good Provision and the Optimal Number of Countries To find the optimal size of a country and therefore the optimal number we need to look at the costs and benefits of making a country larger Benefits - fixed cost such as the provision of public goods like defense are shared between more individuals Costs - the country will be more heterogeneous so the provision of a public good may be further on average from each individuals ideal 5/38

  9. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Simple Model 6/38

  10. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Simple Model Citizens 6/38

  11. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Simple Model Citizens Assume individuals are located uniformly on the unit line 6/38

  12. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Simple Model Citizens Assume individuals are located uniformly on the unit line The distance between two individuals may represent geographical distance or the difference in their preferences over a public good 6/38

  13. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Simple Model 7/38

  14. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Simple Model Citizens Preferences u i = y + g − al − t 7/38

  15. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Simple Model Citizens Preferences u i = y + g − al − t Where 7/38

  16. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Simple Model Citizens Preferences u i = y + g − al − t Where y - income 7/38

  17. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Simple Model Citizens Preferences u i = y + g − al − t Where y - income g - fixed benefit from a public good 7/38

  18. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Simple Model Citizens Preferences u i = y + g − al − t Where y - income g - fixed benefit from a public good l - distance of the public good from citizen i ’s location 7/38

  19. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Simple Model Citizens Preferences u i = y + g − al − t Where y - income g - fixed benefit from a public good l - distance of the public good from citizen i ’s location t - tax 7/38

  20. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Simple Model Citizens Preferences u i = y + g − al − t Where y - income g - fixed benefit from a public good l - distance of the public good from citizen i ’s location t - tax a - fixed parameter - attitude to heterogeneity 7/38

  21. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Simple Model Citizens Preferences u i = y + g − al − t Where y - income g - fixed benefit from a public good l - distance of the public good from citizen i ’s location t - tax a - fixed parameter - attitude to heterogeneity Citizens are identical except for location 7/38

  22. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Simple Model 8/38

  23. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Simple Model Nations 8/38

  24. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Simple Model Nations Are represented by a partition of the unit interval into N nation sections 8/38

  25. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Simple Model Nations Are represented by a partition of the unit interval into N nation sections Supply a single unit of the public good at the midpoint of the interval that defines them 8/38

  26. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Simple Model 9/38

  27. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Simple Model Nations 9/38

  28. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Simple Model Nations Each nation supplies a public good at a cost of Nk per citizen 9/38

  29. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Simple Model Nations Each nation supplies a public good at a cost of Nk per citizen Each nation runs a balanced budget such that t = Nk 9/38

  30. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Simple Model 10/38

  31. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Simple Model Given 10/38

  32. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Simple Model Given Citizens are distributed uniformly on [ 0, 1 ] 10/38

  33. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Simple Model Given Citizens are distributed uniformly on [ 0, 1 ] Public good are supplied in the center of each country 10/38

  34. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Simple Model Given Citizens are distributed uniformly on [ 0, 1 ] Public good are supplied in the center of each country Then 10/38

  35. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Simple Model Given Citizens are distributed uniformly on [ 0, 1 ] Public good are supplied in the center of each country Then Maximizing total citizen utility in a country is the same as maximizing average citizen utility 10/38

  36. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Simple Model Given Citizens are distributed uniformly on [ 0, 1 ] Public good are supplied in the center of each country Then Maximizing total citizen utility in a country is the same as maximizing average citizen utility Average citizen utility u av = y + g − a 4 N − Nk 10/38

  37. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Simple Model Given Citizens are distributed uniformly on [ 0, 1 ] Public good are supplied in the center of each country Then Maximizing total citizen utility in a country is the same as maximizing average citizen utility Average citizen utility u av = y + g − a 4 N − Nk First order condition a 4 N 2 − k = 0 10/38

  38. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Simple Model Given Citizens are distributed uniformly on [ 0, 1 ] Public good are supplied in the center of each country Then Maximizing total citizen utility in a country is the same as maximizing average citizen utility Average citizen utility u av = y + g − a 4 N − Nk First order condition a 4 N 2 − k = 0 Optimal number of countries N ∗ = ( a / 4 k ) 1 / 2 10/38

  39. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Simple Model 11/38

  40. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Simple Model Examples N ∗ = 1 and N ∗ = 2 11/38

  41. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Simple Model 12/38

  42. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Simple Model Given the optimal number of countries N ∗ = ( a / 4 k ) 1 / 2 12/38

  43. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Simple Model Given the optimal number of countries N ∗ = ( a / 4 k ) 1 / 2 We conclude the optimal number of countries 12/38

  44. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Simple Model Given the optimal number of countries N ∗ = ( a / 4 k ) 1 / 2 We conclude the optimal number of countries Is increasing in heterogeneity a 12/38

  45. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Simple Model Given the optimal number of countries N ∗ = ( a / 4 k ) 1 / 2 We conclude the optimal number of countries Is increasing in heterogeneity a Is decreasing in the cost of pubic good provision k 12/38

  46. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Majority voting and the number of nations 13/38

  47. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Majority voting and the number of nations The question here is; if citizens voted over N would they choose the optimal N ∗ 13/38

  48. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Majority voting and the number of nations The question here is; if citizens voted over N would they choose the optimal N ∗ We shall consider a simple example to show that under majority voting N � = N ∗ 13/38

  49. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Majority voting and the number of nations The question here is; if citizens voted over N would they choose the optimal N ∗ We shall consider a simple example to show that under majority voting N � = N ∗ We shall compare a single unified country with one split into two 13/38

  50. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Majority voting and the number of nations The question here is; if citizens voted over N would they choose the optimal N ∗ We shall consider a simple example to show that under majority voting N � = N ∗ We shall compare a single unified country with one split into two If N = 1 the utility of the average citizen is u N = 1 = y + g − a 4 − k 13/38

  51. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Majority voting and the number of nations The question here is; if citizens voted over N would they choose the optimal N ∗ We shall consider a simple example to show that under majority voting N � = N ∗ We shall compare a single unified country with one split into two If N = 1 the utility of the average citizen is u N = 1 = y + g − a 4 − k If N = 2 the utility of the average citizen is u N = 2 = y + g − a 8 − 2 k 13/38

  52. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Average utility is higher in the one country world if y + g − a 4 − k > y + g − a 8 − 2 k ⇒ k > a = 8 14/38

  53. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Average utility is higher in the one country world if y + g − a 4 − k > y + g − a 8 − 2 k ⇒ k > a = 8 Which we shall assume holds 14/38

  54. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Average utility is higher in the one country world if y + g − a 4 − k > y + g − a 8 − 2 k ⇒ k > a = 8 Which we shall assume holds But would a majority vote to keep the country unified or to split it in two? 14/38

  55. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Consider the voters located at 1 / 4 and 3 / 4 15/38

  56. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Consider the voters located at 1 / 4 and 3 / 4 These are the voters located in the centers of the two countries if the country divides 15/38

  57. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Consider the voters located at 1 / 4 and 3 / 4 These are the voters located in the centers of the two countries if the country divides These voters are indifferent between N = 1 and N = 2 if y + g − a 4 − k = y + g − 2 k ⇒ k = a = 4 15/38

  58. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Consider the voters located at 1 / 4 and 3 / 4 These are the voters located in the centers of the two countries if the country divides These voters are indifferent between N = 1 and N = 2 if y + g − a 4 − k = y + g − 2 k ⇒ k = a = 4 So if k < a 4 these individuals prefer to split the country into two 15/38

  59. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Consider the voters located on [ 0, 1 / 4 ) and ( 3 / 4, 1 ] who 16/38

  60. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Consider the voters located on [ 0, 1 / 4 ) and ( 3 / 4, 1 ] who Face the same decrease in the distance of the public good from their preferred location as the 1 / 4 and 3 / 4 individuals 16/38

  61. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Consider the voters located on [ 0, 1 / 4 ) and ( 3 / 4, 1 ] who Face the same decrease in the distance of the public good from their preferred location as the 1 / 4 and 3 / 4 individuals Face the same increase in taxes k → 2 k as the 1 / 4 and 3 / 4 individuals 16/38

  62. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Consider the voters located on [ 0, 1 / 4 ) and ( 3 / 4, 1 ] who Face the same decrease in the distance of the public good from their preferred location as the 1 / 4 and 3 / 4 individuals Face the same increase in taxes k → 2 k as the 1 / 4 and 3 / 4 individuals So they also prefer to split the country in two 16/38

  63. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Consider the voters located on [ 0, 1 / 4 ) and ( 3 / 4, 1 ] who Face the same decrease in the distance of the public good from their preferred location as the 1 / 4 and 3 / 4 individuals Face the same increase in taxes k → 2 k as the 1 / 4 and 3 / 4 individuals So they also prefer to split the country in two = ⇒ Majority vote to divide the country 16/38

  64. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Consider the voters located on [ 0, 1 / 4 ) and ( 3 / 4, 1 ] who Face the same decrease in the distance of the public good from their preferred location as the 1 / 4 and 3 / 4 individuals Face the same increase in taxes k → 2 k as the 1 / 4 and 3 / 4 individuals So they also prefer to split the country in two = ⇒ Majority vote to divide the country But if a 8 < k < a 4 this is inefficient - average and total utility is lower in the two countries 16/38

  65. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Consider the voters located on [ 0, 1 / 4 ) and ( 3 / 4, 1 ] who Face the same decrease in the distance of the public good from their preferred location as the 1 / 4 and 3 / 4 individuals Face the same increase in taxes k → 2 k as the 1 / 4 and 3 / 4 individuals So they also prefer to split the country in two = ⇒ Majority vote to divide the country But if a 8 < k < a 4 this is inefficient - average and total utility is lower in the two countries Problem is the winners have no means to compensate the losers! 16/38

  66. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Conclusion: Under democracy there are too many inefficiently small countries 17/38

  67. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Conclusion: Under democracy there are too many inefficiently small countries This conclusion follows because individuals on the periphery far from the location of public good provision pay the same taxes as those who are close, hence they vote to divide the country. 17/38

  68. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Conclusion: Under democracy there are too many inefficiently small countries This conclusion follows because individuals on the periphery far from the location of public good provision pay the same taxes as those who are close, hence they vote to divide the country. It would be better to remain unified, share in the economies of scale, and redistribute the gains 17/38

  69. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Suppose that instead of being determined by majority vote country size is determined by ”Leviathans” autocratic regimes motivated by self interest 18/38

  70. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Suppose that instead of being determined by majority vote country size is determined by ”Leviathans” autocratic regimes motivated by self interest It is clear that an unconstrained Leviathan would tax as much income as possible from citizens, and provide the minimum level of the public good 18/38

  71. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Suppose that instead of being determined by majority vote country size is determined by ”Leviathans” autocratic regimes motivated by self interest It is clear that an unconstrained Leviathan would tax as much income as possible from citizens, and provide the minimum level of the public good We now ask how large countries might be if their governments were Leviathans, and how this compares to the optimum and to democracy 18/38

  72. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Clearly an unconstrained Leviathan prefers a world empire, so it becomes important to specify the constraints that it faces 19/38

  73. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Clearly an unconstrained Leviathan prefers a world empire, so it becomes important to specify the constraints that it faces We assume a Leviathan 19/38

  74. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Clearly an unconstrained Leviathan prefers a world empire, so it becomes important to specify the constraints that it faces We assume a Leviathan Need the support of at least some proportion of the citizens - let this be δ 19/38

  75. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Clearly an unconstrained Leviathan prefers a world empire, so it becomes important to specify the constraints that it faces We assume a Leviathan Need the support of at least some proportion of the citizens - let this be δ Must provide some minimal utility to it’s supporters - let this be u 0 19/38

  76. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Clearly an unconstrained Leviathan prefers a world empire, so it becomes important to specify the constraints that it faces We assume a Leviathan Need the support of at least some proportion of the citizens - let this be δ Must provide some minimal utility to it’s supporters - let this be u 0 We further assume 19/38

  77. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Clearly an unconstrained Leviathan prefers a world empire, so it becomes important to specify the constraints that it faces We assume a Leviathan Need the support of at least some proportion of the citizens - let this be δ Must provide some minimal utility to it’s supporters - let this be u 0 We further assume The Leviathans collude to maximize their joint net revenues 19/38

  78. Observations Questions Optimal Countries Democracy Leviathans The Dissolution of States The Size and Number of Nations Clearly an unconstrained Leviathan prefers a world empire, so it becomes important to specify the constraints that it faces We assume a Leviathan Need the support of at least some proportion of the citizens - let this be δ Must provide some minimal utility to it’s supporters - let this be u 0 We further assume The Leviathans collude to maximize their joint net revenues Think of the interrelated European royal families of 150-200 years ago 19/38

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