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THE CASE FOR - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

THE CASE FOR


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THE CASE FOR NETWORKED REMOTE VOTING PRECINCTS

Daniel R. Sandler and Dan S. Wallach Rice University

EVT ’08

2008 USENIX/ACCURATE Electronic Voting Technology workshop | July 28, 2008

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When I talk to my father about e-voting he always asks the same question

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“When will we be able to vote over the internet?”

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This is a (mostly) reasonable question! We can now do almost anything over the internet remotely! reliably! securely!

(when was the last time you went in to a bank?)

the expectation exists: “surely this must be possible”

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“When will we be able to vote over the internet?”

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“When will we be able to vote over the internet?” The “right answer” from a security standpoint is

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“When will we be able to vote over the internet?” The “right answer” from a security standpoint is

N E V E R

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voting is special

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unlike entertainment & communication & banking a physical presence is absolutely essential why?

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EQUIPMENT ENVIRONMENT

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EQUIPMENT

the voting terminal must be trusted

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ENVIRONMENT

the voter must be free of coercion

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e.g.

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voting at home may never be practical or secure

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voting at home may never be practical or secure remote voting may be both practical and secure

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HOW?

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we propose a solution inspired by PROVISIONAL & POSTAL VOTING but relying on e-voting technology

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POSTAL VOTING

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POSTAL VOTING

aka “vote-by-mail”

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POSTAL VOTING

aka “vote-by-mail” voters declare intent to vote by mail

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POSTAL VOTING

aka “vote-by-mail” voters declare intent to vote by mail ballots are mailed in advance of the election

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POSTAL VOTING

aka “vote-by-mail” voters declare intent to vote by mail ballots are mailed in advance of the election

ALICE BOB CHUCK X

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POSTAL VOTING

aka “vote-by-mail” voters declare intent to vote by mail ballots are mailed in advance of the election

ALICE BOB CHUCK X ALICE BOB CHUCK X

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POSTAL VOTING

aka “vote-by-mail” voters declare intent to vote by mail ballots are mailed in advance of the election

ALICE BOB CHUCK X ALICE BOB CHUCK X

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POSTAL VOTING

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POSTAL VOTING

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POSTAL VOTING

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POSTAL VOTING

VOTER SIGNATURE Daniel R. Sandler XD

R Sandler

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POSTAL VOTING

VOTER SIGNATURE Daniel R. Sandler XD

R Sandler

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PROVISIONAL VOTING

Similar to postal voting, but in a polling place Voter and pollworkers disagree about eligibility Voter casts a ballot anyway Ballot sealed in an opaque envelope w/ voter’s identifying info & claim of eligibility

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The double enclosure Allows election officials to decide whether to count a vote before the vote is revealed

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Our objectives

  • 1. obviate voter’s need to be at “home”
  • 2. replace (unreliable, slow) postal channel

with networked transmission

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Electronic voting system Remote polling place Database of eligible remote voters Voter identification Provisional electronic ballots One-way publishing medium

Ingredients

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Electronic voting system, e.g.

VoteBox [see Sandler et al, USENIX Security ’08] voting machines are on a private network all cast ballots are broadcast & logged by each VoteBox “booth” machine to defend against loss & tampering a “supervisor” machine manages the polling place

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  • 1 vote authorization (blank ballot)

2 cast ballot (encrypted) 3 vote confirmation (signed)

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Encrypted ballots can be posted in public Even in real time over the Internet. Benaloh challenges (EVT ’07) Challenge machines to prove accuracy. Threshold cryptography to decrypt totals Anyone can verify the decryption. Applicable to mixnets, homomorphic crypto, etc.

VoteBox tabulation

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1 database: voter→ballot 2 voter identification 3 authorization (blank ballot) 4 cast ballot (encrypted) 5 signed envelope: id + ballot 6 ballot forwarded to precinct

  • NAME,BALLOT

NAME,BALLOT NAME,BALLOT NAME,BALLOT

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=

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  • ALICE

BOB CHUCK X

=

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  • ALICE

BOB CHUCK X

= >

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Fast Ballot types from home precinct Cast ballots back to home precinct Robust Post and networks both lossy …but networks can retransmit More secure Choices cannot be observed while in transit Crypto protects vote secrecy (even from officials)

Benefits of the networked remote polling place

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RELATED WORK

Industrial US Military: SERVE (2004) Democrats Abroad Estonian election (2007) Commercial systems: “unofficial” results by modem Research systems Fujioka, Okamoto, Ohta [FOO 93] blind-signature systems: Sensus [Craner & Cytron 97], EVOX [Herschberg 97], ... Civitas [Clarkson et al 08], Helios [Adida 08]

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CONCLUSION

Remote e-voting works a remote polling place is essential coercion-resistance; trustworthy equipment we use the provisional/postal voting model replace the post with a network replace opaque envelopes with encryption replace sealed envelopes with digital sigs a natural extension to existing research & industrial e-voting approaches

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More on VoteBox

Presentation on Friday

www.cs.rice.edu/~dsandler/pub/sandler08votebox.pdf

Summer project: open source release coming soon