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The Failure of a Clearinghouse: Empirical Evidence Vincent Bignon Guillaume Vuillemey Banque de France HEC Paris & CEPR 10 years after Lehman Paris September 2018 Vincent Bignon, Guillaume Vuillemey The Failure of a


  1. The Failure of a Clearinghouse: Empirical Evidence Vincent Bignon Guillaume Vuillemey Banque de France HEC Paris & CEPR 10 years after Lehman Paris September 2018 Vincent Bignon, Guillaume Vuillemey The Failure of a Clearinghouse:Empirical Evidence

  2. Motivation Central clearing counterparties (CCPs) become widespread Vincent Bignon, Guillaume Vuillemey The Failure of a Clearinghouse:Empirical Evidence

  3. Motivation Central clearing counterparties (CCPs) become widespread CCP expected to improve financial stability CCPs insure counterparty risk; netting benefits Vincent Bignon, Guillaume Vuillemey The Failure of a Clearinghouse:Empirical Evidence

  4. Motivation Central clearing counterparties (CCPs) become widespread CCP expected to improve financial stability CCPs insure counterparty risk; netting benefits Vincent Bignon, Guillaume Vuillemey The Failure of a Clearinghouse:Empirical Evidence

  5. Motivation Central clearing counterparties (CCPs) become widespread CCP expected to improve financial stability CCPs insure counterparty risk; netting benefits Vincent Bignon, Guillaume Vuillemey The Failure of a Clearinghouse:Empirical Evidence

  6. Motivation Central clearing counterparties (CCPs) become widespread CCP expected to improve financial stability CCPs insure counterparty risk; netting benefits Vincent Bignon, Guillaume Vuillemey The Failure of a Clearinghouse:Empirical Evidence

  7. Motivation Central clearing counterparties (CCPs) become widespread CCP expected to improve financial stability CCPs insure counterparty risk; netting benefits Vincent Bignon, Guillaume Vuillemey The Failure of a Clearinghouse:Empirical Evidence

  8. Motivation New risk: CCP default Dramatic effects on markets and macro stability (Duffie, 2015) LCH Swapclear: 269 trillion USD outstanding Rare events: Three cases known in history, no existing study Vincent Bignon, Guillaume Vuillemey The Failure of a Clearinghouse:Empirical Evidence

  9. Motivation New risk: CCP default Dramatic effects on markets and macro stability (Duffie, 2015) LCH Swapclear: 269 trillion USD outstanding Rare events: Three cases known in history, no existing study This paper: First empirical evidence on CCP default Failure of CCP in Paris Commodity Exchange in 1974 Unique descriptive evidence: novel, hand-collected, archive data CCP risk management outside and around distress Vincent Bignon, Guillaume Vuillemey The Failure of a Clearinghouse:Empirical Evidence

  10. Motivation New risk: CCP default Dramatic effects on markets and macro stability (Duffie, 2015) LCH Swapclear: 269 trillion USD outstanding Rare events: Three cases known in history, no existing study This paper: First empirical evidence on CCP default Failure of CCP in Paris Commodity Exchange in 1974 Unique descriptive evidence: novel, hand-collected, archive data CCP risk management outside and around distress Implications CCP capital structure Resolution schemes for financial institutions Vincent Bignon, Guillaume Vuillemey The Failure of a Clearinghouse:Empirical Evidence

  11. CCP capital structure Matched book Out-of-the-money In-the-money transactions transactions Amounts owing Collateral held to members Other assets Equity Vincent Bignon, Guillaume Vuillemey The Failure of a Clearinghouse:Empirical Evidence

  12. CCP capital structure Matched book Indifferent to settlement prices Out-of-the-money In-the-money transactions transactions Amounts owing Collateral held to members Other assets Equity Vincent Bignon, Guillaume Vuillemey The Failure of a Clearinghouse:Empirical Evidence

  13. CCP capital structure New in-the-money New out-of-the money Matched book Indifferent to settlement prices Out-of-the-money In-the-money transactions transactions Collateral held Amounts owing to members Other assets Equity Vincent Bignon, Guillaume Vuillemey The Failure of a Clearinghouse:Empirical Evidence

  14. CCP capital structure New in-the-money New out-of-the money Matched book Indifferent to settlement prices Out-of-the-money In-the-money transactions transactions Low equity Collateral held Amounts owing to members Other assets Equity Vincent Bignon, Guillaume Vuillemey The Failure of a Clearinghouse:Empirical Evidence

  15. Theory: When a member is in distress Charter value effect Protect CCP value arising from continuation Be tough with distressed members, to keep surviving members Liquidate defaulted position quickly Vincent Bignon, Guillaume Vuillemey The Failure of a Clearinghouse:Empirical Evidence

  16. Theory: When a member is in distress Charter value effect Protect CCP value arising from continuation Be tough with distressed members, to keep surviving members Liquidate defaulted position quickly Risk-shifting effect Quick liquidation can impair CCP equity value which is bounded below by zero Can incentivize gambles (e.g. delay liquidation to be on reversal) Vincent Bignon, Guillaume Vuillemey The Failure of a Clearinghouse:Empirical Evidence

  17. Theory: When a member is in distress Charter value effect Protect CCP value arising from continuation Be tough with distressed members, to keep surviving members Liquidate defaulted position quickly Risk-shifting effect Quick liquidation can impair CCP equity value which is bounded below by zero Can incentivize gambles (e.g. delay liquidation to be on reversal) Trade-off is affected by resolution schemes Resolution/recovery schemes change payoffs to equityholders Here: asymmetric information with supervisors → Incentive to misreport to shift losses to creditors Vincent Bignon, Guillaume Vuillemey The Failure of a Clearinghouse:Empirical Evidence

  18. The market Paris Commodity Exchange Futures on sugar, cocoa, coffee Trading through 35 registered brokers → Also clearing members Execute orders on behalf of clients, including retail investors Short positions: commodity producers; long positions: retail investors Vincent Bignon, Guillaume Vuillemey The Failure of a Clearinghouse:Empirical Evidence

  19. The market Paris Commodity Exchange Futures on sugar, cocoa, coffee Trading through 35 registered brokers → Also clearing members Execute orders on behalf of clients, including retail investors Short positions: commodity producers; long positions: retail investors CCP : Caisse de Liquidation des Affaires en Marchandises (CLAM) All trades centrally cleared → CLAM takes counterparty risk Risk managed by calling initial + variation margins Initial margins : Paid at initiation of contract Variation margins : Called daily based on price fluctuations If default on margins: Liquidate member’s position If loss: equity absorbs; no additional waterfall Vincent Bignon, Guillaume Vuillemey The Failure of a Clearinghouse:Empirical Evidence

  20. The 1974 sugar price boom Nov. 1973 - Nov. 1974: Six fold increase in global sugar prices 1,300 to 8,100 FRF: 1 1974 FRF ≈ 0.85 2015 USD Limited free market + Embargoes + Bad crops + Fear of shortage 6000 World sugar price / ton (in 2016 USD) 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Vincent Bignon, Guillaume Vuillemey The Failure of a Clearinghouse:Empirical Evidence

  21. The 1974 sugar crisis Boom in sugar prices : Until Nov. 21st, 1974 Increase in trading activity: From 54,000 to 1.9m tons / month [See] 96.9% of retail investors hold long positions Vincent Bignon, Guillaume Vuillemey The Failure of a Clearinghouse:Empirical Evidence

  22. The 1974 sugar crisis Boom in sugar prices : Until Nov. 21st, 1974 Increase in trading activity: From 54,000 to 1.9m tons / month [See] 96.9% of retail investors hold long positions Fall in sugar prices : Nov. 21st to Dec. 2nd, 1974 One broker, Nataf , holds 56% of the long open position Limit down prevents execution of sell orders Nataf fails on variation margin calls CLAM waits until shortfall > initial margins to declare default Vincent Bignon, Guillaume Vuillemey The Failure of a Clearinghouse:Empirical Evidence

  23. The 1974 sugar crisis Boom in sugar prices : Until Nov. 21st, 1974 Increase in trading activity: From 54,000 to 1.9m tons / month [See] 96.9% of retail investors hold long positions Fall in sugar prices : Nov. 21st to Dec. 2nd, 1974 One broker, Nataf , holds 56% of the long open position Limit down prevents execution of sell orders Nataf fails on variation margin calls CLAM waits until shortfall > initial margins to declare default Closure of sugar market : Dec. 3rd, 1974 to Jan. 1976 Market closes under pressure of CLAM + registered brokers Negotiation + Judicial battle about loss allocation Resolution of the CLAM, re-open with new CCP Vincent Bignon, Guillaume Vuillemey The Failure of a Clearinghouse:Empirical Evidence

  24. Archive data Department of Commerce + Paris Chamber of Commerce Legal, judicial and statistical documents, notes, confidential reports → Exposures of CLAM, brokers and investors → Account and transactions by Nataf → Financial position on all of Nataf’s clients Bank of France Supervisory reports and notes Balance sheet data Stock price data from Cours authentique et officiel Sugar price data from Les Echos . Spot/future in Paris, London and New York Vincent Bignon, Guillaume Vuillemey The Failure of a Clearinghouse:Empirical Evidence

  25. Causes of CCP failure Vincent Bignon, Guillaume Vuillemey The Failure of a Clearinghouse:Empirical Evidence

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