Modelling Lies Related Work Alexandru Baltag[Bal02] 3 , David Steiner [Ste06] 4 , Ditmarsch et al.[VDVESW12] 5 , Hans Van Ditmarsch [VD14] 6 use event model to model the act of lying “lying that p” : “communicating p in the belief that ¬ p is the case” Project lying as an epistemic action that induces a transformation on an epistemic state (pointed Kripke model). 3 A logic for suspicious players: Epistemic actions and beliefupdates in games, Bulletin of Economic Research (2002) 4 David Steiner, A system for consistency preserving belief change, Proceedings of the ESSLLI Workshop on Rationality and Knowledge 5 Hans Van Ditmarsch, Jan Van Eijck, Floor Sietsma, and Yanjing Wang, On the logic of lying, Games, actions and social software, Springer, 2012 6 Hans Van Ditmarsch, Dynamics of lying, Synthese 191 (2014) Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 22 / 55
Modelling Lies Related Work Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 23 / 55
Outline Motivation 1 Lying and Cognition 2 Lies and Deception 3 Defining-Modelling Lies (Existing work) Engineering Lies Epistemic Planning 4 Classical Planning Our approach State-of-the-art: Epistemic Planning Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 24 / 55
Engineering Lies Questions we are interested in.. The decision to lie Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 25 / 55
Engineering Lies Questions we are interested in.. The decision to lie The synthesis of a lie Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 25 / 55
Engineering Lies We seek a solution by formulating this problem as an epistemic planning problem... Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 26 / 55
Engineering Lies We seek a solution by formulating this problem as an epistemic planning problem... The decision to lie: motivated by a goal The synthesis of a lie: a plan to achieve the goal Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 26 / 55
Outline Motivation 1 Lying and Cognition 2 Lies and Deception 3 Defining-Modelling Lies (Existing work) Engineering Lies Epistemic Planning 4 Classical Planning Our approach State-of-the-art: Epistemic Planning Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 27 / 55
Classical Planning Task of finding a sequence of deterministic actions with known effects such that, when applied in the initial, fully- known state , it results in a state where the goal is satisfied. Definition The classical planning model S is defined as the tuple � S , s 0 , S G , A , f , c � where: Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 28 / 55
Classical Planning Task of finding a sequence of deterministic actions with known effects such that, when applied in the initial, fully- known state , it results in a state where the goal is satisfied. Definition The classical planning model S is defined as the tuple � S , s 0 , S G , A , f , c � where: S is a finite and discrete set of states Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 28 / 55
Classical Planning Task of finding a sequence of deterministic actions with known effects such that, when applied in the initial, fully- known state , it results in a state where the goal is satisfied. Definition The classical planning model S is defined as the tuple � S , s 0 , S G , A , f , c � where: S is a finite and discrete set of states s 0 ∈ S is the known initial state Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 28 / 55
Classical Planning Task of finding a sequence of deterministic actions with known effects such that, when applied in the initial, fully- known state , it results in a state where the goal is satisfied. Definition The classical planning model S is defined as the tuple � S , s 0 , S G , A , f , c � where: S is a finite and discrete set of states s 0 ∈ S is the known initial state S G ⊆ S is a non-empty set of goal states Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 28 / 55
Classical Planning Task of finding a sequence of deterministic actions with known effects such that, when applied in the initial, fully- known state , it results in a state where the goal is satisfied. Definition The classical planning model S is defined as the tuple � S , s 0 , S G , A , f , c � where: S is a finite and discrete set of states s 0 ∈ S is the known initial state S G ⊆ S is a non-empty set of goal states A ( s ) ⊆ A the set of actions in A that are applicable in each state s ∈ S , Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 28 / 55
Classical Planning Task of finding a sequence of deterministic actions with known effects such that, when applied in the initial, fully- known state , it results in a state where the goal is satisfied. Definition The classical planning model S is defined as the tuple � S , s 0 , S G , A , f , c � where: S is a finite and discrete set of states s 0 ∈ S is the known initial state S G ⊆ S is a non-empty set of goal states A ( s ) ⊆ A the set of actions in A that are applicable in each state s ∈ S , s 0 = f ( a , s ) is a deterministic transition function which, given a state s ∈ S and an action a ∈ A ( s ), returns the resulting state s 0 c ( a , s ) is the positive cost of applying action a in the state s Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 28 / 55
Classical Planning Representation: STRIPS (Fikes and Nilsson, 1971)[FN71] Definition A classical planning problem P in STRIPS is defined as the tuple � F , I , A , G � where: Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 29 / 55
Classical Planning Representation: STRIPS (Fikes and Nilsson, 1971)[FN71] Definition A classical planning problem P in STRIPS is defined as the tuple � F , I , A , G � where: F is the set of fluent symbols in the problem. Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 29 / 55
Classical Planning Representation: STRIPS (Fikes and Nilsson, 1971)[FN71] Definition A classical planning problem P in STRIPS is defined as the tuple � F , I , A , G � where: F is the set of fluent symbols in the problem. I the set of atoms over F which are true initially, Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 29 / 55
Classical Planning Representation: STRIPS (Fikes and Nilsson, 1971)[FN71] Definition A classical planning problem P in STRIPS is defined as the tuple � F , I , A , G � where: F is the set of fluent symbols in the problem. I the set of atoms over F which are true initially, A is the set of actions, where every α ∈ A is a tuple � pre( α ), add( α ), del( α ) � , where pre( α ), add( α ), del( α ) ⊆ F , Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 29 / 55
Classical Planning Representation: STRIPS (Fikes and Nilsson, 1971)[FN71] Definition A classical planning problem P in STRIPS is defined as the tuple � F , I , A , G � where: F is the set of fluent symbols in the problem. I the set of atoms over F which are true initially, A is the set of actions, where every α ∈ A is a tuple � pre( α ), add( α ), del( α ) � , where pre( α ), add( α ), del( α ) ⊆ F , G is a set of atoms over F that define the goal Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 29 / 55
Classical Planning Solution: A plan Definition A plan π for a classical planning model S is a sequence of actions π = [ a 0 , a 1 , ..., a n ] such that, when applied to the initial state s 0 , it results in a sequence of states [ s 0 , s 1 , ..., s n ] where s n ∈ S G . Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 30 / 55
Epistemic Planning Enrichment of automated planning with epistemic notions: Knowledge , Belief . Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 31 / 55
Epistemic Planning Enrichment of automated planning with epistemic notions: Knowledge , Belief . Single-agent: given an agent’s current state of knowledge, and a desirable state of knowledge, how does it get from one to the other? Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 31 / 55
Epistemic Planning Enrichment of automated planning with epistemic notions: Knowledge , Belief . Single-agent: given an agent’s current state of knowledge, and a desirable state of knowledge, how does it get from one to the other? Multi-agent: the current and desirable states of knowledge might also refer to the states of knowledge of other agents, including higher-order knowledge like ensuring that agent A doesn’t get to know that agent B knows P. Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 31 / 55
Epistemic Planning an epistemic planning domain Definition An epistemic planning domain is then defined as a state transition system Σ = ( S , A , λ ), where S is a set of epistemic states of L ( F , AG ) , A is a finite set of epistemic actions of L ( F , AG ), and λ ( s , a ) = s ⊗ a if s ⊗ a is defined and ⊗ is the above operation. Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 32 / 55
Epistemic Planning an epistemic planning problem Definition An epistemic planning problem is a triple (Σ , s 0 , φ g ) where Σ = ( S , A , λ ) is an epistemic planning domain on ( F , AG ), s 0 ∈ S is the initial state, and φ g is a formula in L ( F , AG ). An action sequence a 1 , ..., a n where s 0 ⊗ a 1 ⊗ ... ⊗ a n | = φ g is a solution of the problem. Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 33 / 55
Lying and deception From epistemic planning perspective.. The world of lies... Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 34 / 55
Lying and deception From epistemic planning perspective.. The world of lies... Doxastic world: an agent reasoning about lying cannot work with knowledge modality; but with its own belief set. Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 34 / 55
Lying and deception From epistemic planning perspective.. The world of lies... Doxastic world: an agent reasoning about lying cannot work with knowledge modality; but with its own belief set. Partially observable environment: Uncertainity about the initial situation Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 34 / 55
Lying and deception From epistemic planning perspective.. The world of lies... Doxastic world: an agent reasoning about lying cannot work with knowledge modality; but with its own belief set. Partially observable environment: Uncertainity about the initial situation Talkative agents: restricted only to epistemic actions- speech acts (announcements) Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 34 / 55
Lying and deception From epistemic planning perspective.. The world of lies... Doxastic world: an agent reasoning about lying cannot work with knowledge modality; but with its own belief set. Partially observable environment: Uncertainity about the initial situation Talkative agents: restricted only to epistemic actions- speech acts (announcements) Non-reliable audience: speech acts have non-deterministic effects Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 34 / 55
Lying and deception From epistemic planning perspective.. The world of lies... Can we relax some conditions? Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 35 / 55
Lying and deception From epistemic planning perspective.. The world of lies... Can we relax some conditions? Like, non-deterministic effects of the speech act? Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 35 / 55
Lying and deception From epistemic planning perspective.. The world of lies... Can we relax some conditions? Like, non-deterministic effects of the speech act? (Dynamics of lying, van Ditmarsch, H. Synthese (2014)) distinguish three addressee perspectives: Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 35 / 55
Lying and deception From epistemic planning perspective.. The world of lies... Can we relax some conditions? Like, non-deterministic effects of the speech act? (Dynamics of lying, van Ditmarsch, H. Synthese (2014)) distinguish three addressee perspectives: (Cred) the credulous agent who believes everything that it is told (even at the price of inconsistency) Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 35 / 55
Lying and deception From epistemic planning perspective.. The world of lies... Can we relax some conditions? Like, non-deterministic effects of the speech act? (Dynamics of lying, van Ditmarsch, H. Synthese (2014)) distinguish three addressee perspectives: (Cred) the credulous agent who believes everything that it is told (even at the price of inconsistency) (Skep) the skeptical agent who only believes what it is told if that is consistent with its current beliefs Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 35 / 55
Lying and deception From epistemic planning perspective.. The world of lies... Can we relax some conditions? Like, non-deterministic effects of the speech act? (Dynamics of lying, van Ditmarsch, H. Synthese (2014)) distinguish three addressee perspectives: (Cred) the credulous agent who believes everything that it is told (even at the price of inconsistency) (Skep) the skeptical agent who only believes what it is told if that is consistent with its current beliefs the belief revising agent who believes everything that it is told by consistently revising its current, possibly conflicting, beliefs Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 35 / 55
Outline Motivation 1 Lying and Cognition 2 Lies and Deception 3 Defining-Modelling Lies (Existing work) Engineering Lies Epistemic Planning 4 Classical Planning Our approach State-of-the-art: Epistemic Planning Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 36 / 55
Lying and deception From epistemic planning perspective... The world of lies... Doxastic world: an agent reasoning about lying cannot work with knowledge modality; but with its own belief set. Partially observable environment: Uncertainity about the initial situation Talkative agents: restricted only to epistemic actions - speech acts (announcements) Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 37 / 55
Lying and deception From epistemic planning perspective... The world of lies... Doxastic world: an agent reasoning about lying cannot work with knowledge modality; but with its own belief set. Partially observable environment: Uncertainity about the initial situation Talkative agents: restricted only to epistemic actions - speech acts (announcements) Credulous audience Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 37 / 55
Lying and deception From epistemic planning perspective... The world of lies... Doxastic world: an agent reasoning about lying cannot work with knowledge modality; but with its own belief set. Partially observable environment: Uncertainity about the initial situation Credulous audience Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 38 / 55
Lying and deception From epistemic planning perspective... The world of lies... Doxastic world: an agent reasoning about lying cannot work with knowledge modality; but with its own belief set. Partially observable environment: Uncertainity about the initial situation Talkative agents: restricted only to epistemic actions - speech acts (announcements) < −− and we focus here Credulous audience Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 38 / 55
On synthsizing lies From epistemic planning perspective Problem: In a (Adversarial) multi-agent epistemic planning setting... Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 39 / 55
On synthsizing lies From epistemic planning perspective Problem: In a (Adversarial) multi-agent epistemic planning setting... where an agent is a reasoner and a planner, Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 39 / 55
On synthsizing lies From epistemic planning perspective Problem: In a (Adversarial) multi-agent epistemic planning setting... where an agent is a reasoner and a planner, given its initial belief set, a goal condition Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 39 / 55
On synthsizing lies From epistemic planning perspective Problem: In a (Adversarial) multi-agent epistemic planning setting... where an agent is a reasoner and a planner, given its initial belief set, a goal condition and all possible speech acts, Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 39 / 55
On synthsizing lies From epistemic planning perspective Problem: In a (Adversarial) multi-agent epistemic planning setting... where an agent is a reasoner and a planner, given its initial belief set, a goal condition and all possible speech acts, Can it come up with a deceiving plan? Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 39 / 55
On synthsizing lies From epistemic planning perspective Problem: In a (Adversarial) multi-agent epistemic planning setting... where an agent is a reasoner and a planner, given its initial belief set, a goal condition and all possible speech acts, Can it come up with a deceiving plan? Or, said to have lied ? Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 39 / 55
On synthsizing lies From epistemic planning perspective Problem: In a (Adversarial) multi-agent epistemic planning setting... where an agent is a reasoner and a planner, given its initial belief set, a goal condition and all possible speech acts, Can it come up with a deceiving plan? Or, said to have lied ? Does the agent choose ’what we call’ a deceptive speech act? Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 39 / 55
On synthsizing lies From epistemic planning perspective The one where the mouse deceives the fox... We formulate our problem as: �F , AG , A , s 0 , φ g � , where Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 40 / 55
On synthsizing lies From epistemic planning perspective The one where the mouse deceives the fox... We formulate our problem as: �F , AG , A , s 0 , φ g � , where F be the set of grounded fluents, F = { at ( X , L , T ) , dang ( X , Y ) , threat ( X , L , T ) , ( at ( X , L , T ) ∩ at ( Y , L , T ) ∩ dang ( X , Y )) → threat ( Y , L , T ) where X , Y ∈ AG Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 40 / 55
On synthsizing lies From epistemic planning perspective The one where the mouse deceives the fox... We formulate our problem as: �F , AG , A , s 0 , φ g � , where F be the set of grounded fluents, F = { at ( X , L , T ) , dang ( X , Y ) , threat ( X , L , T ) , ( at ( X , L , T ) ∩ at ( Y , L , T ) ∩ dang ( X , Y )) → threat ( Y , L , T ) where X , Y ∈ AG AG be the set of agents, AG = { m , f , g } Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 40 / 55
On synthsizing lies From epistemic planning perspective The one where the mouse deceives the fox... We formulate our problem as: �F , AG , A , s 0 , φ g � , where F be the set of grounded fluents, F = { at ( X , L , T ) , dang ( X , Y ) , threat ( X , L , T ) , ( at ( X , L , T ) ∩ at ( Y , L , T ) ∩ dang ( X , Y )) → threat ( Y , L , T ) where X , Y ∈ AG AG be the set of agents, AG = { m , f , g } A is the set of grounded actions, A = { announce ( X , φ ) , quit ( X , L , T ) } where φ ∈ S and S is a set of epistemic states of L ( F , AG ) and X ∈ AG Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 40 / 55
On synthsizing lies From epistemic planning perspective The one where the mouse deceives the fox... We formulate our problem as: �F , AG , A , s 0 , φ g � , where F be the set of grounded fluents, F = { at ( X , L , T ) , dang ( X , Y ) , threat ( X , L , T ) , ( at ( X , L , T ) ∩ at ( Y , L , T ) ∩ dang ( X , Y )) → threat ( Y , L , T ) where X , Y ∈ AG AG be the set of agents, AG = { m , f , g } A is the set of grounded actions, A = { announce ( X , φ ) , quit ( X , L , T ) } where φ ∈ S and S is a set of epistemic states of L ( F , AG ) and X ∈ AG s 0 be the initial state, s 0 = { at ( f , l , t ) , at ( m , l , t ) , ¬ at ( g , l , t ) , dang ( f , m ) , dang ( g , m ) , dang ( g , f ) } Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 40 / 55
On synthsizing lies From epistemic planning perspective The one where the mouse deceives the fox... We formulate our problem as: �F , AG , A , s 0 , φ g � , where F be the set of grounded fluents, F = { at ( X , L , T ) , dang ( X , Y ) , threat ( X , L , T ) , ( at ( X , L , T ) ∩ at ( Y , L , T ) ∩ dang ( X , Y )) → threat ( Y , L , T ) where X , Y ∈ AG AG be the set of agents, AG = { m , f , g } A is the set of grounded actions, A = { announce ( X , φ ) , quit ( X , L , T ) } where φ ∈ S and S is a set of epistemic states of L ( F , AG ) and X ∈ AG s 0 be the initial state, s 0 = { at ( f , l , t ) , at ( m , l , t ) , ¬ at ( g , l , t ) , dang ( f , m ) , dang ( g , m ) , dang ( g , f ) } φ g is the goal formula, φ g = ¬ threat ( m , l , t ′ ) ∩ t ′ > t Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 40 / 55
On synthsizing lies From epistemic planning perspective The action operators are further defined as: announce ( X , φ ) : pre: Nil add: B {AG− X } φ del: Nil quit ( X , L , T ) : (domain specific action operator) pre: threat ( X , L , T ) add: ¬ at ( X , L , T + 1) del: Nil Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 41 / 55
On synthsizing lies From epistemic planning perspective Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 42 / 55
On synthsizing lies From epistemic planning perspective Second order reasoning that the mouse does in S2 (on the fox’s behalf) B f ( at ( f , l , t ) ∩ at ( g , l , t ) ∩ dang ( g , f )) ∩ B f (( at ( X , L , T ) ∩ at ( Y , L , T ) ∩ dang ( X , Y )) → threat ( Y , L , T )) → B f threat ( f , l , t ) mouse believes that fox believes that there is a threat to its life. Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 43 / 55
On synthsizing lies From epistemic planning perspective Second order reasoning that the mouse does in S2 (on the fox’s behalf) according to which: Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 44 / 55
On synthsizing lies From epistemic planning perspective Second order reasoning that the mouse does in S2 (on the fox’s behalf) according to which: State S2 entails the preconditions of Quit ( f , l , t ), Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 44 / 55
On synthsizing lies From epistemic planning perspective Second order reasoning that the mouse does in S2 (on the fox’s behalf) according to which: State S2 entails the preconditions of Quit ( f , l , t ), hence, Quit ( f , l , t ) is applicable in it, Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 44 / 55
On synthsizing lies From epistemic planning perspective Second order reasoning that the mouse does in S2 (on the fox’s behalf) according to which: State S2 entails the preconditions of Quit ( f , l , t ), hence, Quit ( f , l , t ) is applicable in it, leading to the addition of the post-effect: ¬ at ( f , l , t + 1), which led the mouse anticipate that the fox would flee away. Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 44 / 55
On synthsizing lies From epistemic planning perspective Second order reasoning that the mouse does in S2 (on the fox’s behalf) according to which: State S2 entails the preconditions of Quit ( f , l , t ), hence, Quit ( f , l , t ) is applicable in it, leading to the addition of the post-effect: ¬ at ( f , l , t + 1), which led the mouse anticipate that the fox would flee away. and due to ¬ at ( f , l , t + 1), threat ( m , l , t + 1) wouldn’t hold in S3 Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 44 / 55
On synthsizing lies From epistemic planning perspective The one where the mouse deceives the fox... One solution (a plan) could be: announce ( m , at ( g , l , t )) ⊗ quit ( f , l , t ) such that: s 0 ⊗ announce ( m , at ( g , l , t )) ⊗ quit ( f , l , t ) | = ¬ threat ( m , l , t + 1) which consists of a deceptive speech act... Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 45 / 55
On synthsizing lies From epistemic planning perspective The one where the mouse deceives the gruffalo... Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 46 / 55
On synthsizing lies From epistemic planning perspective The one where the mouse deceives the gruffalo... The gruffalo is not a credulous agent Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 46 / 55
On synthsizing lies From epistemic planning perspective The one where the mouse deceives the gruffalo... The gruffalo is not a credulous agent Belief revision mechanism required. Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 46 / 55
On synthsizing lies From epistemic planning perspective The one where the mouse deceives the gruffalo... The gruffalo is not a credulous agent Belief revision mechanism required. Abduction involved! Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 46 / 55
On synthsizing lies From epistemic planning perspective The one where the mouse deceives the gruffalo... The gruffalo is not a credulous agent Belief revision mechanism required. Abduction involved! A harder problem indeed!! Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 46 / 55
Outline Motivation 1 Lying and Cognition 2 Lies and Deception 3 Defining-Modelling Lies (Existing work) Engineering Lies Epistemic Planning 4 Classical Planning Our approach State-of-the-art: Epistemic Planning Shikha Singh, Deepak Khemani Deception: An epistemic planned event? 47 / 55
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