The devil is in the details How cybercriminals, leakers, - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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The devil is in the details How cybercriminals, leakers, - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

The devil is in the details How cybercriminals, leakers, State-sponsored hackers failed their opsec #NOHAT 2019 - Carola Frediani Opsec and the human factor You can get the tech right and still fail the opsec. Why? undisciplined past


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The devil is in the details

How cybercriminals, leakers, State-sponsored hackers failed their opsec #NOHAT 2019 - Carola Frediani

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Opsec and the human factor

You can get the tech right and still fail the opsec. Why?

  • undisciplined past
  • no compartmentation of identities (and of different operations)
  • undeletable data
  • language (is a traitor)
  • money flows (follow the money)
  • rush to get results
  • group dynamics (peer pressure and recognition)
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Harold T. Martin III

  • Contractor Nsa, sentenced to 9 years for stealing secret documents
  • Ph.D in information security management
  • He used virtual machines, encryption and anonymization systems, probably

Tails or a similar system -> “a sophisticated software tool which runs without being installed on a computer and provides anonymous internet access, leaving no digital footprint on the machine” (indictment)

  • “He has a demonstrated ability to conceal his online communications and his

access to the internet”.

  • He sent strange messages to Kaspersky via DM Twitter during the Shadow

Brokers leaks

  • His Twitter handle @Hal_999999999 connected him to his real life
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Harold T. Martin III

A Google search on the Twitter handle and display name found someone using the same name on a personal ad seeking female sex partners. The anonymous ad included a real picture of Martin and identified him as a 6-foot-4-inch 50-year-old male living in Annapolis, Md. A different search led them to a LinkedIn profile for Hal Martin, described as a researcher in Annapolis Junction and "technical advisor and investigator on offensive cyber issues." (source: Politico)

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Harold T. Martin III

Twitter handle > dating site > his real photo, location, age > Linkedin profile > language clue (CAMBRIC) Also:

  • Twitter account created with email

associated to his real life

  • On a social networking website, the user

hal999999999 had a display picture matching the motor vehicle administration photo of Martin

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Paige Thompson (Capital One)

  • Some leaked data were openly stored on GitHub
  • The GitHub page included Paige Thompson full

name in the digital address and it was linked to

  • ther pages on GitLab linking to Thompson and

her résumé (source: affidavit)

  • Thompson posted about the hack in an open

Slack channel, naming her VPN, that matched Capital One logs of the intruder and GItHub logs

  • A Meetup group was linked to the Slack channel

where the alias erratic posted breached data

  • The Meetup page had a "Paige Thompson

(erratic)" as organizer

  • Thompson used the alias “erratic” on Twitter

(where she talked of the hack, and had her real life photo)

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Alexandre Cazes

  • 26 years old Canadian programmer, living in Thailand, and alleged kingpin

behind AlphaBay Market

  • arrested on July 5th, 2017 in Bangkok; he committed suicide after few days in

prison

  • in 2015 the Alphabay administrator, known as alpha02 (allegedly Cazes) said to

DeepDotWeb: “I am absolutely certain that my opsec is secure, and I live in an

  • ffshore country where I am safe.”
  • an email address in the AlphaBay forum welcome message was the main lead
  • email address > real name > Linkedin > PayPal
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Alexandre Cazes

Around December 2014 AlphaBay's operators decided to add a forum to the martketplace. Users who registered on AlphaBay's forum got a greeting message from the site's admin. In December 2016, FBI learned that for a short period in 2014 these greeting emails included the AlphaBay admin's personal email address in the message header. That email address was: "pimp_alex_91@hotmail.com" Image credits: Christy Quinn

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Alexandre Cazes

  • Cazes' email was also included in the

header of the AlphaBay forum pwd recovery process (forfeiture complaint)

  • The FBI linked it to his identity. It was also

associated to a LinkedIn account for Alexandre Cazes, born in 1991

  • In his Linkedin profile he was from

Montreal and run a tech company, EBX technologies

  • A PayPal account run by Cazes listed his

Hotmail account

  • He used a pseudonym to run AlphaBay

previously used on carding forums. And that was linked to his email and name in a 2008 post on a tech forum

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Alexandre Cazes

Police caused AlphaBay servers to shutdown, forcing Cazes to access AlphaBay forum/datacenter and try to reboot the servers. (“Law enforcement-caused outage”) Then they tricked Cazes into leaving his laptop by simulating a car accident outside his Thai home. Undercover cops crashed a car through his front gate. Cazes had the passwords for the servers stored in unencrypted text files, and an Excel with all his properties. (Thanks to @Patrick_Shortis for some help on this case)

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Ross Ulbricht (Silk Road)

ALTOID HANDLE -> SILK ROAD ALTOID HANDLE -> ULBRICHT EMAIL I (Images via IPVN.net)

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Ross Ulbricht

On October 2013, FBI agents decided to arrest Ross Ulbricht because there was a chance to get the laptop unencrypted. In the public library he was working in, a couple (two FBI agents) simulated a fight behind him. And when he turned away the FBI snatched his laptop, a Samsung 700z encrypted with TrueCrypt. He was logged into Silk Road. They found: PGP private keys, the .php files that built Silk Road, spreadsheets, chat logs, a journal. Thettttt

Source: The Grugq

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OxyMonster

Gal Vallerius aka OxyMonster was a vendor on underground marketplace Dream Market. He was arrested in August 2017 after flying to the US to attend a beard competition. Border guards searched his (unencrypted?) laptop and found his credentials for Dream Market, a PGP private key used by a Dream Market vendor, $500,000 US in bitcoin and a copy of Tor browser. Why was he a suspect?

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OxyMonster

  • OxyMonster had a Bitcoin tip jar for the

help he gave in the forum.

  • From this address many outgoing

transactions went to a Localbitcoins.com account registered to Gal Vallerius.

  • The agents searched his Twitter/

Instagram accounts and analysed his writing style comparing it with more than 1,000 comments left by OxyMonster on Dream Market.

  • Cheers, double exclamation and quotation

marks, French posts were a common pattern.

  • Enough to mark him and get a warrant.
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OxyMonster

Investigation: chain analysis > social media OSINT > writing analysis > device search at the border Mistakes: no tumblers > no compartmentation > no avoiding US > no encryption

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Hacktivism

Stick to yourselves. If you are in a crew - keep your opsec up 24/7. Friends will try to take you down if they have to. (Sabu aka Hector Xavier Monsegur) Jeremy Hammond identified via a triangulation

  • f real life insights revealed through his 3

nicknames (Anarchaos, yohoho, POW)

  • Groups are often an enemy of opsec
  • Social dynamics, group think, the need of

peer recognition, the exchange of tools weaken opsec

  • Hacktivists are easy to infiltrate (more than

cybercriminal groups; much more than State-sponsored groups)

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Guccifer 2.0 and the GRU

State-sponsored hackers (Russian GRU) allegedly responsible for the DNC leaks:

  • Language (Guccifer 2.0)
  • Identifying metadata (PDF documents)
  • Real IP address (forgot to activate VPN)
  • Account and IP reuse (email, server)
  • Malware reuse (X-Agent, X-Tunnel ->

APT28)

  • Money flows (bitcoin)

So Source: Motherboard

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Guccifer 2.0 and the GRU

  • spear phishing domains
  • DCLeaks.com site same pool of bitcoin
  • X-Tunnel malware domain

(linuxkrnl.net) Guccifer’s VPN funds from same DCLeaks bitcoin address Bitly link > Bitly account (not private) > many Bitly URLs (phishing campaign targeting the Democrats)

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Park Jin Hyok (Lazarus Group)

Kim Hyon Woo persona accounts (Lazarus attacks): tty198410@gmail.com hyon_u@hotmail.com hyonwoo01@gmail.com hyonwu@gmail.com @hyon_u Chosun Expo accounts (Park Jin Hyok): ttykim1018@gmail.com surigaemind@hotmail.it pkj0615710@hotmail.com mrkimjin123@gmail.com tty198410@gmail.com ttykim1018@gmail.com surigaemind@hotmail.it hyonwu@gmail.com pkj0615710@hotmail.com mrkimjin123@gmail.com tty198410@gmail.com

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Looking forward

  • Establishing cyber criminal

identity (WHO)

  • Establishing the outcomes of

criminal conduct (WHAT) “Successful cyber criminals are those who avoid both detection of their crimes and identification”

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Some takeaways (from an opsec perspective)

  • If you have good crypto but you fail at

OPSEC and TRADECRAFT then you lose - (Krypt3ia) However, crypto helps.

  • Don’t reveal operational data
  • Don’t contaminate.

Contact between personas (covers) contaminates both (the grugq)

  • No logs, no crime (the grugq).

However, people love logging.

  • When you start, that’s probably when you

are going to mess up.

  • If you are going to build a big campaign

attacking many targets maintaining a good

  • psec is hard, and expensive.
  • The solitary highly-skilled one-off hacker

might well be the toughest to identify (especially if she/he doesn’t move much money).

  • Opsec is rooted in psychology, mental

well-being, autonomy, patience.

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Thank you!

Carola Frediani Twitter: @carolafrediani Newsletter: https://guerredirete.substack.com/