The measurement of PPPs and the measurement of poverty AN GU S D E - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
The measurement of PPPs and the measurement of poverty AN GU S D E - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
The measurement of PPPs and the measurement of poverty AN GU S D E ATON W OR LD B AN K J U N E 16 , 2 0 14 Two topics ICP 2011 The new PPPs, why are they so different from what was anticipated? Work jointly with Bettina Aten,
Two topics
ICP 2011
The new PPPs, why are they so different from what was
anticipated?
Work jointly with Bettina Aten, Bureau of Economic Analysis Paper is on my website
http:/ / www.princeton.edu/ ~deaton/ papers.html
NBER Working Paper later this week
Implications for measuring poverty
As well as PPPs and poverty more generally
Introduction
ICP 2011 summary report was published on April 29th,
2014
Large decrease in PPPs for non-OECD countries relative
to the US
Makes the world much less unequal China is not larger than the US, but close India is bigger than Japan These received lots of attention in the media Also, media and blogs noted that there were major
implications for global poverty
If $1.25 is held constant, about half of global poverty will vanish About 2/ 3 for India, from 300 million to about 100 million
Consumption PPPs
PPPs for individual consumption by households are
used for poverty calculations
I focus on them here Somewhat simpler to ask what happened than for
GDP
We don’t need to deal with the trade balance, government
services, education, and other comparison resistant items
Document what happened And an explanation for how we got here
As well as estimates of the size of the problem And how to correct it
Need to think about 2005 and 2011 together
ICP2005 raised PPPs in poor countries relative to rich
countries, compared with ex ante extrapolation from 1993/ 96
ICP2011 results do the opposite, decreasing PPPs in poor
countries relative to rich countries, compared with ex ante extrapolation from 2005
Discussion has mostly been about how implausible 2011
results are conditional on 2005 being correct
Little criticism of ICP 2005 because ICP 1993/ 96 had so many
things wrong with it
No China, no India, piecemeal not integrated, and many new methods
So it was easy to dismiss the 2005 changes, which might have
been a mistake
The hypothesis
Perhaps part of what is going on is that 2005 numbers
were too high?
Would account for jump up in 2005 Corresponding jump back down in 2011
The 2005 regional linking could possibly have done this
ICP 2005 priced a ring list of 1000 items in 18 countries Much less cross checking than for the regional lists All of the ring prices get aggregated into four “tectonic” indexes Africa, Asia, Western Asia, LAC versus OECD countries If the ring goods were hard to find (unrepresentative) and
- verpriced in Africa, say
All African countries would have PPPs that were too high No ring in 2011, but common global list So the ring effect would be undone
Documenting what happened
Some graphs comparing actual ICP 2005 and ICP
2011 with previous extrapolations
Extrapolations come from previous rounds using CPI
from the country and CPI from the US
With country c and US country 0 Except for Eurostat, which updates continuously
Failures of extrapolation
Many reasons why extrapolation can fail PPPs are multilateral indexes
Each bilateral is superlative and so has weights of both countries CPIs have only weights of one country So you can’t get one from the other
ICP and CPI collect different prices
Usual ICP issues of representativity versus comparability Not the same in selection of items for the CPI
Standard errors are likely to be large Poor quality of CPIs in many countries
Old weights, and relative price of food increased from 2005 to 2011 But this doesn’t do it, see paper
Is it the ring?
Certainly not all the ring
The difference with extrapolation in 2011 is not uniform by region Changes of relative positions within regions This cannot be the ring, because it doesn’t work this way
A test for the ring itself
Simple case, the ring collected food prices in Cameroon in 2005 Global list collected food prices in Cameroon in 2011 We have an estimate of food price inflation from successive ICPs We have food price inflation from Cameroon’s own CPI If ring story is right, ICP prediction of food inflation should be
substantially lower than CPI change itself
Because of the overstatement in ICP ring in 2005 Ideally repeat for each basic head of each ring country
In reality. . .
Insufficient overlap in ring list and new global list to
allow this to be done at basic head level
We do it instead using PPPs Our procedure
Recalculate PPPs for each of 18 ring countries using only ring
country data for consumption in both 2005 and 2011
We use GBR as numeraire, as in the original ring. We can check
extrapolation, by comparing change in log PPPs relative to GBR from 2005 to 2011 with change in log CPI minus change in log CPI for GBR
If ring overpriced in poor countries, ICP calculation of
CPI change should be substantially lower than reality
What do we see?
GBR goes through (0,0) by construction Extrapolation for other rich ring countries is OK
Japan an exception, but not if the ring list were unrepresentative
there
South Africa in the other direction, but ring list likely representative
there, for at least part of the population
For poorer ring countries, actual CPI change is much
larger than predicted from ICP
Extrapolation from 2005 would overestimate 2011 results
The gap between the lines is 25 percent
With a huge leap of faith at this stage, something like 2005
- verestimation for Africa, Asia, and W Asia
Correcting for ZAF, 22 percent
Summary so far
Last slide shows plot of underestimation against log
per capita income
Confirms strong positive relationship between pc GDP and size
- f discrepancy
Hardly slam-dunk evidence But it is plausible, and together with standard errors
and CPI deficiencies could take us quite a long way to understanding the difference between 2005 and 2011
Not clear what else could explain systematic
reduction in PPPs in poorer countries
A cross check
We can use the Balassa-Samuelson theorem, or its empirical
counterpart, the Penn effect
Price level index (the ratio of PPP to exchange rate) is lower in
poor countries than in rich countries
Because non-traded goods are relatively cheap in poor countries
If the BS relationship is stable over time, particularly 2005
and 2011
Then in 2005, countries in W. Asia, Asia, and Africa should be
above the line
This turns out to be true Average gap between the two lines is 20 percent Consistent with direct evidence from the ring Gap between actual and extrapolations a little larger
End of Part One
Africa, Asia, W. Asia 20-30 percent overstated in ICP
2005
Two corroborating sources of evidence
Within region PPPs and not so different from
extrapolations
Also evidence for a ring-based explanation
ICP 2011 looks OK (for now) Could revise 2005 by back-casting from 2011 using
CPIs, and then adjust to preserve regional fixity
Effectively revised only the ring linking factors
H O W I T W O R K S ? A L T E R N A T I V E S ? W H A T T O D O ? L A T T E R I S M U C H M O R E A M A T T E R O F O P I N I O N
Poverty and the ICP
Starting points
Bank’s poverty count uses consumption PPPs at several points Poorest countries’ poverty lines are averaged to get global line
Having first been converted using PPPs Currently $1.25 per person per day
The line is converted back to LCU at country PPPs to give LCU
versions of global line
Number of people below the line counted country by country
NB If there were only one poor country (“India”)
India’s national line would be the global line India’s PPP in USD is irrelevant for global count Changing India’s PPP affects the USD value of global line, but not the number of
people in poverty
More generally, with many poor countries, global count depends
- nly on relative PPPs of poor countries
PPPs of poor countries relative to the US matter for the global line, not count All assuming that the poorest countries are not changed at the same time
When PPPs change
ICP 2011 lowered PPPs for poor countries relative to
extrapolations
If we hold global line at $1.25 (updated for US inflation since
2005)
Local lines are now much lower, and many fewer poor
Global poverty falls by around a half, Indian poverty by about two-thirds
Post 2005, chief economist noted “the sobering news—that
poverty is more pervasive than we thought—means that we should redouble our efforts, especially in sub-Saharan Africa”
The corresponding response would today be “the inebriating
news—that poverty is less pervasive than we thought—means that we should halve our efforts, especially in sub-Saharan Africa”
Presumably not, though interesting to ask just why not
Nothing happened
PPPs changed, but nothing actually happened to global poverty Perhaps we should recognize this, and adjust global line to keep
total fixed
Around $2 in 2011 prices Still be major changes in regional and country structure of poverty
SSA much less sensitive to changes than is South Asia Large numbers of people in the latter near global lines These things matter: Africanization of poverty in 1993 revision of 1985
Major choice
Hold the line, and big reduction in count Hold the count, and increase the line
Statistical arguments are surely for the latter
But $1-a-day line has had considerable rhetorical value in development
discussions
Few people understand these matters, and even some who do, or should, will
accuse the Bank of self-interested dishonesty, whatever it chooses to do
What should be done?
I don’t believe that there is any solution that squares the
circle, but there are some suggestions
Don’t change the line at the same time as an ICP revision.
Multiplies confusion
Don’t use an unweighted average of poor country lines
Guinea Bissau can determine the fate of India Weight all country lines by the number of poor people in the country
PPPs should ideally exclude the rich countries, and
exclude the goods not consumed by the poor
Better still weight by consumption patterns near the global line Makes less difference than one might think, see my paper with
Olivier Dupriez
More fundamentally
In a world where many people live near the global line, headcount
ratio measures of poverty are so sensitive as to threaten their utility
PPPs have substantial standard errors: magnified by use in HCR Global poverty, as currently defined, perhaps cannot be measured with useful
precision
Not just ICP, but reporting periods in surveys, for example
Divorce global counts from the ICP
Might be possible to price a basic food bundle with local functional substitutions Bob Allen has argued for this, and has used it effectively in historical work Even costs $1.25 in the US
Don’t use PPPs at all
Remember global count does not depend on PPPs of poor countries relative to
the US
Only on relative PPPs among poor countries: not so different from exchange
rates: worth making calculations along these lines
Balassa Samuelson works mostly between rich and poor Would lose only $ value of global line, but perhaps time to lose that anyway