The inverse Faraday challenge Myth: Faraday cage (grounded or - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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The inverse Faraday challenge Daniel J. Bernstein University of Illinois at Chicago & Technische Universiteit Eindhoven

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Myth: Faraday cage (grounded or ungrounded) eliminates some types of leakage.

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The inverse Faraday challenge Daniel J. Bernstein University of Illinois at Chicago & Technische Universiteit Eindhoven

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Myth: Faraday cage (grounded or ungrounded) eliminates some types of leakage. Fact for each m: All information inside Faraday cage is visible m meters away.

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The inverse Faraday challenge Daniel J. Bernstein University of Illinois at Chicago & Technische Universiteit Eindhoven

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Myth: Faraday cage (grounded or ungrounded) eliminates some types of leakage. Fact for each m: All information inside Faraday cage is visible m meters away. Hard proof: Messy calculations using laws of electromagnetism.

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The inverse Faraday challenge Daniel J. Bernstein University of Illinois at Chicago & Technische Universiteit Eindhoven

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Myth: Faraday cage (grounded or ungrounded) eliminates some types of leakage. Fact for each m: All information inside Faraday cage is visible m meters away. Hard proof: Messy calculations using laws of electromagnetism. Easy proof: This is a special case

• f the “holographic principle”.

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inverse Faraday challenge

• J. Bernstein

University of Illinois at Chicago & echnische Universiteit Eindhoven

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Myth: Faraday cage (grounded or ungrounded) eliminates some types of leakage. Fact for each m: All information inside Faraday cage is visible m meters away. Hard proof: Messy calculations using laws of electromagnetism. Easy proof: This is a special case

• f the “holographic principle”.

Typical EM Use sens from chip.

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raday challenge Bernstein Illinois at Chicago & Universiteit Eindhoven

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Myth: Faraday cage (grounded or ungrounded) eliminates some types of leakage. Fact for each m: All information inside Faraday cage is visible m meters away. Hard proof: Messy calculations using laws of electromagnetism. Easy proof: This is a special case

• f the “holographic principle”.

Typical EM attack: Use sensors to extract from chip. Compute

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nge Chicago & Eindhoven

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Myth: Faraday cage (grounded or ungrounded) eliminates some types of leakage. Fact for each m: All information inside Faraday cage is visible m meters away. Hard proof: Messy calculations using laws of electromagnetism. Easy proof: This is a special case

• f the “holographic principle”.

Typical EM attack: Use sensors to extract EM data from chip. Compute secret k

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Myth: Faraday cage (grounded or ungrounded) eliminates some types of leakage. Fact for each m: All information inside Faraday cage is visible m meters away. Hard proof: Messy calculations using laws of electromagnetism. Easy proof: This is a special case

• f the “holographic principle”.

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Typical EM attack: Use sensors to extract EM data from chip. Compute secret key.

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Myth: Faraday cage (grounded or ungrounded) eliminates some types of leakage. Fact for each m: All information inside Faraday cage is visible m meters away. Hard proof: Messy calculations using laws of electromagnetism. Easy proof: This is a special case

• f the “holographic principle”.

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Typical EM attack: Use sensors to extract EM data from chip. Compute secret key. Countermeasure: Put Faraday cage around chip. Sensors fail.

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Myth: Faraday cage (grounded or ungrounded) eliminates some types of leakage. Fact for each m: All information inside Faraday cage is visible m meters away. Hard proof: Messy calculations using laws of electromagnetism. Easy proof: This is a special case

• f the “holographic principle”.

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Typical EM attack: Use sensors to extract EM data from chip. Compute secret key. Countermeasure: Put Faraday cage around chip. Sensors fail. Challenge: Surround Faraday cage with an inverse Faraday cage that rebuilds the original EM data. Sensors work again.

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Faraday cage (grounded or ungrounded) eliminates some types of leakage. for each m: information inside Faraday is visible m meters away. roof: Messy calculations laws of electromagnetism. roof: This is a special case “holographic principle”.

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Typical EM attack: Use sensors to extract EM data from chip. Compute secret key. Countermeasure: Put Faraday cage around chip. Sensors fail. Challenge: Surround Faraday cage with an inverse Faraday cage that rebuilds the original EM data. Sensors work again. Should b inverse F

• many EM
• the mess
• many EM

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cage ungrounded) types of leakage. : inside Faraday meters away. Messy calculations electromagnetism. This is a special case hic principle”.

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Typical EM attack: Use sensors to extract EM data from chip. Compute secret key. Countermeasure: Put Faraday cage around chip. Sensors fail. Challenge: Surround Faraday cage with an inverse Faraday cage that rebuilds the original EM data. Sensors work again. Should be able to inverse Faraday cage

• many EM sensors;
• the messy calculations;
• many EM generato

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leakage. raday ay. calculations electromagnetism. ecial case rinciple”.

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Typical EM attack: Use sensors to extract EM data from chip. Compute secret key. Countermeasure: Put Faraday cage around chip. Sensors fail. Challenge: Surround Faraday cage with an inverse Faraday cage that rebuilds the original EM data. Sensors work again. Should be able to build inverse Faraday cage from

• many EM sensors;
• the messy calculations;
• many EM generators.

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Typical EM attack: Use sensors to extract EM data from chip. Compute secret key. Countermeasure: Put Faraday cage around chip. Sensors fail. Challenge: Surround Faraday cage with an inverse Faraday cage that rebuilds the original EM data. Sensors work again.

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Should be able to build inverse Faraday cage from

• many EM sensors;
• the messy calculations;
• many EM generators.

3

Typical EM attack: Use sensors to extract EM data from chip. Compute secret key. Countermeasure: Put Faraday cage around chip. Sensors fail. Challenge: Surround Faraday cage with an inverse Faraday cage that rebuilds the original EM data. Sensors work again.

4

Should be able to build inverse Faraday cage from

• many EM sensors;
• the messy calculations;
• many EM generators.

Probably easier: Directly build a many-sensor EM attack against a chip inside a Faraday cage.

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Typical EM attack: Use sensors to extract EM data from chip. Compute secret key. Countermeasure: Put Faraday cage around chip. Sensors fail. Challenge: Surround Faraday cage with an inverse Faraday cage that rebuilds the original EM data. Sensors work again.

4

Should be able to build inverse Faraday cage from

• many EM sensors;
• the messy calculations;
• many EM generators.

Probably easier: Directly build a many-sensor EM attack against a chip inside a Faraday cage. Maybe harder, maybe impossible: Build inverse Faraday cage as a simple physical device.

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ypical EM attack: nsors to extract EM data

• chip. Compute secret key.

Countermeasure: raday cage around chip. rs fail. Challenge: Surround Faraday cage with inverse Faraday cage that rebuilds the original EM data. rs work again.

4

Should be able to build inverse Faraday cage from

• many EM sensors;
• the messy calculations;
• many EM generators.

Probably easier: Directly build a many-sensor EM attack against a chip inside a Faraday cage. Maybe harder, maybe impossible: Build inverse Faraday cage as a simple physical device.

Technical note the talk: My primary Fa inside the into movements cage, creating the cage, which cage should Faraday cages tap the ground. can also b

• f information,

sensors might

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attack: extract EM data Compute secret key. Countermeasure: cage around chip. y cage with raday cage that riginal EM data. again.

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Should be able to build inverse Faraday cage from

• many EM sensors;
• the messy calculations;
• many EM generators.

Probably easier: Directly build a many-sensor EM attack against a chip inside a Faraday cage. Maybe harder, maybe impossible: Build inverse Faraday cage as a simple physical device.

Technical note added to the talk: My understanding primary Faraday effect inside the Faraday cage into movements of electrons cage, creating magnetic the cage, which EM senso cage should be able to Faraday cages it should tap the ground. Electromagnetic can also be converted

• f information, so using

sensors might also be

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data secret key. chip. with that data.

4

Should be able to build inverse Faraday cage from

• many EM sensors;
• the messy calculations;
• many EM generators.

Probably easier: Directly build a many-sensor EM attack against a chip inside a Faraday cage. Maybe harder, maybe impossible: Build inverse Faraday cage as a simple physical device.

Technical note added to slides after the talk: My understanding of the primary Faraday effect is that waves inside the Faraday cage are converted into movements of electrons on the cage, creating magnetic fields outside the cage, which EM sensors outside cage should be able to see. For grounded Faraday cages it should also be helpful tap the ground. Electromagnetic w can also be converted into other fo

• f information, so using other types

sensors might also be helpful.

4

Should be able to build inverse Faraday cage from

• many EM sensors;
• the messy calculations;
• many EM generators.

Probably easier: Directly build a many-sensor EM attack against a chip inside a Faraday cage. Maybe harder, maybe impossible: Build inverse Faraday cage as a simple physical device.

5

Technical note added to slides after the talk: My understanding of the primary Faraday effect is that waves inside the Faraday cage are converted into movements of electrons on the cage, creating magnetic fields outside the cage, which EM sensors outside the cage should be able to see. For grounded Faraday cages it should also be helpful to tap the ground. Electromagnetic waves can also be converted into other forms

• f information, so using other types of

sensors might also be helpful.