TECHNOLOGY Zalini Yunus, PhD STRIDE, Ministry of Defence, - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

SESSION 2: STRENGTHENING THE REVIEW PROCESS ON BREAKTHROUGHS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

International Workshop The Eighth BWC Review Conference: Promoting BWC Implementation, Enhancing Global Biosecurity Governance 5 – 7 Sept. 2016, Wuxi China

Zalini Yunus, PhD STRIDE, Ministry of Defence, Malaysia Email: zalini.yunus@stride.gov.my

Science & Technology Research Institute for Defence Ministry of Defence

Publication of dual-use discoveries have been particularly controversial.

Reconstructed

• f Spanish Flu

virus Artificial synthesis of Polio Virus Mousepox experiment

Transferability

• f AI viruses

between mammals

INTRODUCTION

“It is reasonable to anticipate that humans are capable of engineering infectious agents with virulence equal to or perhaps far worse than any observed naturally.”

“Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences (NRC, 2006)” Infection Biology Bioinformatics Genome Research Systems Biology

Nanotechnology

Neurosciences Synthetic Biology DIY Biology Targeted Delivery Technologies

FIELDS OF RESEARCH IMPACTING BWC / BIOSECURITY

S&T REVIEW PROCESS

A number of working papers submitted by States Parties to the PrepCom on this issue, including:

• 1. Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention Proposal for the

establishment of a Scientific Advisory Committee – Submitted by the Russian Federation; 2.Science and technology review for the BWC: Features of an effective process – Submitted by the United States of America; 3.A future science and technology review process – Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; 4.Elements on science and technology for the 2016 Review Conference – the importance of an active review process – Submitted by Finland, Norway and Sweden; and 5.Strengthening the BWC science and technology review process – Submitted by Switzerland.

S&T REVIEW PROCESS

Needed for effective, on-going, and suitably resourced arrangements to:

• Formulate specific questions that can

be answered by reviewing developments in science and technology;

• Identify current scientific and

technical capabilities pertinent to these questions;

• Consider the implications of those

development in the context of the BWC; and

• Take decisions or actions necessitated

by those developments. Whatever processes is eventually implemented, it should be:

• Flexible
• Inclusive
• Agile
• Responsive
• Able to foster greater engagement
• Transparent

IAP Conference Report: International workshop on Advances in Science and Technology for the BWC, 13 -15, Sept. 2015, Warsaw

LIFE SCIENCE COMMUNITY

• Plays a crucial role in sustaining biological disarmament and non-

proliferation.

• Education and awareness on dual-use risk:

 Encourage responsible conduct of research.

• The unexpected result
• Malicious intent

NATIONAL PREVENTIVE MEASURES

NATIONAL PREVENTIVE MEASURES

• Developed a “Malaysia Biosafety and Biosecurity Policy and Guideline”

MOH

• Multisectoral education and awareness in biosecurity; Networking with international

partners in organising workshops and trainings (CBEP, DTRA, US DoD & EU CBRN CoE)

• Draft legislation & CoC for Biosecurity

MOD (STRIDE)

• Developed national guidelines for safe use of modern biotechnology and

guideline on risk assessments for genetically modified microorganisms

NRE

(Dept. of Biosafety)

• Developed a Malaysian Standards, “Biosafety and Biocontainment for

Microbiology Laboratories”.

Malaysia Standards

• Networking with international in organizing workshops and seminars to promote

laboratory biosafety and biosecurity in Malaysia

MBBA

• Responsible Science

Academy Sciences of Malaysia

Strengthening country

• bligation to

BWC

A list of National Health Research Priorities A system for awarding research grants A system for monitoring progress and research outputs

Research Review Committee, Medical Ethics Committee, Animal Ethics, IBC, GMAC guidelines, Good Clinical Practice Guidelines

MALAYSIA BIOSAFETY REVIEW PROCESS

Researchers are bound by all legal requirements, (local & international) which regulate their work, particularly health and safety requirements, environmental standards.

Biorisk Spectrum

Natural Disease Outbreak Unintended Consequences Accidents Negligence Vandalism / Sabotage Deliberate Use of BW

Self-Governance & Legislation

WHAT ELSE MIGHT BE DONE

“a journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step”

THANK YOU

Science & Technology Research Institute for Defence Ministry of Defence