The measurement of PPPs and the measurement of poverty AN GU S D E - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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The measurement of PPPs and the measurement of poverty AN GU S D E - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

The measurement of PPPs and the measurement of poverty AN GU S D E ATON W OR LD B AN K J U N E 16 , 2 0 14 Two topics ICP 2011 The new PPPs, why are they so different from what was anticipated? Work jointly with Bettina Aten,


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AN GU S D E ATON W OR LD B AN K J U N E 16 , 2 0 14

The measurement of PPPs and the measurement of poverty

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Two topics

 ICP 2011

 The new PPPs, why are they so different from what was

anticipated?

 Work jointly with Bettina Aten, Bureau of Economic Analysis  Paper is on my website

http:/ / www.princeton.edu/ ~deaton/ papers.html

 NBER Working Paper later this week

 Implications for measuring poverty

 As well as PPPs and poverty more generally

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Introduction

 ICP 2011 summary report was published on April 29th,

2014

 Large decrease in PPPs for non-OECD countries relative

to the US

 Makes the world much less unequal  China is not larger than the US, but close  India is bigger than Japan  These received lots of attention in the media  Also, media and blogs noted that there were major

implications for global poverty

 If $1.25 is held constant, about half of global poverty will vanish  About 2/ 3 for India, from 300 million to about 100 million

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Consumption PPPs

 PPPs for individual consumption by households are

used for poverty calculations

 I focus on them here  Somewhat simpler to ask what happened than for

GDP

 We don’t need to deal with the trade balance, government

services, education, and other comparison resistant items

 Document what happened  And an explanation for how we got here

 As well as estimates of the size of the problem  And how to correct it

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Need to think about 2005 and 2011 together

 ICP2005 raised PPPs in poor countries relative to rich

countries, compared with ex ante extrapolation from 1993/ 96

 ICP2011 results do the opposite, decreasing PPPs in poor

countries relative to rich countries, compared with ex ante extrapolation from 2005

 Discussion has mostly been about how implausible 2011

results are conditional on 2005 being correct

 Little criticism of ICP 2005 because ICP 1993/ 96 had so many

things wrong with it

 No China, no India, piecemeal not integrated, and many new methods

 So it was easy to dismiss the 2005 changes, which might have

been a mistake

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The hypothesis

 Perhaps part of what is going on is that 2005 numbers

were too high?

 Would account for jump up in 2005  Corresponding jump back down in 2011

 The 2005 regional linking could possibly have done this

 ICP 2005 priced a ring list of 1000 items in 18 countries  Much less cross checking than for the regional lists  All of the ring prices get aggregated into four “tectonic” indexes  Africa, Asia, Western Asia, LAC versus OECD countries  If the ring goods were hard to find (unrepresentative) and

  • verpriced in Africa, say

 All African countries would have PPPs that were too high  No ring in 2011, but common global list  So the ring effect would be undone

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Documenting what happened

 Some graphs comparing actual ICP 2005 and ICP

2011 with previous extrapolations

 Extrapolations come from previous rounds using CPI

from the country and CPI from the US

 With country c and US country 0  Except for Eurostat, which updates continuously

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Failures of extrapolation

 Many reasons why extrapolation can fail  PPPs are multilateral indexes

 Each bilateral is superlative and so has weights of both countries  CPIs have only weights of one country  So you can’t get one from the other

 ICP and CPI collect different prices

 Usual ICP issues of representativity versus comparability  Not the same in selection of items for the CPI

 Standard errors are likely to be large  Poor quality of CPIs in many countries

 Old weights, and relative price of food increased from 2005 to 2011  But this doesn’t do it, see paper

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Is it the ring?

 Certainly not all the ring

 The difference with extrapolation in 2011 is not uniform by region  Changes of relative positions within regions  This cannot be the ring, because it doesn’t work this way

 A test for the ring itself

 Simple case, the ring collected food prices in Cameroon in 2005  Global list collected food prices in Cameroon in 2011  We have an estimate of food price inflation from successive ICPs  We have food price inflation from Cameroon’s own CPI  If ring story is right, ICP prediction of food inflation should be

substantially lower than CPI change itself

 Because of the overstatement in ICP ring in 2005  Ideally repeat for each basic head of each ring country

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In reality. . .

 Insufficient overlap in ring list and new global list to

allow this to be done at basic head level

 We do it instead using PPPs  Our procedure

 Recalculate PPPs for each of 18 ring countries using only ring

country data for consumption in both 2005 and 2011

 We use GBR as numeraire, as in the original ring. We can check

extrapolation, by comparing change in log PPPs relative to GBR from 2005 to 2011 with change in log CPI minus change in log CPI for GBR

 If ring overpriced in poor countries, ICP calculation of

CPI change should be substantially lower than reality

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What do we see?

 GBR goes through (0,0) by construction  Extrapolation for other rich ring countries is OK

 Japan an exception, but not if the ring list were unrepresentative

there

 South Africa in the other direction, but ring list likely representative

there, for at least part of the population

 For poorer ring countries, actual CPI change is much

larger than predicted from ICP

 Extrapolation from 2005 would overestimate 2011 results

 The gap between the lines is 25 percent

 With a huge leap of faith at this stage, something like 2005

  • verestimation for Africa, Asia, and W Asia

 Correcting for ZAF, 22 percent

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Summary so far

 Last slide shows plot of underestimation against log

per capita income

 Confirms strong positive relationship between pc GDP and size

  • f discrepancy

 Hardly slam-dunk evidence  But it is plausible, and together with standard errors

and CPI deficiencies could take us quite a long way to understanding the difference between 2005 and 2011

 Not clear what else could explain systematic

reduction in PPPs in poorer countries

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A cross check

 We can use the Balassa-Samuelson theorem, or its empirical

counterpart, the Penn effect

 Price level index (the ratio of PPP to exchange rate) is lower in

poor countries than in rich countries

 Because non-traded goods are relatively cheap in poor countries

 If the BS relationship is stable over time, particularly 2005

and 2011

 Then in 2005, countries in W. Asia, Asia, and Africa should be

above the line

 This turns out to be true  Average gap between the two lines is 20 percent  Consistent with direct evidence from the ring  Gap between actual and extrapolations a little larger

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End of Part One

 Africa, Asia, W. Asia 20-30 percent overstated in ICP

2005

 Two corroborating sources of evidence

 Within region PPPs and not so different from

extrapolations

 Also evidence for a ring-based explanation

 ICP 2011 looks OK (for now)  Could revise 2005 by back-casting from 2011 using

CPIs, and then adjust to preserve regional fixity

 Effectively revised only the ring linking factors

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H O W I T W O R K S ? A L T E R N A T I V E S ? W H A T T O D O ? L A T T E R I S M U C H M O R E A M A T T E R O F O P I N I O N

Poverty and the ICP

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Starting points

 Bank’s poverty count uses consumption PPPs at several points  Poorest countries’ poverty lines are averaged to get global line

 Having first been converted using PPPs  Currently $1.25 per person per day

 The line is converted back to LCU at country PPPs to give LCU

versions of global line

 Number of people below the line counted country by country

 NB If there were only one poor country (“India”)

 India’s national line would be the global line  India’s PPP in USD is irrelevant for global count  Changing India’s PPP affects the USD value of global line, but not the number of

people in poverty

 More generally, with many poor countries, global count depends

  • nly on relative PPPs of poor countries

 PPPs of poor countries relative to the US matter for the global line, not count  All assuming that the poorest countries are not changed at the same time

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When PPPs change

 ICP 2011 lowered PPPs for poor countries relative to

extrapolations

 If we hold global line at $1.25 (updated for US inflation since

2005)

 Local lines are now much lower, and many fewer poor

 Global poverty falls by around a half, Indian poverty by about two-thirds

 Post 2005, chief economist noted “the sobering news—that

poverty is more pervasive than we thought—means that we should redouble our efforts, especially in sub-Saharan Africa”

 The corresponding response would today be “the inebriating

news—that poverty is less pervasive than we thought—means that we should halve our efforts, especially in sub-Saharan Africa”

 Presumably not, though interesting to ask just why not

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Nothing happened

 PPPs changed, but nothing actually happened to global poverty  Perhaps we should recognize this, and adjust global line to keep

total fixed

 Around $2 in 2011 prices  Still be major changes in regional and country structure of poverty

 SSA much less sensitive to changes than is South Asia  Large numbers of people in the latter near global lines  These things matter: Africanization of poverty in 1993 revision of 1985

 Major choice

 Hold the line, and big reduction in count  Hold the count, and increase the line

 Statistical arguments are surely for the latter

 But $1-a-day line has had considerable rhetorical value in development

discussions

 Few people understand these matters, and even some who do, or should, will

accuse the Bank of self-interested dishonesty, whatever it chooses to do

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What should be done?

 I don’t believe that there is any solution that squares the

circle, but there are some suggestions

 Don’t change the line at the same time as an ICP revision.

 Multiplies confusion

 Don’t use an unweighted average of poor country lines

 Guinea Bissau can determine the fate of India  Weight all country lines by the number of poor people in the country

 PPPs should ideally exclude the rich countries, and

exclude the goods not consumed by the poor

 Better still weight by consumption patterns near the global line  Makes less difference than one might think, see my paper with

Olivier Dupriez

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More fundamentally

 In a world where many people live near the global line, headcount

ratio measures of poverty are so sensitive as to threaten their utility

 PPPs have substantial standard errors: magnified by use in HCR  Global poverty, as currently defined, perhaps cannot be measured with useful

precision

 Not just ICP, but reporting periods in surveys, for example

 Divorce global counts from the ICP

 Might be possible to price a basic food bundle with local functional substitutions  Bob Allen has argued for this, and has used it effectively in historical work  Even costs $1.25 in the US

 Don’t use PPPs at all

 Remember global count does not depend on PPPs of poor countries relative to

the US

 Only on relative PPPs among poor countries: not so different from exchange

rates: worth making calculations along these lines

 Balassa Samuelson works mostly between rich and poor  Would lose only $ value of global line, but perhaps time to lose that anyway