Preparing for the Deliberate Use of Biological Weapons: The - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Preparing for the Deliberate Use of Biological Weapons: The Relevance of the Biological Weapons Convention to Central Asian States Parties

Regional Workshop for Central Asian States Parties to the BWC On Preparedness to Respond to the Deliberate Use of Biological Weapons 26 – 27 June 2019, Issyk Kul, Kyrgyz Republic

• Dr. Alex Lampalzer

Deputy Chief, BWC Implementation Support Unit United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs

WEF Global Risks Report 2019

“The world is badly under-prepared for even modest biological threats. We are vulnerable to potentially huge impacts on individual lives, societal well-being, economic activity and national security. Revolutionary new biotechnologies promise miraculous advances, but they also create daunting challenges of oversight and control.”

The Biological Weapons Convention in a Nutshell

prohibits development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, retention or transfer of BWs

• opened for signature on 10/04/72,

EiF on 26/03/75

• First multilateral disarmament

treaty banning an entire category

• f WMD
• Non-discriminatory in nature
• Unlimited duration and open to any

state

• No verification regime; no own,

separate int. organization

• Intersessional Work Programmes,

decisions by consensus 182 States Parties 5 Signatories 10 States not party

Article I Never under any circumstances to acquire or retain biological weapons Article II To destroy or divert to peaceful purposes biological weapons and associated resources prior to joining Article III Not to transfer, or in any way assist, encourage or induce anyone else to acquire or retain biological weapons Article IV To take any national measures necessary to implement the provisions of the BWC domestically Article V To consult bilaterally and multilaterally to solve any problems with the implementation of the BWC Article VI To request the UN Security Council to investigate alleged breaches

• f the BWC and to comply with its subsequent decisions

Article VII To assist States which have been exposed to danger as a result of a violation of the BWC Article X To do all of the above in a way that encourages the peaceful uses of biological science and technology

• Provides an unequivocal norm against biological weapons
• Sole multilateral forum for dialogue concerning all issues

pertaining to BWs in a holistic manner

• Facilitates assistance and cooperation at the bi- and

multilateral level and helps building capacity

• Supports the promotion of peaceful uses of biological S&T
• Offers a mechanism for consultation and cooperation in solving

any problems

• Builds transparency through Confidence Building Measures

What is the relevance of the BWC?

Continued Political Support for the BWC

87 102 118 132 146 155 165 178 40 58 69 65 68 78 93 114 53 63 78 77 94 103 103 124 50 100 150 200 RC1 1980 RC2 1986 RC3 1991 RC4 1996 RC5 2001/02 RC6 2006 RC7 2011 RC8 2016 SPs Participating SPs PrepCom Participating SPs RevCon 1 4 1 2 5 1 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

17 new States Parties since 2012

2019 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit, Bishkek, 13-14 June 2019

The SCO member states called for unfailingly honouring the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction.

Multilateral Instruments against WMD

State NPT CTBT 1925

Geneva Protocol

BWC CWC 1540

Natl. Report 1540 Natl. Action Plan (vol.)

Belarus ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Kazakhstan ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  Kyrgyzstan ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Russian Fed. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Tajikistan ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

Turkmenistan

✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Uzbekistan ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

• No international verification regime
• No separate international organization
• States Parties obliged to translate the

commitments found in the Convention into effective national action

• Intersessional work programmes between the

Review Conferences that include annual Meetings of Experts and Meetings of States Parties

• Highest Organ: Review Conference
• Chair 2019 Meeting of States Parties:
• Ambassador Yann Hwang (France)
• Three regional groups:
• Eastern European Group (Poland)
• NAM (Venezuela)
• Western Group (Australia)
• Three Depositaries

How does the BWC work?

2018-2020 Intersessional Programme

5 Meetings of Experts (29 July - 8 August 2019) Annual Meeting of States Parties (3 - 6 December 2019)

MX Topic Chair

1 (2d) Cooperation and assistance, with a particular focus on strengthening cooperation and assistance under Article X

• Amb. V. Dolidze,

Georgia 2 (2d) Review of developments in the field of science and technology related to the Convention

• Y. Nikolaichik,

Belarus 3 (1d) Strengthening national implementation

• M. Reddiar, South

Africa 4 (2d) Assistance, response and preparedness

• U. Jadoon, Pakistan

5 (1d) Institutional strengthening of the Convention

• L. Masmejean,

Switzerland

Resources to facilitate Treaty implementation

Weapon Category Nuclear Biological Chemical

Treaty (Status) NPT CTBT BWC CWC States Parties to the Treaty 191 168 182 193 Verification     Organisation IAEA CTBTO

• OPCW

Budget (Mio., 2019) € 371.8 $ 70,9 € 49,8 $1,52 € 69,7 Personnel (approx.) 2,560 275 3 462

Measures taken in 2018 to address financial predictability and sustainability:

Status as at 30/05/2019:

• Assessed contributions: $1,354,110 (89.1%)
• Insufficient funds at this stage to conduct the Meeting of States Parties - funding gap of

$165,000

• BWC Working Capital Fund: $166,594 (21,9% of target level) (Russian contribution: $50,000
• Considerable interest to strengthen preparedness, implementation and

cooperation/assistance - vol. contributions

BWC Finances - $ 1,519,800

856 2922 31 47231 61 398 352 767.44 303.37 4,903.47 2329.92 36.67 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 40000 45000 50000 Belarus Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Russian Federation Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Assessed Contribution (USD)

National Contact Points

Kyr yrgyzstan (Mi (Minis istry ry of

• f

Econ

• nomy)

Taj ajik ikis istan (Nu (Nucle lear and and Ra Radia iatio ion Sa Safety Ag Agen ency) Tur urkmenis istan (non (none) Uzbekis istan (Com (Commissio ion of

• f

the the Cab Cabinet of

• f

Min Minis isters of

• f the

the Rep epubli lic of

• f

Uzbekis istan on

• n the

the Proh

• hib

ibit itio ion of

• f

Biol Biolog

• gical

Weap eapon

• ns)

Kaz azakhstan (Mi (Minis istry ry of

• f

Edu ducatio ion & & Scie Science) Rus Russia ian Fed ederation (Mi (Minis istry ry of

• f Trade

and and Ind ndustry) Bela Belarus (Mi (Minis istry ry of

• f

Hea Healt lth)

Confidence Building Measures

(submissions by 15 April each year)

• CBM A:
• Part 1: research centres and laboratories
• Part 2: Natl. biological defence R&D

programmes

• CBM B: Info on outbreaks of infectious

diseases and similar occurrences, that seem to deviate from the normal pattern

• CBM C: Encouragement of publication of

results and promotion of use of knowledge

• CBM E: legislation, regulations and other

measures

• CBM F: past activities in offensive and/or

defensive biological research and development programmes

• CBM G: vaccine production facilities

Participation in CBMs

25 6 6 33 1 2 20 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Belarus Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Russian Federation Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan

Previous submissions CBM Report submitted in 2019

BWC Cooperation & Assistance Database

Australia Group

61 active offers made by ten SPs and

• ne group of SPs

BWC Cooperation & Assistance Database

43 active requests from 12 SPs

Perspectives on the BW Threat

Perspectives on the BW threat

• Use of BWs has so far been extremely rare
• Most cases involved toxins, most cases were criminal in nature
• Significant level of expertise and tacit knowledge still required

for effective production and delivery of large quantities

• Some potential for a high consequence bioterrorism event,

attacks are much more likely to be crude, amateurish and small-scale

• Greater threat posed by financially, scientifically and militarily

well-resourced groups: states or groups sponsored by states

• Presently gravest challenge may come from (rogue) individuals

with access to BSL-3/4 labs

• Actors do not necessarily have to launch a technically perfect

attack to achieve their malicious objectives, as causing major panic and other disruption may already be sufficient

Impact of S&T Developments

S&T Review – IAP Report (2015)

• Global ability to detect and treat disease has been

enhanced

• Recent advances also facilitated development of

BWs

• Technical barriers to acquiring and using BWs have

been significantly reduced in recent years

Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology (2018)

• Large-scale production of BWs still likely to require

significant financial and intellectual resources

• Developing a synthetic biology-enabled

bioweapon would likely still require significant testing

• Continued convergence may help overcome some

barriers to usability as a weapon for synthetic biology-enabled bioweapons

The Global Risks Landscape 2019

Art VII/BWC

“Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide

• r support assistance, in accordance with the United

Nations Charter, to any Party to the Convention which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been exposed to danger as a result of violation of the Convention.”

• Add. Understandings and Agreements Eighth

RevCon:

• “UN and other IOs could also play an important

role in coordinating, mobilizing and delivering the required support and assistance …” (IGOs such as the WHO, OIE, FAO, and IPPC)

• ... the need for a procedure for assistance by

which timely emergency assistance can be provided…

Key Challenges from BWC perspective

• Political dimension/trigger: Invoking Article VII - serious

allegation of use - decision by the Security Council required

• Lack of operationalization of Article VII/BWC:
• All phases, from invoking Art VII up to on-site coordination

issues

• No autonomous investigative capacity
• No operational capacity for contingency operations
• Currently, no UN Department or Office, or other

international organization mandated to ensure overall coordination of response to a major deliberate disease

• utbreak

Initiatives to operationalize Article VII

Key Proposals by States Parties

• Mobile biomedical units (Russian Federation)
• Assistance database (France/India)
• Set of guidelines and format for assistance

request (South Africa)

Activities to strengthen Article VII/BWC

• Tabletop Exercises FRS on Art VII

process/France (upcoming TTX from 9-10 August Geneva

• Canada (Action 11/SG Disarmament Agenda)
• Capacity Building Activities (Japan, EU Council

Decision 2019/97

For more information …

www.unog.ch/bwc

Or contact:

BWC Implementation Support Unit United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs Palais des Nations Geneva fax: +41 (0)22 917 0483 e-mail: bwc@un.org Website: www.unog.ch/bwc Twitter: @BWCISU Facebook: www.facebook.com/1972BWC