THANK YOU La Fin @VK_Intel :) Talk Outline Evolution of Hunting - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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THANK YOU La Fin @VK_Intel :) Talk Outline Evolution of Hunting - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

THANK YOU La Fin @VK_Intel :) Talk Outline Evolution of Hunting for High- 2 1 Criminal Intent Value Targets APT Approach & 4 Emergence of 3 Ransomware Ransomhacks 5 YARA Hunting for 5 Key Takeaways Crypto Implementations ~whoami


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THANK YOU La Fin @VK_Intel :)

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Evolution of Criminal Intent

Talk Outline

1 3

Hunting for High- Value Targets APT Approach & Ransomware

2 4 Emergence of

Ransomhacks

5 YARA Hunting for

Crypto Implementations

5 Key Takeaways

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~whoami

Vitali Kremez is a well-known ethical hacker. His cybercrime and nation-state research and discoveries led to his direct name appearing in the malware linked to the Russian nation- state group known as "APT28," which is believed to the military

  • peration led by the Russian GRU after his blog revealing one

particular group malware. Moreover, his name oftentimes appears in various malware families from Maze to Medusa ransomware as cybercrime tribute to him by the criminal actors who closely watch and acknowledge his research. Executive & Strategic Advisor
 Personal blog: vkremez.com Twitter: @VK_Intel

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Cybercrime Trends (2020)

  • Sophisticated criminal enterprises such as TrickBot & QakBot &

TA505 - focused on parsing and identifying high-value targets (HVT)

  • Cybercrime Meets APT
  • Ransomhacks to Amplify Extortions
  • Big botnet data collectors necessitate scalable solutions to identify

high-value targets (corporate networks with local domains) versus “useless” infections

  • Simple idea: Squeeze as £ / € / $ value from your bots as possible
  • Banking Malware
  • Credential Stealer
  • Miner
  • Ransomware!

Reference: “Charting the Next Cybercrime Frontier https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ptL0aTYzRfM

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Father of Crimeware: Slavik

  • P2PZeuS group refer to

themselves as “Business Club"

  • They target wholesale banking

globally

  • Fraud amounts are much higher
  • Networks of fake companies are

used as mule accounts

  • Build a new attack model: Hybrid

attack

  • “Business Club” also introduces

CryptoLocker

  • First real ransomware
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Hunting for High-Value Targets: Network Parsing & High-Value Targets

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Emotet (Loader for Installs) -> TrickBot -> Ryuk Ransomware (via PowerShell Empire/Cobalt Strike)

Reference: “Charting the Next Cybercrime Frontier, or Evolution of Criminal Intent https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ptL0aTYzRfM
 Credit: Ryuk image (https://nogiartshop.com/products/ryuk)

…Network & Active Directory Parsing!…. Automated Malware + Interactive Human Exploitation Operator

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TrickBot -> Ryuk in the Cloud: CloudJumper MSP Intrusion

Reference:

https://twitter.com/barton_paul/status/1127088679132987394

  • $5 Billion Extortion Amount in Total (!)
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DoppelPaymer Ransomware Attack: PEMEX Intrusion 

  • 565 Bitcoins Extortion
  • Victim Note via Portal Link on Tor

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Clop Ransomware Attack: Rouen University Hospital France

  • Analysis: .cIop
  • Targeted Attack (Linked to TA505)

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Underground Infrastructures for Monetizing Corporate Breaches

ACCESS TO CORPORATE NETWORK Hackers specializing in network vulnerabilities

  • btain access through

compromised RDPs, credential stealers or

  • botnets. Most often,

these accesses are sold directly on the darkweb If the network access is not sold directly, intermediaries offer specific files or financial databases or provide access to the segments of the compromised environment to manipulate it Access owners offer

  • ther hackers to upload

their malicious files (primarily ransomware), establish secure access for one session,

  • r offer to use the

network to disseminate malware via spam or bots

Access-as-a-commodity Access-as-a-service

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  • 2. APT Approach & Ransomware

(TrickBot & “Lazarus” Angle)

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The “Anchor” Mystery

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The “Anchor” Mystery: The North Korean “Lazarus” APT

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The North Korean “Lazarus” APT Angle: Chilean Redbanc Intrusion

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  • III. Ransomhacks (REvil & Maze

Publicizing Leaks)

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MAZE Ransomware: Leak Portal Victim Shaming

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Big Shift - Legal Framework - GDPR: REvil Ransomware

GDPR Implemented on May 25, 2018. Instead of encrypting the files, the extortionists threatened to publish them.

REvil Exploits the GDPR

  • December 2019 REvil claimed a recent ransomware attack against the CyrusOne data center.
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Hunting Using YARA for Malware Developer Crypto Logic Implementation

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YARA Hunting for Code Reuse

  • Malware developers work just like legitimate software

developers, aiming to automate their work and reduce the time wasted on repetitive tasks wherever possible.

  • That means they create and reuse code across their

malware (especially, crypto routines)

  • This has a pay-off for malware hunters: we can learn

how to create search rules to detect this kind of code reuse, reducing our workload, too!

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  • I. TrickBot Crypter Layer (since May

2019)

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  • TrickBot has utilized their own crypting service for

some time now and it has been frequently updated

  • ver time.
  • The latest version utilizes RC4 with a twist and is also

a perfect example for writing a simple unpacker while at the same time being forced to analyze a slightly modified encryption routine. Source: https://zero2auto.com/2020/06/22/decrypting- trickbot-crypter/

TrickBot Custom RC4 : YARA Implementation

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  • ror-13 API hash
  • RC4 key (with NULL

terminator)

  • SBOX 0x184

TrickBot Custom RC4 : YARA Implementation

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rule TrickBot { meta: author = "jreaves" description = "TrickBot Crypter 2019/2020" strings: $snippet1 = {be ?? ?? ?? ?0 8d 7c 24 [1-2] f3 a5} $sbox_size = {be ?? ?? 00 00 f7 f6 [0-1] 81} condition: ($snippet1 and $sbox_size) }

TrickBot Custom RC4 : YARA Implementation

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TrickBot Custom RC4 : YARA Implementation

  • YARA scan for custom SBOX and key for

automated static unpacker scripting

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Netwalker Ransomware Crypto YARA Implementation

Source: https://zero2auto.com/2020/05/19/netwalker-re/

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  • two constant strings

associated with SALSA20

  • r CHACHA20 encryption

and following it is a dword value associated with hashing

Netwalker Ransomware Crypto YARA Implementation

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  • content:”{657870616e6420

33322d62797465206b6578 70616e642031362d627974 65206b982f8a42}”

Netwalker Ransomware Crypto YARA Implementation

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rule NetWalker { strings: $crypto_implement = {657870616e642033322d62797465206b657870616e6 42031362d62797465206b982f8a42} condition: ($crypto_implement) }

Netwalker Ransomware Crypto YARA Implementation

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Key Takeaways & Outlook

  • Automated Malware + Interactive Human

Exploitation Operator -> Convergence of APT & Crimeware

  • Cybercrime Meets APT
  • Hunting Using YARA for Malware Developer

Crypto Logic Implementation is the Key

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Malware Course Author: “Zero2Automated”

  • Created a 10% off coupon the Confidence

attendees (code is “REVERSING2020”) to enroll part of the course (courses.zero2auto.com)

  • Short Description: Developed for those

looking to further enhance their skills in the Malware Analysis/Reverse Engineering field

  • Instructors: Vitali Kremez (@VK_Intel),

Daniel Bunce (@0verfl0w_), Jason Reaves (@sysopfb)

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THANK YOU La Fin