The contribution of the Biological Weapons Convention to global - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

The contribution of the Biological Weapons Convention to global biosecurity

Se Second OIE IE Glo lobal l Confere rence on Bio Biological Thre reat Red eduction Ottawa, Canada 31 Oct ctober – 2 November r 2017

Daniel Feakes Chief BWC Implementation Support Unit United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (Geneva Branch)

“Determined, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons” “Convinced that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that no effort should be spared to minimise this risk”

“Without a shadow of a doubt there is something in man’s make-up th that causes him im to hesit sitate when at t th the poin int of bri ringin ing war r to his is enemy by poiso isonin ing him im or r his is cattle le and crops s

• r spreading disease […] The human

race sh shri rinks and draws back when the su subje ject is is broached. It It alw lways has, and it probably always will”.

Vannevar Bus Bush, US US pr presid identia ial l scie science ad advis iser, 1949 1949

The BWC represents an “ironclad norm against the possession and use of biological weapons, and the abhorrence associated with the very idea of using disease as a weapon. How many States today boast that they are “biological weapon States”? Who argues now that the bubonic plague and smallpox are legitimate weapons to use under any circumstances?”

Angela Kane, Former UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs

Biological Weapons Convention

Prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, retention

• r transfer of biological weapons
• Opened for signature on 10

April 1972

• EiF on 26 March 1975
• First multilateral disarmament

treaty banning an entire category of WMD

• Comprehensive scope
• Non-discriminatory in nature
• Unlimited duration
• Open to any state
• No institution, no in-built

verification mechanism

179 States Parties 6 Signatories 11 States not party

Technology is accelerating progress but causing discontinuities:

• “Biotechnologies such as genome editing will revolutionize medicine

and other fields, while sharpening moral differences.”

• “Technological barriers to acquiring and using a biological weapon

have been conspicuously eroded since the Seventh Review Conference.”

Governing is getting harder:

• “Managing global issues will become harder as actors multiply—to

include NGOs, corporations, and empowered individuals—resulting in more ad hoc, fewer encompassing efforts.”

The nature of conflict is changing:

• “Disrupting societies will become more common, with long-range

precision weapons, cyber, and robotic systems to target infrastructure from afar, and more accessible technology to create weapons of mass destruction”.

Global trends impacting on the BWC

“I view the threat of deadly pandemics right up there with nuclear war and climate change. Getting ready for a global pandemic is every bit as important as nuclear deterrence and avoiding a climate

• catastrophe. […] Whether it occurs

by a quirk of nature or at the hand

• f a terrorist, epidemiologists say a

fast-moving airborne pathogen could kill more than 30 million people in less than a year. And they say there is a reasonable probability the world will experience such an outbreak in the next 10-15 years.”

“The means by which these agreements survive and adapt to changing conditions after they enter into force deserve as much attention as the negotiations that produced them in the first place. They cannot be left simply to fend for themselves. … For governments to realize the benefits they originally sought in arms control agreements, some government officials must live with them full-time, all the time.”

Charles Flowerree, former US Representative to the BWC

Eighth BWC Review Conference

Issues of contention - different principle visions

• Comprehensive, legally-binding verification protocol vs.

incremental strengthening of the BWC

• Decision-making authority of the Meeting of States

Parties

Outcome

• Minimal decisions compared with the large number of

Working Papers, ideas and programme of work

• riginally put forward
• Fundamentally different visions on the way forward
• Agreement to hold “annual meetings” from 2017-2020

BWC in 2017

• MSP to take place from 4-8 December in Geneva:
• “seek to make progress on issues of substance and process for the period before

the next Review Conference, with a view to reaching consensus on an intersessional process”

• To be chaired by Amb. Amandeep Singh Gill (India) with 2 Vice-Chairs
• Amb. Michael Biontino (Germany) and Amb. Juraj Podhorsky (Slovakia)
• “Convening function” of the MSP – international/regional organizations,

industry, NGOs, scientific and professional associations etc

• Side events and statements – can be made and organized by any relevant

stakeholders, e.g. international organizations like OIE

• Financial crisis putting future of BWC meetings and ISU in jeopardy

• 13. The Conference notes the value of national implementation

measures, as appropriate, in accordance with the constitutional process

• f each State Party, to:
• implement voluntary management standards on biosafety and biosecurity
• encourage the consideration of development of appropriate arrangements to

promote awareness among relevant professionals in the private and public sectors … promote amongst those working in the biological sciences awareness

• f the obligations of States Parties under the Convention …
• promote the development of training and education programmes for those

granted access to biological agents and toxins relevant to the Convention and for those with the knowledge or capacity to modify such agents and toxins

• encourage the promotion of a culture of responsibility amongst relevant

national professionals and the voluntary development, adoption and promulgation of codes of conduct

BWC as a network/facilitator

• 179 States Parties
• Approx. 115 National Contact

Points

• Around 70-75 annual reports

submitted per year

• Annual meeting in Geneva
• Collaboration with e.g. AU, EU,

IAP, TWAS, OIE, OPCW, WHO, Interpol etc

Piers Millett, “The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in context: from monolith to keystone”, Disarmament Forum, 2006

• ISU established and administers a database, open to all States Parties,

where the requests and offers are stored

• States Parties may bilaterally match offers with requests or use the

services of the ISU to facilitate the exchange of information

• Database will be improved before the end of the year
• 60 offers of assistance made by:

www.unog.ch/bwc/database

BWC Cooperation & Assistance Database

Australia Group

capacity building and training Assistance on CBM preparation emergency response & assistance governance-legal assistance joint cooperation and research science outreach and education

5 10 15 20 25 30 35

BWC Sponsorship Programme

• To enable participation in BWC meetings in Geneva
• Supported by voluntary contributions
• Aimed at developing States Parties, who have not

previously/regularly attended BWC meetings

• Also available for States not party to the BWC
• Covers cost of flights to and from Geneva and DSA for

attendance at BWC meetings

• BWC sponsorship programme for MSP in December

2017 closed on 30 Sept 2017

• Applicatio now being evaluated and selection will be

made by Chair and Vice-Chairs

• www.unog.ch/bwc/sponsorship

South Africa, July 2018 Jordan, January 2018 Ukraine, September 2017 Mexico, March 2018

Beneficiary countries

Cameroon Colombia Cote d’Ivoire Iraq Malawi Malaysia Sierra Leone Yemen Nepal Lebanon

“Deliberate disease” project

• Strengthened response preparedness through effective policy

coordination and resource sharing among relevant international

• rganizations;
• Strengthened international coordination capabilities at the
• perational level in the event of a BW attack; and
• Availability of operational procedures and tools under the BWC at the

disposal of BWC States Parties.

Strengthening global mechanisms and capabilities for responding to the deliberate use of disease

SDG 3 – Good health and well-being

• Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages
• Target 3D - Strengthen the capacity of all countries, in particular

developing countries, for early warning, risk reduction and management of national and global health risks

• Indicator 3.D.1 - International Health Regulations (IHR) capacity and health

emergency preparedness “The Conference recognizes capacity building at the national and international levels as the most immediate imperative for enhancing and strengthening the capacity of the States Parties to promptly and effectively detect and respond to the alleged use

• r threat of use of biological weapons”

“States Parties recognize that in this regard health and security issues are interrelated at both the national and international levels.”

WHO Joint External Evaluations

• Aims of the International Health Regulations are

compatible with the BWC

• BWC is relevant to JEE Prevent-6 and Respond-3
• BWC also relevant to GHSA Action Package

Prevent-3 and Action Package Respond-2

“Smaller, developing states’ parties have worked to connect the dots between bioweapons, biosecurity, infectious disease, nonproliferation, science, and

• technology. This outreach shows that despite the lack of activity in Geneva,

the BWC is not an isolated instrument—rather, it is related to other ongoing global initiatives of international security, such as on global health security and

• nonproliferation. When global initiatives interconnect like this, it reinforces all
• f the initiatives.”

Bonnie Jenkins, Brookings Institution https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/09/06/the-biological-weapons-convention- at-a-crossroad/

Summary

• BWC has strong normative value and it is universal and

comprehensive in its scope

• If BWC was to become irrelevant or slip into obscurity, what

would replace it?

• BWC is the foundation of all other efforts to prevent the hostile

application of the life sciences

• Should be promoted at every opportunity and can be used as a

vehicle to facilitate contributory activities

• Important to work collaboratively with other relevant
• rganizations etc

For more information…

www.un w.unog

• g.ch/bwc

.ch/bwc Or contact:

BWC Implementation Support Unit United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs Palais des Nations Geneva, Switzerland e-mail: bwc@unog.ch @BWCISU www.facebook.com/1972BWC