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Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion On Deception and Defection Jason Quinley Chris Ahern University of Tbingen, University of Pennsylvania August 7, 2012


  1. Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion On Deception and Defection Jason Quinley Chris Ahern University of Tübingen, University of Pennsylvania August 7, 2012 Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 1 / 32

  2. Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion Huelva, Spain: 1943 Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 2 / 32

  3. Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion Huelva, Spain: 1943 Body in the water. Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 2 / 32

  4. Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion Huelva, Spain: 1943 Body in the water. Major William Martin, Royal Marines Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 2 / 32

  5. Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion Huelva, Spain: 1943 Body in the water. Major William Martin, Royal Marines Briefcase. Forward to official channels. Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 2 / 32

  6. Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion Huelva, Spain: 1943 Body in the water. Major William Martin, Royal Marines Briefcase. Forward to official channels. Frantic messages: Where is it? Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 2 / 32

  7. Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion German Intelligence High Command Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 3 / 32

  8. Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion German Intelligence High Command General Archibald Nye’s Orders: Attack the Peloponnese and Sardinia from Tunisia. Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 3 / 32

  9. Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion German Intelligence High Command General Archibald Nye’s Orders: Attack the Peloponnese and Sardinia from Tunisia. Divert the Panzers from France to Greece! Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 3 / 32

  10. Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion German Intelligence High Command General Archibald Nye’s Orders: Attack the Peloponnese and Sardinia from Tunisia. Divert the Panzers from France to Greece! Secure the island of Sardinia! Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 3 / 32

  11. Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion German Intelligence High Command General Archibald Nye’s Orders: Attack the Peloponnese and Sardinia from Tunisia. Divert the Panzers from France to Greece! Secure the island of Sardinia! The problem: There was no William Martin. There was no attack on Sardinia or Greece. Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 3 / 32

  12. Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion German Intelligence High Command General Archibald Nye’s Orders: Attack the Peloponnese and Sardinia from Tunisia. Divert the Panzers from France to Greece! Secure the island of Sardinia! The problem: There was no William Martin. There was no attack on Sardinia or Greece. Operation Mincemeat reveals themes relevant to ESSLLI Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 3 / 32

  13. Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion German Intelligence High Command General Archibald Nye’s Orders: Attack the Peloponnese and Sardinia from Tunisia. Divert the Panzers from France to Greece! Secure the island of Sardinia! The problem: There was no William Martin. There was no attack on Sardinia or Greece. Operation Mincemeat reveals themes relevant to ESSLLI Beliefs about Beliefs Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 3 / 32

  14. Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion German Intelligence High Command General Archibald Nye’s Orders: Attack the Peloponnese and Sardinia from Tunisia. Divert the Panzers from France to Greece! Secure the island of Sardinia! The problem: There was no William Martin. There was no attack on Sardinia or Greece. Operation Mincemeat reveals themes relevant to ESSLLI Beliefs about Beliefs Signaling and Coordination Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 3 / 32

  15. Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion German Intelligence High Command General Archibald Nye’s Orders: Attack the Peloponnese and Sardinia from Tunisia. Divert the Panzers from France to Greece! Secure the island of Sardinia! The problem: There was no William Martin. There was no attack on Sardinia or Greece. Operation Mincemeat reveals themes relevant to ESSLLI Beliefs about Beliefs Signaling and Coordination Logic of Deception Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 3 / 32

  16. Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion German Intelligence High Command General Archibald Nye’s Orders: Attack the Peloponnese and Sardinia from Tunisia. Divert the Panzers from France to Greece! Secure the island of Sardinia! The problem: There was no William Martin. There was no attack on Sardinia or Greece. Operation Mincemeat reveals themes relevant to ESSLLI Beliefs about Beliefs Signaling and Coordination Logic of Deception Challenge: Find Computionally Tractable Models Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 3 / 32

  17. Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion Goals Consider human deception in light of concerns in animal signaling. What constitutes cooperation and deception in animal behavior and signaling? When is human deception truly defection? How does this clarify human behavior with regard to meaning? Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 4 / 32

  18. Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion Goals Consider human deception in light of concerns in animal signaling. What constitutes cooperation and deception in animal behavior and signaling? When is human deception truly defection? How does this clarify human behavior with regard to meaning? Themes: Signals can be deceptive, even when costly. Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 4 / 32

  19. Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion Goals Consider human deception in light of concerns in animal signaling. What constitutes cooperation and deception in animal behavior and signaling? When is human deception truly defection? How does this clarify human behavior with regard to meaning? Themes: Signals can be deceptive, even when costly. Preferences and Payoffs can differ. Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 4 / 32

  20. Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion Goals Consider human deception in light of concerns in animal signaling. What constitutes cooperation and deception in animal behavior and signaling? When is human deception truly defection? How does this clarify human behavior with regard to meaning? Themes: Signals can be deceptive, even when costly. Preferences and Payoffs can differ. Deception can occur in multiple places. Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 4 / 32

  21. Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion Talk Outline Cooperation and Deception 1 Beggars and Signals 2 Face and Other-Regarding Preferences 3 Further Examples and Discussion 4 Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 5 / 32

  22. Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion Cooperation Cooperation or Cooperation Folk Sense Joint action towards a common purpose or benefit. Biological Sense “Selfish replicators forgo some of their reproductive potential to help one another.” (Nowak, 2006) Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 6 / 32

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