The Role of Deception in Games CMPUT 654 Leticia Wanderley 1 - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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The Role of Deception in Games CMPUT 654 Leticia Wanderley 1 Agenda Social psychology (FAE) Example: Kasparov vs. Deep Blue Overview of deception research Poker 2x2 games Voting games Repeated games

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The Role of Deception in Games

CMPUT 654 Leticia Wanderley

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Agenda

  • Social psychology (FAE)

○ Example: Kasparov vs. Deep Blue

  • Overview of deception research

○ Poker ○ 2x2 games ○ Voting games ○ Repeated games ■ Reputation & Credibility

  • Other topics

○ Consequences ○ Guilt ○ Lying by telling the truth ○ Gender and deception

  • Future research

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Underlying social psychology concept

Fundamental Attribution Error

(Ettinger & Jehiel, 2010)

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Fun(ny) example

1997 rematch: IBM’s Deep Blue vs. Garry Kasparov

Figure 1: IBM’s Deep Blue. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_Blue_vers us_Garry_Kasparov Figure 2: Garry Kasparov. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_Blue_vers us_Garry_Kasparov 4

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Fun(ny) example

1997 rematch: IBM’s Deep Blue vs. Garry Kasparov

Figure 1: IBM’s Deep Blue. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_Blue_vers us_Garry_Kasparov Figure 2: Garry Kasparov. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_Blue_vers us_Garry_Kasparov 5

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Fun(ny) example

1997 rematch: IBM’s Deep Blue vs. Garry Kasparov

Figure 1: IBM’s Deep Blue. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_Blue_vers us_Garry_Kasparov Figure 2: Garry Kasparov. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_Blue_vers us_Garry_Kasparov

Observed behaviour: The program is taking more time than usual to make its next move.

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Fun(ny) example

1997 rematch: IBM’s Deep Blue vs. Garry Kasparov

Figure 1: IBM’s Deep Blue. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_Blue_vers us_Garry_Kasparov Figure 2: Garry Kasparov. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_Blue_vers us_Garry_Kasparov

Observed behaviour: The program is taking more time than usual to make its next move. Attribution error: This program is not as capable as a grandmaster. (Fry, 2018)

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Figure 3: Deep Blue defeats Kasparov. 1997. Retrieved from https://cdn.theatlantic.com/static/mt/assets/science/kasparov615.jpg 8

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Theory of Games and Economic Behavior

Bluffing in poker

(Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944)

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Theory of Games and Economic Behavior

(Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944)

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Deception in 2 x 2 Games

(Brams, 1977)

  • Went through 78 distinct 2x2 games
  • One agent is the deceiver

○ Complete information

  • The other agent is the deceived

○ Incomplete information

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Deception in 2 x 2 Games

(Brams, 1977)

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Deception in 2 x 2 Games

(Brams, 1977)

  • Deception-vulnerable (tacit)

○ “A game is deception-vulnerable (tacit) iff at least one player, as deceiver, can ensure as the rational outcome an outcome better than his next worst (2) only by announcing preferences different from his (true) preferences.” (Brams, 1977)

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Deception in 2 x 2 Games

(Brams, 1977)

  • Deception-vulnerable (tacit)

○ “A game is deception-vulnerable (tacit) iff at least one player, as deceiver, can ensure as the rational outcome an outcome better than his next worst (2) only by announcing preferences different from his (true) preferences.” (Brams, 1977)

A B a (4, 1) (2, 2) b (3, 2) (1, 1)

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Deception in 2 x 2 Games

(Brams, 1977)

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Deception in 2 x 2 Games

(Brams, 1977)

  • Deception-vulnerable (revealed)

○ “A game is deception-vulnerable (revealed) iff it is not deception-proof and (tacit) deceiver is not satisfied by the rational outcome.” (Brams, 1977)

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Deception in 2 x 2 Games

(Brams, 1977)

  • Deception-vulnerable (revealed)

○ “A game is deception-vulnerable (revealed) iff it is not deception-proof and (tacit) deceiver is not satisfied by the rational outcome.” (Brams, 1977)

A B a (2, 4) (3, 1) b (4, 2) (1, 3)

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Deception in Simple Voting Games

(Brams & Zagare, 1977)

  • Three-person voting game

○ One deceiver ■ Complete information ■ Chairman ○ Two deceived ■ Incomplete information

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Deception in Simple Voting Games

(Brams & Zagare, 1977)

Preference order Agent 1 a b c Agent 2 b c a Agent 3 c a b

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Deception in Simple Voting Games

(Brams & Zagare, 1977)

In a game with perfect information, c is chosen. Preference order Agent 1 a b c Agent 2 b c a Agent 3 c a b

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Deception in Simple Voting Games

(Brams & Zagare, 1977)

Agent 1, as the deceiver, announces that it is voting b. Preference order Agent 1 a b c Agent 2 b c a Agent 3 c a b

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Deception in Simple Voting Games

(Brams & Zagare, 1977)

Agent 1, as the deceiver, announces that it is voting b. Preference order Agent 1 a b c Agent 2 b c a Agent 3 c a b

Tacit deception.

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Deception in Simple Voting Games

(Brams & Zagare, 1977)

Agent 1, as the deceiver, announces that it is voting b, but actually votes a. Preference order Agent 1 a b c Agent 2 b c a Agent 3 c a b Agent 3’s vote doesn’t matter.

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Deception in Simple Voting Games

(Brams & Zagare, 1977)

Agent 1, as the deceiver, announces that it is voting b, but actually votes a. Preference order Agent 1 a b c Agent 2 b c a Agent 3 c a b Agent 3’s vote doesn’t matter.

Revealed deception.

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Reputation and Imperfect Information

(Kreps & Wilson, 1982)

  • Imperfect information assumption
  • Reputation effect
  • Reputation is fragile and breaking it often has irreversible consequences

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A Theory of Credibility

(Sobel, 1985)

  • Two-agent repeated game

○ A Sender (Spy) ○ A Receiver (Decision maker)

  • The players can either be friends or enemies
  • The game payoff increases along with the number of games played

○ There is incentive for deception

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The Role of Deception in Decision Theory

(Greenberg, 1982) “... first shot at a decision theory framework for deception”

  • Decision under risk
  • “Deception causes the decision maker to misperceive the true q values”

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The Role of Deception in Decision Theory

(Greenberg, 1982)

  • Deception in an information theory context

○ False signal ○ Noise

  • Normandy Invasion

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(Hespanha et al., 2000)

  • Deception technique = information manipulation

Deception in Non-Cooperative Games with Partial Information

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(Hespanha et al., 2000)

  • “... when the degree of possible manipulation is high, deception becomes

useless against an intelligent opponent since it will simply ignore the information that has potentially been manipulated.” (Hespanha et al., 2000)

Deception in Non-Cooperative Games with Partial Information

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  • Deception: The Role of Consequences (Gneezy, 2005)
  • Deception: The role of guilt (Battigalli et al., 2013)
  • Deception through telling the truth?! Experimental evidence from individuals

and teams (Sutter, 2009)

  • The value of a smile: Game theory with a human face (Scharlemann et al.,

2001) ○ 😋฀😋฀

  • Gender differences in deception (Dreber et al., 2008)

Other topics

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  • Do agents allow second chances?

○ Is losing one’s reputation really irreversible?

  • How different cultures face deception?

Future research

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References

Ettinger, D., & Jehiel, P. (2010). A theory of deception. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2(1), 1-20. Fry, H. (2018). Hello World: Being Human in the Age of Algorithms. WW Norton & Company. Von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (2007). Theory of games and economic behavior (commemorative edition). Princeton university press. Brams, S. J. (1977). Deception in 2× 2 games. Journal of Peace Science, 2(2), 171-203.

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References

Brams, S. J., & Zagare, F. C. (1977). Deception in simple voting games. Social Science Research, 6(3), 257-272. Kreps, D. M., & Wilson, R. (1982). Reputation and imperfect information. Journal

  • f economic theory, 27(2), 253-279.

Sobel, J. (1985). A theory of credibility. The Review of Economic Studies, 52(4), 557-573. Greenberg, I. (1982). The role of deception in decision theory. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 26(1), 139-156.

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References

Hespanha, J. P., Ateskan, Y. S., & Kizilocak, H. (2000, July). Deception in non-cooperative games with partial information. In Proceedings of the 2nd DARPA-JFACC Symposium on Advances in Enterprise Control (pp. 1-9). Gneezy, U. (2005). Deception: The role of consequences. American Economic Review, 95(1), 384-394. Battigalli, P., Charness, G., & Dufwenberg, M. (2013). Deception: The role of guilt. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 93, 227-232. Sutter, M. (2009). Deception through telling the truth?! Experimental evidence from individuals and teams. The Economic Journal, 119(534), 47-60.

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References

Scharlemann, J. P., Eckel, C. C., Kacelnik, A., & Wilson, R. K. (2001). The value

  • f a smile: Game theory with a human face. Journal of Economic Psychology,

22(5), 617-640. Dreber, A., & Johannesson, M. (2008). Gender differences in deception. Economics Letters, 99(1), 197-199.

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