On Deception and Defection Jason Quinley Chris Ahern University of - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion

On Deception and Defection

Jason Quinley Chris Ahern

University of Tübingen, University of Pennsylvania

August 7, 2012

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 1 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion

Huelva, Spain: 1943

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 2 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion

Huelva, Spain: 1943

Body in the water.

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 2 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion

Huelva, Spain: 1943

Body in the water. Major William Martin, Royal Marines

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 2 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion

Huelva, Spain: 1943

Body in the water. Major William Martin, Royal Marines

• Briefcase. Forward to official channels.

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 2 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion

Huelva, Spain: 1943

Body in the water. Major William Martin, Royal Marines

• Briefcase. Forward to official channels.

Frantic messages: Where is it?

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 2 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion

German Intelligence High Command

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 3 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion

German Intelligence High Command

General Archibald Nye’s Orders: Attack the Peloponnese and Sardinia from Tunisia.

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 3 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion

German Intelligence High Command

General Archibald Nye’s Orders: Attack the Peloponnese and Sardinia from Tunisia. Divert the Panzers from France to Greece!

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 3 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion

German Intelligence High Command

General Archibald Nye’s Orders: Attack the Peloponnese and Sardinia from Tunisia. Divert the Panzers from France to Greece! Secure the island of Sardinia!

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 3 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion

German Intelligence High Command

General Archibald Nye’s Orders: Attack the Peloponnese and Sardinia from Tunisia. Divert the Panzers from France to Greece! Secure the island of Sardinia! The problem: There was no William Martin. There was no attack on Sardinia or Greece.

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 3 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion

German Intelligence High Command

General Archibald Nye’s Orders: Attack the Peloponnese and Sardinia from Tunisia. Divert the Panzers from France to Greece! Secure the island of Sardinia! The problem: There was no William Martin. There was no attack on Sardinia or Greece. Operation Mincemeat reveals themes relevant to ESSLLI

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 3 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion

German Intelligence High Command

General Archibald Nye’s Orders: Attack the Peloponnese and Sardinia from Tunisia. Divert the Panzers from France to Greece! Secure the island of Sardinia! The problem: There was no William Martin. There was no attack on Sardinia or Greece. Operation Mincemeat reveals themes relevant to ESSLLI Beliefs about Beliefs

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 3 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion

German Intelligence High Command

General Archibald Nye’s Orders: Attack the Peloponnese and Sardinia from Tunisia. Divert the Panzers from France to Greece! Secure the island of Sardinia! The problem: There was no William Martin. There was no attack on Sardinia or Greece. Operation Mincemeat reveals themes relevant to ESSLLI Beliefs about Beliefs Signaling and Coordination

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 3 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion

German Intelligence High Command

General Archibald Nye’s Orders: Attack the Peloponnese and Sardinia from Tunisia. Divert the Panzers from France to Greece! Secure the island of Sardinia! The problem: There was no William Martin. There was no attack on Sardinia or Greece. Operation Mincemeat reveals themes relevant to ESSLLI Beliefs about Beliefs Signaling and Coordination Logic of Deception

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 3 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion

German Intelligence High Command

General Archibald Nye’s Orders: Attack the Peloponnese and Sardinia from Tunisia. Divert the Panzers from France to Greece! Secure the island of Sardinia! The problem: There was no William Martin. There was no attack on Sardinia or Greece. Operation Mincemeat reveals themes relevant to ESSLLI Beliefs about Beliefs Signaling and Coordination Logic of Deception Challenge: Find Computionally Tractable Models

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 3 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion

Goals

Consider human deception in light of concerns in animal signaling. What constitutes cooperation and deception in animal behavior and signaling? When is human deception truly defection? How does this clarify human behavior with regard to meaning?

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 4 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion

Goals

Consider human deception in light of concerns in animal signaling. What constitutes cooperation and deception in animal behavior and signaling? When is human deception truly defection? How does this clarify human behavior with regard to meaning? Themes: Signals can be deceptive, even when costly.

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 4 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion

Goals

Consider human deception in light of concerns in animal signaling. What constitutes cooperation and deception in animal behavior and signaling? When is human deception truly defection? How does this clarify human behavior with regard to meaning? Themes: Signals can be deceptive, even when costly. Preferences and Payoffs can differ.

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 4 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion

Goals

Consider human deception in light of concerns in animal signaling. What constitutes cooperation and deception in animal behavior and signaling? When is human deception truly defection? How does this clarify human behavior with regard to meaning? Themes: Signals can be deceptive, even when costly. Preferences and Payoffs can differ. Deception can occur in multiple places.

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 4 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion

Talk Outline

1

Cooperation and Deception

2

Beggars and Signals

3

Face and Other-Regarding Preferences

4

Further Examples and Discussion

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 5 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion Cooperation

Cooperation or Cooperation

Folk Sense

Joint action towards a common purpose or benefit.

Biological Sense

“Selfish replicators forgo some of their reproductive potential to help one another.” (Nowak, 2006)

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 6 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion Cooperation

Cooperation or Cooperation

Stag Hare Stag 4,4 0,2 Hare 2,0 2,2 Work Shirk Work 3,3 0,4 Shirk 4,0 2,2

Ambiguity

Cooperation in the folk sense is ambiguous between the two game structures. Biological sense is only applicable to Work-Shirk game (right).

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 7 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion Deception

Cooperation as non-Deception

Deception (Searcy & Nowicki, 2005)

A Sender sends a signal to a Receiver and:

• 1. the Receiver responds in a way that benefits the Sender
• 2. the response is appropriate if the signal reliably indicates a situation, X,

and

• 3. it is not the case that X obtains

Honesty

When a Sender does not deceive a Receiver.

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 8 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion Deception

Cooperation as non-Deception

Stag Hare Stag 4,4 0,2 Hare 2,0 2,2 Work Shirk Work 3,3 0,4 Shirk 4,0 2,2

When is deception possible?

Deception is not possible in the Stag Hunt (left), but is in the Work-Shirk game (right) Hare Hunter: “I am going to hunt Stag!” (No possible benefit) Shirker: “I am going to work!” (Possible benefit)

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 9 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion Deception

Deception and Meaning

Deception Undermines “Meaning”

Assuming that deception involves a loss on the part of the receiver, if individuals have incentive to deceive each other then signaling is counter-selected for (Zahavi, 1993). Signals cease to reliably correlate with any aspects of the sender or the environment. Credulous receivers do worse than skeptical ones. Skeptical receivers do not attend to signals. Senders should not signal if receivers do not attend to signals. Signaling should disappear under the effects of deception.

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 10 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion Questions

Where to from here?

Cooperation (Honesty) vs. Defection (Deception) Does human deception undermine meaning in this way? Short Answer: No. Interesting Answer: No, and it depends on what you mean by deception.

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 11 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion Beggars

Beggars and Deception

4a Beggar: Do you have any money? 4a Passer-by: (Sorry) No I don’t. Is this deception? Does Passer-by benefit by saying “No”? Why say something rather than nothing? Especially if you have money?

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 12 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion Beggars

An important side issue—implicatures

4a’ Beggar: Do you have any money that you can spare? The passer-by is now answering truthfully, but can is ambiguous. The issues still remains: Why say anything at all?1

1Thanks to Nick Asher for his inputs on this section.

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 13 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion Signals

Signaling Model

B(eggar) decides to A(sk) a P(asser-by) for money or not based on his expectation of return. P can W(alk) or T(alk). Should P Talk, he can truthfully convey his state

• r not by sending a signal of Yes or No.

B cannot deduce if P has money or not, and this is common knowledge. The interests of B and P diverge. B prefers to have P give money and P does not prefer to do so. P has no preference to have a conversation with B.

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 14 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion Signals

Signaling with a Beggar

N B P P (1,0) Y (0,1) N T (−1,1) W A (0,1) ¬ A money B (0,0) ¬ A P (−1,0) W P (−2,−2) Y (0,0) N T A no money

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 15 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion Signals

Face and Signaling

Face

is the term given to an individual’s basic social needs, characterized broadly as the need for autonomy (negative face) and acceptance (positive face). Positive face: the wants of the individual, the desire that those wants be desirable to or approved of by others. Negative face: the freedom of action and the freedom from imposition. B respects the negative face of the passer-by by posing the question indirectly. If P ignores B, then B loses some amount of face, f. P can respect the positive face of B by insisting that either he has no money or no money to give. Both take some effort, c.

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 16 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion Signals

Signaling with a Beggar

N B P P (1−c,0) Y (0,1−c) N T (−f −c,1) W A (0,1) ¬ A money B (0,0) ¬ A P (−f −c,0) W P (−2,−2) Y (0,0) N T A no money

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 17 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion Solution

Conflicting Preferences

B prefers to get money to not, but also prefers not asking to being ignored. P prefers to Walk or not be asked in the first place. If B asks, P will Walk. Thus, B should not ask. But B does. Why?

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 18 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion Face

Saving Face

Consider your reaction to...

Seeing someone you know (and like) embarrassed. Seeing someone you don’t know embarrassed.

Consider your desire to...

Grant a request to a friend. Grant a request to a stranger (beggar).

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 19 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion Other-Regarding Preferences

Homo economicus or Homo empathicus

Theoretical (Rabin 1993, Fehr & Schmidt 1999, Levine 1998) Behavioral (Fehr & Schmidt 2003, Camerer 2003) Neurobiological (Fehr 2009)

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 20 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion Other-Regarding Preferences

Sympathy (Sally 2000, 2001)

Sympathy Distribution

For each agent, there is a distribution, δi ∈ ∆(U), such that ∑j δi(Uj) = 1, which determines how much that agent cares about her own payoffs and those

• f others.

Homo economicus

δi(Uj) = 0 for all j = i.

New utility function

Vi = δi(Ui)·Ui +(1−δi(Ui))·Uj

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 21 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion Other-Regarding Preferences

Signaling with a Beggar

N B P P (1−c,0) Y (0,1−c) N T (−f −c,1) W A (0,1) ¬ A money B (0,0) ¬ A P (−f −c,0) W P (−2,−2) Y (0,0) N T A no money

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 22 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion Other-Regarding Preferences

When Deception isn’t Defection

Condition

It suffices for P to prefer N to W when VP(N) > VP(W), which is true when: δP(UB) > c f +2c (1)

Interpretation

If the cost of addressing B’s face is low in comparison to the effort made by B and the face that would be lost by B if P were to walk then P will be more likely to politely say No. If B is rude, then P will be less likely to even say No.

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 23 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion Other-Regarding Preferences

Cooperation and Other-Regarding Preferences

Stag Hare Stag 4,4 0,2 Hare 2,0 2,2 Work Shirk Work 3,3 0,4 Shirk 4,0 2,2

Condition

Work-Shirk is a Stag Hunt (generally, an Assurance game) when δi(Uj) > 1

4

for all i.

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 24 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion Other-Regarding Preferences

Relationships and Other-Regarding Preferences

Different Types of Relationships (Pinker et al. 2007)

Reciprocity Communality Dominance

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 25 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion

Do these jeans make me look fat?

Alice: Do these jeans look okay? Betty: They look great! Alice: Do these jeans look okay? Betty: Hey did I tell you what I saw today? Alice: Do these jeans look okay? Betty: (Sorry.) They don’t look so good.

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 26 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion

Do these jeans make me look fat?

Alice can choose to ask (A) or not ask (¬ A) Betty for her opinion. Betty can change the subject (C) or talk (T), saying (Yes) or (No) to the question of if the jeans look okay.

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 27 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion

Do these jeans make me look fat?

N A B B 1,1 Y −1,−1 N T 0,0 C A 0,0 ¬ A great A 0,0 ¬ A B 0,0 C B 1,−1 Y −1,1 N T A not great A

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 28 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion

Other extensions

Maultaschen (Herrgotts Bescheisserle or Lord God Bullshitters) Child: Mommy is there a Santa Claus? How does deception work when we try to deceive a more advanced reasoner? How do we deceive someone whose epistemic states are rapidly advancing. What are the payoffs/ risks?

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 29 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion

Conclusion

Language is used not just to convey propositional content, but also to negotiate relationships. Deception is not always defection, but rather a way to deal with a variety

• f relationships as well social wants and other-regarding preferences

Understanding cooperation’s nuances helps us understand signaling within a given game Relationships exist outside of language Preferences exist outside of payoffs

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 30 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion

Want to know more?

Enforcing Honest Signaling (Chris Ahern, Wednesday, ForModCom, 14:00) Saving Face (JQ, Friday, Multi-Modal Comm, 17:00) Questions of Trust (JQ +CA, Monday, StuSess)

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 31 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 32 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion

Thanks!

Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 32 / 32

Cooperation and Deception Beggars and Signals Face and Other-Regarding Preferences Further Examples and Discussion

References

1

Camerer (2003) Behavioral Game Theory

2

Fehr (2009) Social Preferences and the Brain

3

Fehr & Schmidt (1999) A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation

4

Fehr & Schmidt (2003) Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity: Evidence and Economic Applications

5

Levine (1998) Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments

6

Nowak (2006), Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation

7

Pinker, Nowak, and Lee(2007), The Logic of Indirect Speech

8

Rabin (1993) Incorporating Fairness Into Game Theory and Economics.

9

Sally (2000) A General Theory of Sympathy, Mind-Reading, and Social Interaction, with an Application to the Prisoners’ Dilemma.

10 Sally (2001) On Sympathy and Games 11 Searcy & Nowicki (2005) The Evolution of Animal Communication 12 Zahavi (1993) The Fallacy of Conventional Signalling Quinley and Ahern (UniT) On Deception and Defection August 7, 2012 33 / 32