The Biological Weapons Convention Richard Lennane BWC - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Disarmament Fellowship 2008 Briefing on the BWC, 28 August

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

The Biological Weapons Convention

Richard Lennane BWC Implementation Support Unit United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (Geneva Branch)

Disarmament Fellowship 2008 Briefing on the BWC, 28 August

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

BWC Facts and Figures (1)

• Opened for signature in 1972
• Entered into force in 1975
• Current membership:

– 162 States Parties – 13 signatories – 20 states neither signed nor ratified

• Depositaries are Russia, UK, USA

Disarmament Fellowship 2008 Briefing on the BWC, 28 August

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

BWC Facts and Figures (2)

• No BWC organisation or implementing body, in

contrast to:

– the Chemical Weapons Convention (Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) – the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (IAEA)

• Implementation Support Unit is new

development

– established by Sixth Review Conference in 2006 – mandate to “help States Parties help themselves”

Disarmament Fellowship 2008 Briefing on the BWC, 28 August

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

Main Provisions: Overview (1)

• Article I: do not acquire biological or toxin

weapons

• Article II: get rid of any such weapons you

already have

• Article III: do not help or allow anyone else to

acquire such weapons

• Article IV: take necessary domestic measures to

ensure such weapons are prohibited

Disarmament Fellowship 2008 Briefing on the BWC, 28 August

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

Main Provisions: Overview (2)

• Article V: consult and cooperate with other

States Parties on problems

• Article VI: report suspected breaches to the

Security Council

• Article VII: help States Parties which have been

attacked or threatened with BW

• Article X: do all of the above in a way that

encourages the peaceful uses of biological science and technology

Disarmament Fellowship 2008 Briefing on the BWC, 28 August

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

And just what is a biological weapon?

“(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; (2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.”

• from Article I of the BWC

Disarmament Fellowship 2008 Briefing on the BWC, 28 August

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

Strengthening the BWC (1)

• Review Conferences every five years (1980, 1986,

1991, 1996, 2001, 2006 – next one in 2011)

• Confidence-building Measures (CBMs) introduced

1986, expanded 1991

• VEREX group established 1991 to examine

verification possibilities

• Special Conference in 1994 establishes Ad Hoc Group

to negotiate protocol

• Ad Hoc Group negotiations end in failure in 2001;

Fifth RevCon suspended

Disarmament Fellowship 2008 Briefing on the BWC, 28 August

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

Strengthening the BWC (2)

• Fifth RevCon resumes in 2002, agrees new

process for 2003-2005

• Expert meetings consider specific topics related

to improving implementation of the BWC

• Exchange of information and experience, but no

binding decisions

• Reluctant agreement and modest expectations,

but proved surprisingly successful

Disarmament Fellowship 2008 Briefing on the BWC, 28 August

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

Sixth Review Conference

• Overcame past divisions (although these remain

unresolved)

• Established new intersessional process similar

to 2003-2005

• Established Implementation Support Unit (ISU)
• Agreed on action plan for universalization
• Made modest improvements to CBM process
• Agreed to nominate national contact points

Disarmament Fellowship 2008 Briefing on the BWC, 28 August

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

2007-2010 Work Program Topics

• 2007: national implementation; regional

cooperation.

• 2008: biosafety/biosecurity; oversight,

education, awareness raising, and codes of conduct.

• 2009: capacity-building in disease surveillance,

detection, diagnosis, and containment.

• 2010: assistance in the case of alleged use of

biological or toxin weapons.

Disarmament Fellowship 2008 Briefing on the BWC, 28 August

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

So what changed?

• Bioterrorism becomes major concern after

September 11, 2001

• Rapid development, growth and spread of

biotechnology capabilities

– Nuclear weapons: 1000 facilities – Chemical weapons: 5000 facilities – Biological weapons: 100,000+?

• Recognition of interconnection of BW with
• ther biological risks

Disarmament Fellowship 2008 Briefing on the BWC, 28 August

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

Weapons of Mass Destruction

Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty International Atomic Energy Agency

Chemical Weapons

Chemical Weapons Convention

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Biological Weapons

Biological Weapons Convention

?

Disarmament Fellowship 2008 Briefing on the BWC, 28 August

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

The Spectrum of Biological Risk

Natural disease

• utbreak

Deliberate use of BW Unintended consequences Accidents Vandalism, sabotage Negligence

WHO BWC “We must look at [the BWC] as part of an interlinked array of tools, designed to deal with an interlinked array of problems” – Kofi Annan, 2006

Disarmament Fellowship 2008 Briefing on the BWC, 28 August

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

WMD Regime: Traditional Model

Treaty Organisation State State State State State

Disarmament Fellowship 2008 Briefing on the BWC, 28 August

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

New approach: a network model?

BWC State State

WHO FAO OIE SCR 1540 INTERPOL Professional associations Industry Scientific

• rganisations

Disarmament Fellowship 2008 Briefing on the BWC, 28 August

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

New approach: a network model?

BWC State State

WHO FAO OIE SCR 1540 INTERPOL Professional associations Industry Scientific

• rganisations

Work Program ISU

Disarmament Fellowship 2008 Briefing on the BWC, 28 August

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

Controversial Issues

• Relationship between Article III and Article X

– “spectrum” concept is starting to bridge the gap

• Verification, and investigation of alleged non-

compliance

• UN Secretary-General’s CBW investigation

mechanism (and UNGA Res 60/288)

• Prohibition of use of BW (and Iranian proposal

to amend the BWC)

• Improving CBMs

Disarmament Fellowship 2008 Briefing on the BWC, 28 August

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

Verification for the BWC?

• Always a technological challenge, and

becoming more so

• Technological advances may help, but can do

little to detect “intention”

• Political differences remain stark
• Seventh RevCon will be first opportunity for

major reassessment

Disarmament Fellowship 2008 Briefing on the BWC, 28 August

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

The good news…

• The BWC has been successful in establishing a

global norm against biological weapons

– No state, whether party to the BWC or not, would argue that BW can ever have a legitimate place in national defence – This is a big change from 1950s-60s – And a contrast to the nuclear weapons situation

Disarmament Fellowship 2008 Briefing on the BWC, 28 August

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

For more information… www.unog.ch/bwc

Or contact:

BWC Implementation Support Unit United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (Geneva Branch) Room C.115, Palais des Nations Geneva tel: +41 (0)22 917 2230 fax: +41 (0)22 917 0483 e-mail: bwc@unog.ch