The Cadbury Report 1992: Shared Vision and Beyond Neeta Shah & - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

the cadbury report 1992 shared vision and beyond
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The Cadbury Report 1992: Shared Vision and Beyond Neeta Shah & - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

The Cadbury Report 1992: Shared Vision and Beyond Neeta Shah & Christopher J. Napier Governance not a new problem The Cadbury Report is nearly 25 years old As an expression, corporate governance seems to emerge in


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The Cadbury Report 1992: Shared Vision and Beyond

Neeta Shah & Christopher J. Napier

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Governance – not a new problem

  • The Cadbury Report is nearly 25 years old
  • As an expression, “corporate governance”

seems to emerge in legal writings in 1930s

  • Important contribution of Bob Tricker’s book

Corporate Governance (1984)

  • Problems of governance are recurring,

particularly role of company directors

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Victorian non-executive directors

Marquess of Tweeddale Earl of Donoughmore

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Good chaps and bad eggs

Gerard Lee Bevan Clarence Hatry Lord Kylsant

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How was Cadbury different?

  • Previous UK financial scandals usually led to

legislative changes:

  • City of Glasgow Bank failure led to Banking Act of

1878

  • London & General Bank frauds (Jabez Balfour) led

to Companies Act 1900

  • City Equitable Life Insurance fraud (Gerard Lee

Bevan) led to Companies Act 1929

  • Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. (Lord Kylsant) led

(eventually) to Companies Act 1948

  • Fire, Auto & Marine (Emil Savundra) led to

Companies Act 1967

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How was Cadbury different?

  • Cadbury Report offered a code of best practice
  • Based on belief that “one size fits all” solutions

are not appropriate

  • Key concept of comply or explain
  • Report emerges against an interesting

background:

  • “Big Bang” a relatively recent event – many traditional

informal mechanisms overthrown

  • Financial Reporting Council recently established –

looking to expand remit beyond accounting standards

  • Cadbury’s own background and personality
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Defining corporate governance

  • Cadbury’s definition is “the system by which

companies are directed and controlled”

  • Emphasis on role of directors, both

individually and collectively as the board.

  • Assumption of unitary board model
  • As “first mover”, Cadbury’s definition was

echoed by many subsequent governance codes, including the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance

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Different notions of the “company”

  • The “company” is the shareholders

collectively, with the board as their representatives controlling management (who are employees carrying on the company’s business):

  • This is usually associated with a philosophy of

shareholder primacy

  • The “company” is the business itself, and the

directors are the “governors” of the business:

  • This may be associated with a philosophy that
  • ther stakeholders are also important
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Other definitions of governance

  • “Giving overall direction to the enterprise, overseeing

and controlling the executive actions of management and satisfying legitimate expectations of accountability and regulation by interests beyond the corporate boundary.”

[Robert Tricker, Corporate Governance, 1984]

  • “The process of supervision and control intended to

ensure that the company’s management acts in accordance with the interests of shareholders.”

[John Parkinson, Corporate Power & Responsibility, 1994]

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Other definitions of governance

  • “Ways to which suppliers of finance to corporations

assure themselves of getting a return on their investment”.

[Shleifer & Vishny, “A survey of corporate governance”, Journal of Finance, 1997]

  • This definition emphasises the financial aspects of

corporate governance, which is what Cadbury was commissioned to review back in 1991

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A window into governance research

  • Search of key journals to identify articles that draw on

Cadbury definition

  • Many papers do not provide a definition of corporate

governance (though they may refer to Cadbury, OECD

  • r a subsequent national governance code)
  • Research is diverse in terms of theoretical frameworks

used

  • Much research is quantitative, but increasing use of

qualitative methods:

  • Some studies are explicitly “mixed-methods”
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A window into governance research

  • Geographical dispersion:
  • Many studies in “Anglophone” countries
  • Developed economies with active stock markets
  • Emerging/developing economies with smaller stock

markets

  • Some comparative studies, often regional
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A window into governance research

  • Common research topics:
  • Attitudes of stakeholders to governance
  • Disclosed governance practices and their

“determinants”

  • Influence of governance practices on firm-specific

variables, e.g.:

  • “Firm performance”
  • Financial structure
  • Analyst following/ratings by external agencies
  • Social and environmental practices
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Challenges in governance research

  • Statistical significance prized over “real”

significance

  • Effect size often not examined
  • Decline in variation of key governance “variables”
  • ver time
  • Governance variables may not change over period
  • f investigation for specific companies
  • Is “good performance” the same as “higher

returns”?

  • How long does it take for governance changes to

have an impact?

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Codes as starting points, not ends

  • Many subsequent reports and reviews subsequent

to Cadbury

  • UK Corporate Governance Code and OECD

Principles never a final version, always subject to updating

  • Recurrent themes:
  • Shareholder focus – other stakeholders still largely
  • verlooked
  • Financial focus
  • Still largely reliant on “good chaps” – role of board in

setting the “tone at the top”

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Future challenges

  • Does increasing use of “Executive Committees” in

large companies make the Board of Directors even more distant from day-to-day operations?

  • Are modern corporations increasingly

“unaccountable” and “ungovernable”?

  • The information gap – how can directors “direct and

control” what they don’t know about?

  • Can risk management systems address these concerns, or

do they just lead to “boilerplate”?

  • Is the introduction of “Anglo-Saxon” governance in

emerging economies achieving anything more than “ceremonial compliance”?

  • The “bad eggs” are still out there!