The dream of online protest Election protests, Iran 2009 Joseph - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

▶
the dream of online protest
SMART_READER_LITE
LIVE PREVIEW

The dream of online protest Election protests, Iran 2009 Joseph - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Nov 19, 2023 272 likes •901 views

T HE CHALLENGES OF ONLINE PROTEST Joseph Bonneau jcb82@cl.cam.ac.uk Computer Laboratory Festival of Ideas Cambridge, UK October 23, 2010 Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 1 / 21 The dream of

slide-1
SLIDE 1

THE CHALLENGES OF ONLINE PROTEST

Joseph Bonneau jcb82@cl.cam.ac.uk

Computer Laboratory Festival of Ideas Cambridge, UK October 23, 2010

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 1 / 21

slide-2
SLIDE 2

The dream of online protest

Election protests, Iran 2009

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 2 / 21

slide-3
SLIDE 3

The dream of online protest

Nestlé environmental protests, 2009

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 2 / 21

slide-4
SLIDE 4

The bitter reality

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 3 / 21

slide-5
SLIDE 5

The bitter reality

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 3 / 21

slide-6
SLIDE 6

Effective online protest is badly needed

Everything else moving online Powerful organisations have increasingly little physical presence Social movements are increasingly dispersed physically

Critical Art Ensemble, 1996 Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 4 / 21

slide-7
SLIDE 7

Effective online protest is badly needed

Everything else moving online Powerful organisations have increasingly little physical presence Social movements are increasingly dispersed physically

Critical Art Ensemble, 1996 Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 4 / 21

slide-8
SLIDE 8

Effective online protest is badly needed

Everything else moving online Powerful organisations have increasingly little physical presence Social movements are increasingly dispersed physically

Critical Art Ensemble, 1996 Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 4 / 21

slide-9
SLIDE 9

Denning’s taxonomy of digital movements

1

Online Activism

Education & awareness building Fundraising Petitions C & C

2

Hacktivism

Denial of service Mail bombs Google bombs Website defacement Harassment & “griefing”

3

Cyber-terrorism

Triggering physical violence

Open Rights Group, UK, 2010 Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 5 / 21

slide-10
SLIDE 10

Denning’s taxonomy of digital movements

1

Online Activism

Education & awareness building Fundraising Petitions C & C

2

Hacktivism

Denial of service Mail bombs Google bombs Website defacement Harassment & “griefing”

3

Cyber-terrorism

Triggering physical violence

Help Israel Win, 2009 Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 5 / 21

slide-11
SLIDE 11

Denning’s taxonomy of digital movements

1

Online Activism

Education & awareness building Fundraising Petitions C & C

2

Hacktivism

Denial of service Mail bombs Google bombs Website defacement Harassment & “griefing”

3

Cyber-terrorism

Triggering physical violence

“Iranian Cyber Army”, 2009 Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 5 / 21

slide-12
SLIDE 12

Denning’s taxonomy of digital movements

1

Online Activism

Education & awareness building Fundraising Petitions C & C

2

Hacktivism

Denial of service Mail bombs Google bombs Website defacement Harassment & “griefing”

3

Cyber-terrorism

Triggering physical violence

WarGames (film), 1983 Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 5 / 21

slide-13
SLIDE 13

Effective protest usually demonstrates two things

1

Morality

Non-violence, solidarity, democracy

2

Commitment

Number of supporters Level of dedication to cause

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 6 / 21

slide-14
SLIDE 14

Effective protest usually demonstrates two things

1

Morality

Non-violence, solidarity, democracy

2

Commitment

Number of supporters Level of dedication to cause

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 6 / 21

slide-15
SLIDE 15

Morality

The man who strikes first admits that his ideas have given out.

  • Chinese proverb

There is no such thing as defeat in non-violence.

  • César Chávez

I have nothing new to teach the world. Truth and non-violence are as old as the hills.

  • Mohandas Gandhi

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 7 / 21

slide-16
SLIDE 16

Adherents believe hacktivism is non-violent

WARNING: This is a Protest, it is not a game, it may have personal consequences as in any off-line political manifestation on the street:

1

Your IP address will be harvested by the government during any FloodNet action...(Similar to having your picture taking during a protest action on the street.)

2

Possible damage to your machine may occur because of your participation in the FloodNet action. (Just as in a street action

  • the police may come and hurt you.)

3

FloodNet clogs bandwidth and may make it difficult for individuals to get information. (This also happens when people take to the streets. Individuals may find themselves unable to get to work because of the action.) We hope that when you join our Virtual Sit-in’s in support of global communities of resistance, you will take the above information to heart.

Electronic Disturbance Theatre, 1999 Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 8 / 21

slide-17
SLIDE 17

Commitment

9/12 “Tea-Party” march Washington, DC, USA, 2009

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 9 / 21

slide-18
SLIDE 18

Numbers don’t always indicate commitment

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 10 / 21

slide-19
SLIDE 19

Numbers don’t always indicate commitment

Live 8 NY Philharmonic London, UK 2005 New York, NY, USA, 2007

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 10 / 21

slide-20
SLIDE 20

Commitment by overcoming opposition

Civil rights marches Birmingham, AL, USA, 1963

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 11 / 21

slide-21
SLIDE 21

Commitment by overcoming opposition

Anti-WTO protests Seattle, WA, USA, 1999

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 11 / 21

slide-22
SLIDE 22

Commitment by overcoming opposition

Boston Massacre Boston, MA, USA, 1770

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 11 / 21

slide-23
SLIDE 23

Commitment by voluntary sacrifice

PETA animal rights protest Barcelona, Spain, 2007

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 12 / 21

slide-24
SLIDE 24

Commitment by voluntary sacrifice

Silent Day pro-life protest USA, 2009

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 12 / 21

slide-25
SLIDE 25

Commitment by voluntary sacrifice

Anti-government “blood protests” Bangkok, Thailand, 2010

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 12 / 21

slide-26
SLIDE 26

Commitment by voluntary sacrifice

Mohandas Gandhi on hunger strike Delhi, India, 1948

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 12 / 21

slide-27
SLIDE 27

Commitment by voluntary sacrifice

Self-immolation of Thích Quảng Đức Saigon, Vietnam, 1963

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 12 / 21

slide-28
SLIDE 28

Proving commitment online is hard

1

Money

2

CPU cycles

3

Traffic

4

Authority

5

Identity

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 13 / 21

slide-29
SLIDE 29

Proving commitment online is hard

1

Money

2

CPU cycles

3

Traffic

4

Authority

5

Identity

Folding at Home Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 13 / 21

slide-30
SLIDE 30

Proving commitment online is hard

1

Money

2

CPU cycles

3

Traffic

4

Authority

5

Identity

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 13 / 21

slide-31
SLIDE 31

Proving commitment online is hard

1

Money

2

CPU cycles

3

Traffic

4

Authority

5

Identity

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 13 / 21

slide-32
SLIDE 32

Proving commitment online is hard

1

Money

2

CPU cycles

3

Traffic

4

Authority

5

Identity

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 13 / 21

slide-33
SLIDE 33

People are trying to use their identity

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 14 / 21

slide-34
SLIDE 34

People are trying to use their identity

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 14 / 21

slide-35
SLIDE 35

People are trying to use their identity

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 14 / 21

slide-36
SLIDE 36

Cryptographers can make things official

N Protesters submit a (valuable) digital identity

SNS profile Webmail account Online market reputation Virtual world avatar

All identites are locked during protest

Cannot be used/accessed/updated

k of N protesters must vote to end the protest

Binding solidarity

Possibility of permanent loss

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 15 / 21

slide-37
SLIDE 37

Cryptographers can make things official

N Protesters submit a (valuable) digital identity

SNS profile Webmail account Online market reputation Virtual world avatar

All identites are locked during protest

Cannot be used/accessed/updated

k of N protesters must vote to end the protest

Binding solidarity

Possibility of permanent loss

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 15 / 21

slide-38
SLIDE 38

Cryptographers can make things official

N Protesters submit a (valuable) digital identity

SNS profile Webmail account Online market reputation Virtual world avatar

All identites are locked during protest

Cannot be used/accessed/updated

k of N protesters must vote to end the protest

Binding solidarity

Possibility of permanent loss

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 15 / 21

slide-39
SLIDE 39

Cryptographers can make things official

N Protesters submit a (valuable) digital identity

SNS profile Webmail account Online market reputation Virtual world avatar

All identites are locked during protest

Cannot be used/accessed/updated

k of N protesters must vote to end the protest

Binding solidarity

Possibility of permanent loss

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 15 / 21

slide-40
SLIDE 40

Cryptographic details

1 Setup P generates a master key pair (kpub

∗

, kpriv

∗

) P generates N shares s1 . . . sN of kpriv

∗

P generates a symmetric escrow key ke 2 Registration Each protester pi sends password xi to P P checks validity of i P sends ZKP(xi ) to O, updates password to random x′

i

P sends a share si of kpriv

∗

to pi 3 Protest P signs & publishes: ( Eke E

kpub i

(x′

i )

!˛ ˛ ˛ ˛ ˛1 ≤ i ≤ n ) , E

kpub ∗

(ke) P destroys kpriv

∗

, ke 4 Completion P generates two escrow keys ki

e+ and ki e− per protester

P signs & publishes: ( Eke+ E

kpub i

(x′

i )

! , Eke− (y′

i ), E kpub ∗

(ki

e+ ), E kpub ∗

(ki

e− )

˛ ˛ ˛ ˛ ˛1 ≤ i ≤ n ) Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 16 / 21

slide-41
SLIDE 41

Basic protocol enables boycott-style protest

Montgomery bus boycotts Montgomery, AL, USA, 1955-1956

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 17 / 21

slide-42
SLIDE 42

Additional property: binding solidarity

Bio 2004 International Convention protests San Francisco, CA, USA, 2004

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 18 / 21

slide-43
SLIDE 43

Can also permanently destroy identities

Irish hunger strikes HM Prison Maze, Belfast, UK, 1981

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 19 / 21

slide-44
SLIDE 44

Many open questions about sacrificing online identities

World of Warcraft characters for sale

Differing value of identities

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 20 / 21

slide-45
SLIDE 45

Many open questions about sacrificing online identities

Friendster

Cost of replacing identities

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 20 / 21

slide-46
SLIDE 46

Many open questions about sacrificing online identities

Ability to create multiple identities (sybils)

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 20 / 21

slide-47
SLIDE 47

Many open questions about sacrificing online identities

Kent State anti-war protests Kent, OH, USA, 1970

Loss of emotional connection

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 20 / 21

slide-48
SLIDE 48

Questions?

xkcd Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 21 / 21

slide-49
SLIDE 49

Protocol details—participants

Password oracle O

Maintains password table T : Z → {0, 1}∗ Will update T[i] given (i, ZKP(T[i]), T[i]′) Must be indifferent to goals of protest

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 21 / 21

slide-50
SLIDE 50

Protocol details—participants

Protesters p1 . . . pN

Each has a password xi registered with O Also has a key pair (kpub

∗

, kpriv

∗

)

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 21 / 21

slide-51
SLIDE 51

Protocol details—participants

Protest initiator P

Has a known public key kpub

P

Must be trusted by all protesters

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 21 / 21

slide-52
SLIDE 52

Protocol details—cryptography

1

Setup

P generates a master key pair (kpub

∗

, kpriv

∗

) P generates N shares s1 . . . sN of kpriv

∗

P generates a symmetric escrow key ke

2

Registration

Each protester pi sends password xi to P P checks validity of i P sends ZKP(xi) to O, updates password to random x′

i

P sends a share si of kpriv

∗

to pi

3

Protest

P signs & publishes:

  • Eke
  • Ekpub

i

(x′

i )

  • 1 ≤ i ≤ n
  • ,

Ekpub

∗ (ke)

P destroys kpriv

∗

, ke

4

Completion

Protest ends when t protesters agree to decrypt ke

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 21 / 21

slide-53
SLIDE 53

Protocol details—cryptography

1

Setup

P generates a master key pair (kpub

∗

, kpriv

∗

) P generates N shares s1 . . . sN of kpriv

∗

P generates a symmetric escrow key ke

2

Registration

Each protester pi sends password xi to P P checks validity of i P sends ZKP(xi) to O, updates password to random x′

i

P sends a share si of kpriv

∗

to pi

3

Protest

P signs & publishes:

  • Eke
  • Ekpub

i

(x′

i )

  • 1 ≤ i ≤ n
  • ,

Ekpub

∗ (ke)

P destroys kpriv

∗

, ke

4

Completion

Protest ends when t protesters agree to decrypt ke

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 21 / 21

slide-54
SLIDE 54

Protocol details—cryptography

1

Setup

P generates a master key pair (kpub

∗

, kpriv

∗

) P generates N shares s1 . . . sN of kpriv

∗

P generates a symmetric escrow key ke

2

Registration

Each protester pi sends password xi to P P checks validity of i P sends ZKP(xi) to O, updates password to random x′

i

P sends a share si of kpriv

∗

to pi

3

Protest

P signs & publishes:

  • Eke
  • Ekpub

i

(x′

i )

  • 1 ≤ i ≤ n
  • ,

Ekpub

∗ (ke)

P destroys kpriv

∗

, ke

4

Completion

Protest ends when t protesters agree to decrypt ke

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 21 / 21

slide-55
SLIDE 55

Protocol details—cryptography

1

Setup

P generates a master key pair (kpub

∗

, kpriv

∗

) P generates N shares s1 . . . sN of kpriv

∗

P generates a symmetric escrow key ke

2

Registration

Each protester pi sends password xi to P P checks validity of i P sends ZKP(xi) to O, updates password to random x′

i

P sends a share si of kpriv

∗

to pi

3

Protest

P signs & publishes:

  • Eke
  • Ekpub

i

(x′

i )

  • 1 ≤ i ≤ n
  • ,

Ekpub

∗ (ke)

P destroys kpriv

∗

, ke

4

Completion

Protest ends when t protesters agree to decrypt ke

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 21 / 21

slide-56
SLIDE 56

Protocol details—group suicide

Irish hunger strike HM Prison Maze, Belfast, UK, 1981

P generates two escrow keys ke+ and ke− P signs & publishes:

  • Eke+
  • Ekpub

i

(x′

i )

  • , Eke−(y′

i )

  • 1 ≤ i ≤ n
  • ,

Ekpub

∗ (ke+), Ekpub ∗ (ke−)

y′

i is an account destruction key

Not protected by pi’s private key May be explicitly provided by O, or be x′

i if we trust griefers

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 21 / 21

slide-57
SLIDE 57

Protocol details—individual destruction

Boston Massacre Boston, MA, USA, 1770

P generates two escrow keys ki

e+ and ki e− per protester

P signs & publishes:

  • Eke+
  • Ekpub

i

(x′

i )

  • , Eke−(y′

i ), Ekpub

∗ (ki

e+), Ekpub

∗ (ki

e−)

  • 1 ≤ i ≤ n
  • Individual accounts can be unlocked or destroyed

May choose accounts at random to destroy at regular intervals

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 21 / 21

slide-58
SLIDE 58

Limitations

Indifference of O

Can’t protest against platform operator itself O can block password updates, reinstate deleted accounts

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 21 / 21

slide-59
SLIDE 59

Limitations

Minority of platform users involved

O will block a protest which costs it too much Less commitment shown if all users leave at once

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 21 / 21

slide-60
SLIDE 60

Limitations

Value of online identities

Real-world protest holds all lives to have equal value Online identities only valuable if built up over time

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 21 / 21

slide-61
SLIDE 61

Limitations

Central trust

Hard to avoid due to circular dependencies during inititiation

Distributed protocol possible?

P can go offline after initialisation

Replace P with an HSM?

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 21 / 21

slide-62
SLIDE 62

Limitations

Voting Issues

Threshold Decryption = voting

Need a robust, homomorphic scheme, at minimum

Infiltration/sybil attacks

Acquire many shares (votes) by submitting dummy profiles

Splinter coalition

Conspiracy can secede, refuse to unlock some profiles

Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Digital Immolation January 26, 2010 21 / 21