Team Structure Mission Success Criteria Vehicle Recovery - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

• Team Structure
• Mission Success Criteria
• Vehicle
• Recovery
• Drag Module
• Payload - Rover
• Payload - Housing
• Testing Plan
• Safety
• Project Plan

• Ashton Johnston - Team Lead
• Dallas Solomon - Safety Officer
• Taylor Forte - Project Manager
• Jose Giacopini - Vehicle Lead
• Brandon Crotty - Vehicle Construction
• Tijon Clark - Vehicle Construction
• David Jessick - Vehicle Recovery
• Jennifer Adams - Payload Lead
• Pedro Regalado - Payload Electronics
• Michael Stokes - Rover Housing Design
• Andrew Hillier - Rover Design
• Andrew Dahl - Rover Construction

• Team Structure
• Mission Success Criteria (Section 3.0.2 & 5.0.2)
• Vehicle
• Recovery
• Drag Module
• Payload - Rover
• Payload - Housing
• Safety
• Project Plan

• Mission Success Criteria

MS1 - The launch vehicle reaches the 5280 ft. target altitude within 100 ft. MS2 - The vehicle carries rover safely through flight and landing MS3 - The rover successfully deploys and travels 5 ft. from the landing site to deploy its solar panels

• Vehicle Success Criteria

VS2 - The airframe must withstand the forces of takeoff, ascent, and landing VS4 - The vehicle must not cause any significant safety risk to onlookers or property VS5 - The team must be able to assemble the vehicle within 4 hours of reaching the launch site

• Recovery Success Criteria

RS3 - All recovery systems must successfully deploy at set altitudes RS4 - The landing energy of all sections must be below 75 lbf-ft

• Housing Success Criteria

PS1 - The rover housing successfully protects the rover through launch, separation, and landing PS2 - The ground team successfully transmits a signal to initiate deployment PS3 - The rover housing orients the rover within ±5° of a normal orientation PS4 - The leadscrew properly deploys the rover from the rover housing

• Rover Success Criteria

PS5 - The rover autonomously travels a minimum distance of 5 ft. from the vehicle PS6 - The rover deploys its foldable solar panel array

• Team Structure
• Mission Success Criteria
• Vehicle (Section 3)
• Recovery
• Drag Module
• Payload - Rover
• Payload - Housing
• Testing Plan
• Safety
• Project Plan

Length (in) Upper Diameter (in) Lower Diameter (in) Un-Loaded Mass (lb) Loaded Mass (lb) CG (in) CP (in)

96.5 6.16 5.13 39.3 49.3 56.93 72.15

Section Mass (lb) Booster 25.3 Recovery 6 Payload 18

Loaded: Unloaded:

LOADED CG/CP:

• Performance Criteria per NASA SL Handbook Statement of Work

○ Maximum Impulse: 5120 Ns (L class) ○ Velocity Off Rail: 52 fps

• Motor choice: Aerotech L1500T

○ Impulse: 5089.3 Ns ○ Burn Time: 3.5 s ○ Max Thrust: 1752 N ○ Avg Thrust: 1500 N

Thrust to Weight Ratio Rail Velocity (fps) Max Altitude (ft) Max Velocity (fps) Max Acceleration (G) 30 65 5877 643 7

Length (in) Diameter (in) Mass (lbm) 40.97 5 25.3 Part Material Airframe Carbon Fiber Fins Polycarbonate Boattail ULTEM 9085

Length (in) Diameter (in) Mass (lbm) 15 5 5 Part Material Body ABS Flaps ABS E-Bay ABS

Drogue parachute Avionics bay BP charges Main parachute Length (in) Diameter (in) Mass (lbm) 18.38 5 to 6 6 Part Material Airframe Carbon Fiber Bulkheads Carbon Fiber Avionics Bay ABS

Rover Housing 10 ft. Main Parachute Housing E- Bay Length (in) Diameter (in) Mass (lbm) 36 6 18 Part Material Airframe Fiberglass Nosecone ABS

• Av. Bay

ABS Avionics

• Carbon Fiber - Booster Airframe, Recovery Airframe, Fincan Motor tube, and Centering Rings

○ Highest strength to weight ratio ○ Rigid and durable for reusability

• Fiberglass - Payload Airframe, Drag Modulation Electronics Bay

○ High strength to weight ratio ○ Non-conductive to allow EM signals to pass

• 3D Printed Polycarbonate - Fincan Fins

○ Tighter print tolerance for precision geometry ○ High rigidity and fatigue allows for reusability

• 3D Printed ABS - Drag Modulation System, Nosecone, Electronic Bays

○ Less expensive and lighter than polycarbonate ○ Sufficient strength to withstand flight

• 3D Printed ULTEM 9085 - Boattail

○ High heat resistance

NASA Outlined Requirements Verification

Item Requirement Verification Method Verification Plan 2.1 The vehicle will deliver the scientific payload to an apogee altitude of 5,280

• ft. above ground level.

Analysis The launch vehicle will reach the target altitude through a combination of motor selection, vehicle aerodynamics, drag modulation, and the overall mass. 2.6 The launch vehicle will be designed to be recoverable and reusable. Reusable is defined as being able to launch again

• n the same day without repairs or

modifications. Inspection Robust design, repackable parachutes, and replaceable fins on hand at launch site will ensure relaunch on same day. 2.17 The launch vehicle will accelerate at a minimum of 52 fps at rail exit. Analysis Simulation software will be utilized to verify velocity at rail exit.

Team Derived Requirements Verification

Item Requirement Verification Method Verification Plan 2.1 Weight Max: 60 lbm Analysis Use lightweight materials, and do not have any empty space. All onboard components will serve a required

• purpose. All components and material

not considered necessary for flight will be removed. 2.4 Allow for EM to pass through necessary materials on Launch Vehicle Analysis Purchase, and properly handle, fiberglass material. 2.5 Do not allow for EM to pass through certain materials on Launch Vehicle Analysis Purchase, and properly handle, carbon fiber and metal components.

Subsystem /Compone nt Name Failure Mode Cause Effect Pre- RAC Mitigation Motor CATO Fracture of motor casing or improper grain packing. Catastrophic loss of vehicle at take-off. 1A Ensure licensed vendor for purchasing

• f motors. Inspection of motor

assembly prior to use. Motor retention Ultem structural failure. Excessive heat near boat tail. Loss of motor retention. Catastrophic mission failure. 1D Proper design such that boat tail is minimally exposed to exhaust. Inspect boattail before and after flight for structural damage. Boat tail attachment failure Improper securing of boat tail to the vehicle Loss of motor retention. Catastrophic mission failure. 1D Inspect boattail for security and proper installation. Fins Fracture of fin during flight Excessive shear forces acting on the fin Drastically altered flight profile and loss vehicle stability 1C Inspect fins before and after flight for structural damage Fracture of fin upon recovery Excessive shear forces acting on the fin Drastically altered flight profile and loss vehicle stability 3A Inspect fin and boattail assembly for proper installation

• Team Structure
• Mission Success Criteria
• Vehicle
• Recovery (Section 3.2)
• Drag Module
• Payload - Rover
• Payload - Housing
• Testing Plan
• Safety
• Project Plan

1. Separation at apogee 2. Booster Drogue 3. Payload Main (reefed) after 2 second delay 4. Booster Main - 600 ft. 5. Payload Main - 300 ft. 6. Landing 7. Rover Deployment

Booster Section Drogue Parachute

• Manufacturer: Fruity Chutes
• Model: Iris Ultra Standard
• Diameter: 3 ft.
• Deployment: Apogee

Booster Section Main Parachute

• Manufacturer: Fruity Chutes
• Model: Iris Ultra Standard
• Diameter: 10 ft.
• Deployment: 600 ft.

Payload Main Parachute

• Manufacturer: Fruity Chutes
• Model: Iris Ultra Standard
• Diameter: 10 feet
• Deployment: Reefed at apogee, full at 300 ft.

• Constricts the opening of the main parachute
• Uses closed main parachute as drogue
• Reefing ring slows opening to dampen opening forces
• Will open at 300 ft.

1 2 3

Wind Speed (mph) Payload Drift Distance (ft) Booster Drift Distance (ft) 5 1334 2028 10 2667 4056 15 4000 6083 20 5331 8111 Payload: Booster:

Section Payload Main Booster Drogue Booster Main Estimated B.P. Charge (g) 3.5 6.7 7.1

NASA Outlined Requirements Verification

Item Requirement Verification Method Verification Plan 3.1 The launch vehicle will stage the deployment of its recovery devices, where a drogue parachute is deployed at apogee and a main parachute is deployed at a lower altitude. Tumble or streamer recovery from apogee to main parachute deployment is also permissible, provided that kinetic energy during drogue-stage descent is reasonable, as deemed by the RSO. Analysis Booster and Recovery section will descend under a 3 ft. drogue parachute until main deployment at 600 ft. The payload section will use a reefed main parachute to act as a drogue until opening fully at 300 ft. 3.3 At landing, each independent sections of the launch vehicle will have a maximum kinetic energy

• f 75 lbf-ft.

Test Recovery and booster section will land with a kinetic energy of 20.96 lbf-ft and payload section will land with a kinetic energy of 27.38 lbf-ft. 3.11.3 The recovery system electronics will be shielded from all onboard transmitting devices which may generate magnetic waves (such as generators, solenoid valves, and Tesla coils) to avoid inadvertent excitation of the recovery system Inspection & Demonstration Recovery system electronics will be in a section surrounded by carbon fiber which will shield the electronics from radio transmissions.

Team Derived Requirements Verification

Item Requirement Verification Method Verification Plan 3.1 Parachute will not exceed a maximum size of 10 ft. Analysis Have the vehicle volumes and masses be appropriate enough to fit various 10 ft. para 3.2 At landing, each independent sections of the launch vehicle will have a maximum kinetic energy

• f 75 lbf-ft.

Test Recovery and booster section will land with a kinetic energy of 20.96 lbf-ft and payload section will land with a kinetic energy of 27.38 lbf-ft.

Subsystem/ Component Name Failure Mode Cause Effect Pre- RAC Mitigation Payload Recovery Failed ejection charge. Defective igniter. Defective

• altimeter. Black powder

leak. Catastrophic mission

• failure. Parachute fails to

deploy. 1B Continuity test of e-matches prior to

• flight. Use of 2 E-matches per ejection

charge. E-match disconnection from altimeters Assembly of altimeter bay removes e-match leads from altimeter. Catastrophic mission

• failure. Primary parachute

does not deploy. 1B Dual verification of E-match connection to altimeter. Secure E-match wiring to inner portion of recovery electronics bay. Parachute Damage from Ejection Charge Improper packing of recovery parachutes. Altered drag characteristics on descent. Possible catastrophic mission failure. 1C All parachutes will be wrapped in fire retardant material. Power loss to altimeters Power supply becomes loose, breaks connection. Catastrophic mission

• failure. Primary parachute

does not deploy. 1C Implement security measures to altimeter power supply. Dual verification of secure connections.

Subsystem/ Component Name Failure Mode Cause Effect Pre- RAC Mitigation VBS recovery E-match disconnects from altimeters Assembly of altimeter bay removes e-match leads from altimeter. Catastrophic mission

• failure. Primary parachute

does not deploy. 1B Dual verification of E-match connection to altimeter. Secure E-match wiring to inner portion of recovery electronics bay. Failed ejection charge. Defective igniter. Defective altimeter. Catastrophic mission

• failure. Parachute fails to

deploy. 1B Continuity test of e-matches prior to

• flight. Use of 2 E-matches per ejection
• charge. Altimeters tested for operation

prior to use. Power loss to altimeters Insecure power supply. Catastrophic mission

• failure. Primary parachute

does not deploy. 1C Implement security measures to altimeter power supply. Dual verification of secure connections. Parachute Damaged from Ejection Charge Improper packing of recovery parachutes. Altered drag characteristics on descent. Possible catastrophic mission failure. 1C Parachutes will be wrapped in fire retardant material to prevent damage.

• Team Structure
• Mission Success Criteria
• Vehicle
• Recovery
• Drag Module (Section 3.1.4)
• Payload - Rover
• Payload - Housing
• Testing Plan
• Safety
• Project Plan

Label Part Material 1 Pucks Aluminum 2 Hinges Aluminum 3 Push Pins Aluminum 4 Center Shaft Steel 5 Press Bar ABS 6 Joint pins Steel 1 2 3 4 5 6 1

Servo Motor:

• HS-7950
• 486 oz-in.
• 3 rad/s

under load Microcontroller:

• Teensy 3.5
• 180 MHz
• Multiple I2C

ports & SPI ports

Designed to:

• Attenuate 15% altitude
• Increase drag coefficient of vehicle by

0.7

• Rapidly extend/retract drag flaps
• Drag module sits just above the

booster

• Serves as a coupler
• Structure is completely 3D

printed

Component Mass (lbm) Body + Flaps 3.5 Mechanism 0.5 Electronics 0.5 Hardware 0.5 Total 5

Subsystem/ Component Name Failure Mode Cause Effect Pre- RAC Mitigation Flaps Fracture of flap Excessive shearing forces acting on the flap Drastically altered flight profile and loss of drag modulation. 1C Design flaps to accommodate loads with safety factor. Inspect flaps before and after flight for structural damage. Fracture of hinge pin Excessive shearing forces acting on the pin Loss of flap control 1D Design hinges to accommodate loads with safety factor. Inspect flap hinges before and after use for structural damage. Control Electronics Power loss. Improper assembly. Insecure power supply. Drastically altered flight profile and loss of altitude control. 2B Detailed assembly checklist with dual verification of power supply connections. Implement security measures for power supply. Steel Push Pins Binding Improper assembly. Improper tolerances when manufactured. Drastically altered flight profile and loss of altitude control. 1D Fit check components upon manufacture. Operational test of drag mod and control software upon assembly.

• Team Structure
• Mission Success Criteria
• Vehicle
• Recovery
• Drag Module
• Payload - Rover (Section 5.1)
• Payload - Housing
• Testing Plan
• Safety
• Project Plan

All units are in inches Rover (lbm) Payload Section (lbm) 3.8 18

⍉6.16 OD

FRONT LEFT All units are in inches

BOTTOM TOP All units are in inches Solar Panels

• Machined from a single plate of 6061 Aluminum

○ Slots allow for adjusting tension on the treads by moving the sprockets

• Mounting points for servos and pillow blocks

Adjustable Sprocket Mounts Pillow Block Mounts Servo Mounts

• Tread system driven by two high

torque continuous rotation servos ○ HSR-2645CRH

• Servos mounted under chassis
• Drive sprockets mounted to

aluminum hub (yellow) ○ Three sprockets per side ○ Splines matched to servo

• utput shaft

• Large contact area for maximum

traction and stability

• Good weight distribution
• Tracks will be rapid prototypes

from ABS

• Steel pins will connect treads
• Continuous tracks will be a

modular system comprised of multiple tread links that are linked together

Camera Ultrasonic Sensors

• A slot for the bottom panel will be

printed as part of the rover body design

• Upper panel will be in a separate

retainer that will be hinged and attached to the servo horn

• The top panel will be unfolded by

a micro servo

Solar Panels

• Raspberry Pi Zero v1.3

○ 1GHz single-core CPU ○ 512MB RAM ○ HAT-compatible 40 pin header ○ Composite video and reset headers ○ CSI camera connector (v1.3

• nly)

• Raspberry Pi Camera Module v2

○ Sony IMX219 8-megapixel sensor ○ 3280 x 2464 static images ○ 40 degree vertical FOV ○ 53 degree horizontal FOV

• MB1220 XL-MaxSonar-EZ2

○ Resolution of 1 cm ○ 10Hz sample rate ○ Virtually no dead zone, objects closer than 20cm range as 20cm ○ Maximum range of 300 inches

• Teensy 3.5

○ 2.5in x 0.7in x 0.2in ○ 120MHz ARM Cortex-M4 ○ 512K Flash, 192K RAM, 4K EEPROM ○ 5V tolerance on all digitial I/O pins ○ USB Full Speed (12Mbit/sec) Port

• 3 Space Embedded AHRS

○ 0.9in x 0.9in x 0.1in ○ 45mA @ 5V ○ Shock survivability of 5000g ○ Communication interfaces: USB 2.0, SPI, UART

• GARMIN GPS 15L

○ 12-channel sensors ○ WAAS-capable to determine position within 3 meters ○ RS-232 interface ○ One pulse per second (PPS) timing ○ Operates on 3.3-5 volts

• Mini GPS Antenna MCX Connector

Sanav MK-76 ○ .014 Amps ○ 3-5 Volts ○ 50 Ohms ○ Termination Method: MCX

• HSR-2645CRH

○ 1.59" x 0.77" x 1.48" ○ Stall Torque @ 7.4V = 166.64 oz-in ○ 24 tooth ; Dual Ball bearings

• TowerPro-SG92R

○ 23 x 12.2 x 27mm ○ Stall Torque @ 4.8V = 34.72 oz-in

NASA Outlined Requirements Verification

Item Requirement Verification Method Verification Plan 4.5.1 Teams will design a custom rover that will deploy from the internal structure of the launch vehicle. Test A wireless signal will be sent from the ground station to deploy the rover. 4.5.3 After deployment, the rover will autonomously move at least 5 ft. (in any direction) from the launch vehicle Test Sufficient testing of the dead reckoning algorithm will be conducted to ensure the 5 ft. mark is reached.

Team Derived Requirements Verification

Item Requirement Verification Method Verification Plan 4.3 Expected lead screw retention will hold the rover in place during flight, parachute deployment, and landing. Test Ground testing, full scale testing 4.5 Housing must be able to attenuate wireless signals given by the ground team Analysis and Test Research, ground testing, subscale and full scale testing

Subsystem/ Component Hazard Cause Effect Pre- RAC Mitigation Rover Rover fails to fully disengage from the leadscrew. Failure to unscrew from chassis guide nut. Rover fails to deploy. 1A Ground testing from different dropped

• heights. Full scale flight test.

Signal fails to actuate and power on rover. Loss of signal. Failed MCU Rover fails to deploy. 1A Multiple ground tests and full scale flight test. One or both drive servos fail to operate. Loss of power due to electronic and/ or battery power. Drastically altered

• displacement. Failure

to complete the 5 ft. minimum distance requirement. 1A Include a high safety factor for torque. Complete a checkout of all wiring, battery power, and electronic signals. Fails to operate upon deployment Electronic component(s) failure. Complete failure to maintain motion. 1A Double check all wiring and electronic sources IAW a checklist. Pre-test full scale rover. Loss of traction. Drastically altered displacement. 1B Design tank tracks to be able to stay in

• ptimum contact with the ground. Test

rover.

Subsystem/ Component Hazard Cause Effect Pre- RAC Mitigation Rover Rover binds in housing Housing warps during parachute deployment and/ or landing Rover might not exit to complete mission 1B Test subscale and full scale housings

• n launches

Rover tread(s) break Sheared pin and/ or fractured tread Treads fall off and/ or bind potentially causing the rover to stop motion or cause MCU to misinterpret

• verall distance.

1C Design treads and pins to take impact force with objects. Pretest on different terrains. Insufficient power in rover battery pack Miscalculation of required power Slowed performance and/ or total rover failure. 1C Include a high safety factor on power

• consumption. Check all batteries

before each flight Fails to travel > 5ft. Binded tracks Drastic decrease in speed and/ or complete failure to move. 1C Design and test tracks for proper tension and operation.

• Team Structure
• Mission Success Criteria
• Vehicle
• Recovery
• Drag Module
• Payload - Rover
• Payload - Housing (Section 5.2)
• Testing Plan
• Safety
• Project Plan

1

Housing Functions:

• Rover Retention
• Rover Orientation
• Rover Deployment

Key Elements:

1) Rover Bay 2) Lead Screw Actuator 3) Housing Rotation System 4) Payload Altimeter Bay 2 3 4

• DC motor with coupler (yellow)
• Threaded collar (red) transmits load to removable bulkhead
• Lead screw bushing (pink)
• Flanged leadnut (green) fixed to rover
• Lead screw (blue) serves as rover retention and deployment device

• Altimeter bay is fastened to

airframe and sits above the housing

• Rotation servo horn

interfaces with bottom of altimeter bay

• Transfers rotational force to

removable bulkhead through electronics sled

• Housing rotates on bushings

mounted inside payload airframe

• Rotation servo and

deployment motor mount to electronics sled

• Microcontrollers and

accelerometer will be mounted on electronics sled

• Batteries and XBee

transmitters will be mounted under rover platform

Subsystem/ Component Hazard Cause Effect Pre- RAC Mitigation Rover Housing Housing will not rotate Hard impact causes

• ut-of-round condition

Rover housing cannot

• rient rover.

1A Design housing to withstand impact force DC motor fails to rotate leadscrew (binds) Failure to provide enough torque. Binding within the bulkhead and/ or rover connection point Rover does not disengage from leadscrew. 1A Select motor with enough torque to rotate leadscrew. Ensure leadscrew and leadscrew nut share identical thread patterns. Housing cap fails to break away Does not unthread from leadscrew Rover fails to deploy from housing. 1A Design cap and leadscrew to unthread from each other. Ensure leadscrew and housing cap share identical thread patterns. Housing electronics fail to receive deploy signal Failure in code/ loose wires. Rover fails to deploy from housing 1A Verify correct code operation. Check wires. Rover binds during leadscrew operation Leadscrew binds within the leadscrew nut attached to the chassis

• r rover

Rover fails to deploy from housing. 1A Dimension leadscrew and leadscrew nut to be in the same x-axis

• rientation. Select correct sizing for

component interaction.

Subsystem/ Component Hazard Cause Effect Pre- RAC Mitigation Rover Housing DC motor fails to operate Battery failure/ disconnection Leadscrew fails to rotate, causing rover not to deploy 1A Select appropriate accelerometer. Orient the accelerometer to desired position. Housing fails to orient Housing deformation upon parachute deployment and/ or impact Rover deploys in an undesired direction or fails to deploy from housing 1C Design housing to withstand parachute deployment force and landing impact. Design recovery to minimize impact force upon landing. Accelerometer fails to detect +z direction Rover deploys in an undesired direction, possibly causing failure to move. 1C Select appropriate accelerometer. Orient the accelerometer to the desired position. Leadscrew fails to fully disengage from rover Leadscrew does not produce enough rotations to fully disengage rover. Increased deployment

• time. Possible failure

to deploy 2A Code the lead screw to rotate more than necessary to disengage from rover

• Team Structure
• Mission Success Criteria
• Vehicle
• Recovery
• Drag Module
• Payload - Rover
• Payload - Housing
• Testing Plan (Section 6)
• Safety
• Project Plan

System Aspect Testing Method Objectives Rover Tread Versatility Adverse terrain conditions (i.e. damp soil), impeding

• bstacles

Ensure rover tread design permits obstacle negotiation Rover Autonomy and Dead Reckoning Obstacle course Ensure autonomous navigation and distance tracking

System Aspect Testing Method Objectives Rover Deployment Test deployment at various angles Ensure successful rover deployment Orientation Control Full and subscale housing

• rientation (upright)

Determine functionality of algorithm, efficacy of design

System Aspect Testing Method Objectives Control Surface Aerodynamics Full scale control surface characterization Determine the drag coefficient range for control surfaces Electronic Control System Hardware in the loop testing Attenuate altitude to a predetermined value

System Aspect Testing Method Objectives Aerodynamics Test Flight Experimentally derive coefficient of drag, verify stability Vehicle Separation Ground separation testing Determine force required to break shear pins and impulse loads experienced by rocket sections Launch Vehicle Motor Determine impulses and thrust curves Determine the maximum accelerations and thrust during launch. Determine rail-exit velocity

System Aspect Testing Method Objectives Airframe/ Altimeter Bay Shear Strength Instron Tensile Test Determine the force required to cause the airframe sidewall, altimeter sidewall or fastener to fail Bulkhead Tensile Strength Instron Tensile Test Determine the force required to cause the bulkhead, eyebolt, or epoxy to fail

• Team Structure
• Mission Success Criteria
• Vehicle
• Recovery
• Drag Module
• Payload - Rover
• Payload - Housing
• Testing Plan
• Safety
• Project Plan

• Safety Officer: Dallas Solomon

○ U.S. Air Force, E-7, Retired. Armament Systems Specialist ○ HazComm, HazMat

• Hazard Recognition and Avoidance

○ Hazard Communication briefing ■ OSHA’s “Right To Know”, 29 CFR 1910.1200 ■ Beginning of each semester, new hazardous material ○ Dual Verification ■ Critical procedures ■ Altimeter/ Parachute Release Mechanism settings ■ Initials, record settings

Procedure is susceptible to electrostatic discharge Pinch point hazard exists Appropriate gloves required Safety glasses required Personnel must ground themselves These icons will appear in the team’s assembly procedures and checklists, prior to the affected procedural step. These icons indicate special safety requirements or hazards that exist.

• Warning: injury to personnel

**WARNING** Failure to ensure batteries are disconnected and power switches are in the OFF position prior to connection of separation charge leads to altimeters could result in inadvertent firing of charges.

• Caution: damage to equipment

*CAUTION*

Failure to ensure proper connection of batteries to altimeters could result in altimeter failure or short circuit of altimeter.

• Note: highlights important procedure

NOTE Ensure Jolly Logic Parachute Retention mechanism is oriented with controls and displays facing away from parachute for setting verification and ease of operation.

Hazard Cause Effect Pre-R AC Mitigation Verification Post- RAC Team member injured by motor detonation (CATO,installation, etc.) Withdrawal distances not observed during launch, improper assembly of solid rocket motor, igniter installed prematurely Loss of life, limb, eyesight 1C Safe withdrawal limits will be

• bserved at all times. Motor only

purchased from reputable dealers

• r assembled by qualified/

certified personnel. Ignitor will not be installed into motor until rocket is on launch rail. Withdrawal distances enforced by RSO IAW NAR High Powered Rocket Safety Code para. 3 "Motors" and para. 6 "Launch Safety". Ignitor will not be installed until rocket is on launch rail IAW NAR High Powered Rocket Safety Code

• para. 4 “Ignition System”.

1E Injury resulting from Recovery system failure (Booster/ Payload) Tangled risers, Jolly Logic failure, or failure

• f separation charges

Injury to personnel, possible death from high velocity impact 1C Risers will inspected for tangling prior to recovery assembly. Continuity checks of e-matches conducted prior to separation charge assembly. Jolly Logics will be turned on IAW Jolly Logics user's manual Detailed checklist used by safety officer to prepare separation charges and to ensure Jolly Logics are set and operating properly and risers are not tangled during recovery system preparation. 1D Team member injured from ignition of separation charge Stray voltage, E-match connected to battery, altimeter powered on Severe burns to hands,

• eyes. Loss
• f limb

1C Separation charge preparation limited to Safety Officer(s). Connection of separation charge leads will be done with batteries disconnected and power off Team members will ground themselves prior to handling any explosive material/

• component. Visual inspection of

electronics to ensure power off condition and batteries disconnected prior to E-match lead connection. 1E

NASA Outlined Requirements Verification

Item Requirement Verification Method Verification Plan 3.1 Each team will use a launch and safety checklist. The final checklists will be included in the FRR report and used during the Launch Readiness Review (LRR) and any launch day operations Inspection, Demonstration Safety checklists will be generated for all assembly, launch, and recovery activities. Final checklists will be used during sub- and full-scale tests and included in the FRR report. All applicable checklists will be used during the LRR and any launch day activities. 5.3.2 Implement procedures developed by the team for construction, assembly, launch, and recovery activities Inspection & Test Detailed checklists will be generated for the all assembly, test, launch, and recovery activities. Use of the checklists is mandatory 5.4 During test flights, teams will abide by the rules and guidance of the local rocketry club’s RSO. The allowance

• f certain vehicle configurations and/or payloads at the

NASA Student Launch Initiative does not give explicit or implicit authority for teams to fly those certain vehicle configurations and/or payloads at other club launches. Teams should communicate their intentions to the local club’s President or Prefect and RSO before attending any NAR or TRA launch. Demonstration The Safety officer will conduct a prelaunch safety briefing no earlier than three days prior to traveling to the launch field. The briefing will include the specific launch field rules and emphasize that the Range Safety Officer is the ultimate launch authority.

Team Derived Requirements Verification

Item Requirement Verification Method Verification Plan

5.5 Two personnel are required to visually verify critical steps in checklists, i.e. altimeter settings, Jolly Logic settings, etc.) Inspection Checklists will be designed for safety

• fficer and project lead to initial critical
• steps. Altimeter/ parachute release

settings will be annotated in checklists. 5.6 All recovery parachutes will be wrapped in fire retardant material to prevent damage from separation charges. Inspection & Demonstration Checklists will include a critical step indicating this requirement. This procedural step will be preceded by a “Caution” statement.

• Team Structure
• Mission Success Criteria
• Vehicle
• Recovery
• Drag Module
• Payload - Rover
• Payload - Housing
• Testing Plan
• Safety
• Project Plan (Section 7)

NASA Requirements Timeline

Sustainability:

• Established in 2009
• Recruit members from UNCC

Rocketry Club

• Goal to leave excess of

$5,000.00 in funds carried forward for the future team. Funding:

• Estimated Budget: $19,277.79
• Several avenues for funding are:

Funding Source Amount NC Space Grant $8,000.00 Eclipse Glasses Sales $1,500.00 UNCC Senior Design $2,000.00 Crowdfunding/ Sponsors $10,000.00

• Dr. Conrad NC Space Grant

$1,500.00 Department Donations $3,000.00 Bridge Tournament $1,000.00 Funds Carried Forward $2,800.00 Ideal Total $29,800.00