Campus Security Task Force : Final Work Product and Recommendations November 14, 2013
Task Force Composition & Intent Linda Moultrie School Board of Escambia County The Campus Security Task Force was RADM Pete Booth Sales Tax Watchdog Committee Shawn Dennis School District of Escambia County comprised of school district staff, law Kevin Windham School District of Escambia County enforcement, community, homeland Anthony Noles School District of Escambia County security, and building and facilities Robert Doss School District of Escambia County Chuck Peterson School District of Escambia County experts. Jennifer Foss School District of Escambia County Mark Lee School District of Escambia County The Task Force was charged with two Larry Knight Sherwood Elementary objectives. Melanie Scarborough Oakcrest Elementary CDR Dale Tharp Escambia County Sheriff’s Office • To identify, define, develop and LT Robby Martin Escambia County Sheriff’s Office SGT Chris Huffman City of Pensacola Police Department assist in the deployment of a Bob Sidoti STOA Architects comprehensive campus security Debby Dorough EEA Representative assessment Amy Whitwell ECCPTA Margie Jacoby Citizen Advisor • To compile and make Jeannine Williams FDLE Mark Holley FDLE recommendations to enhance Jeff Williamson FDLE campus security Debbie Thayer FDLE John Dosh Escambia County Emergency Operations
Background: • Superintendent Malcolm Thomas commissioned a Campus Security Task Force to methodically review and assess the current security state of all schools and facilities within the district. • The District has a long history of proactive security initiatives. The Task Force brings a fresh, objective, multi-agency perspective to the ongoing challenges of school security. • The Task Force was commissioned with two objectives. First, to identify, define and assist in the deployment of a comprehensive campus security assessment and second, to assemble and make recommendations to enhance campus security with an overarching intent to make Escambia County Schools a model for campus safety.
Process Overview : • The Task Force met regularly for eight months. • The Task Force was briefed on the current security state of the District and visited several sites to observe the disparities between sites. • Homeland Security Specialist Jeff Williamson provided the Task Force with an in-depth orientation of the ACAMS assessment model.
Process Overview : • The Task Force unanimously agreed the ACAMS model was the most comprehensive assessment tool available and recommended deployment at all schools, centers, and compounds. • To avoid generic District wide infrastructure recommendations, the Task Force decided to look at ways to customize assessments for each school’s unique needs. • The Task Force reviewed and actively developed a supplemental site specific vulnerability assessment (SVA) that takes operational situations and demands into consideration. The SVA will enhance the ACAMS and tailor the assessment of each site to it’s own unique needs.
Supplemental Vulnerability Assessment (SVA) : • Addresses specific evolutions on each campus. • Enables Sites to assess and determine with specificity. • Fosters local ownership and elevates awareness. • Provides a means for multi-stakeholder involvement.
Recommendations: The Task Force believes that ACAMS along with the SVA takes overall assessment to a level that is meaningful and valuable to the site faculty/staff and thereby makes the recommended approach more comprehensive and more likely to generate not only facility and operational enhancements but also cultural change where needed.
The Task Force recommends a two phase roll out of the assessment: Phase I • Orient Principals and Department Heads • Deploy ACAMS at every school using a three person Task Force to minimize subjectivity • Define site specific working groups to conduct follow-on SVA. Recommend team consisting of principal, facilities site representative, student representative, parent representative • Debrief schools on both ACAMS and SVA findings. • Schools/sites define individualized site specific priorities and training needs . Phase II • Develop a comprehensive reaction and action plan both at the District and site levels. • Facilities Planning and Operations staff define District wide and site specific capital improvement projects. • Secure budgetary estimates • Prioritize District wide and local site priorities as funding permits and execute as expeditiously as practical.
The second objective charged to the Task Force was the development of additional security enhancement recommendations and initiatives for the District to consider.
Physical Security: Increase the number of warning signs on campuses indicating "Cameras in use. ” Increase signage • throughout the district as a preventative measure. Improve communication from teachers to the front office. Consider exploring cellular phone application • technology available to enhance communication linkage between the main office and teachers in their classrooms. Consider the best practice of having the school front office numbers programmed in all staff cell phones. The Task Force recommends consistent application of the identified best practice of providing a key to • substitute teachers issued from the office and returned to the office daily. The Task Force previewed a magnetic “safe latch” device that can be used in lieu of a key. Consider in-classroom crisis packs that contain specific items. A complete content listing of a crisis pack • currently in use in the district is included in the appendix as an example. Consider the use of uniform intercom/verbal code protocols across the district • Consider the use of closed circuit television system as a means of non-verbal communication during an • emergency The Task Force recognizes the excellent incident response protocols developed by the Protection Services • department however, over time various schools have modified and altered some of the reactive measures. As such, the Task Force recommends that Protection Services ensure this process is consistent throughout District and should provide regular training. Standardize visitor screening at all sites. The most prevalent system in use is the raptor system. The Task • Force recommends uniform adherence and deployment of the Raptor system.
Community Action : Encourage after hour’s use of facilities by community groups. Allow residents of the neighborhood • watch to meet at the schools in order to foster awareness of community and incite community involvement in campus security. Enlist the help of Parent/Student/teacher associations for providing site specific ideas to enhance • security. Continue to foster relationship with military and encourage more avenues for military service members • to be present on campus. Encourage local businesses to adopt a school and develop ways to get involved. • Encourages periodic SRO transit from adjacent secondary schools to neighboring elementary schools on a • regular basis. The Task Force further recommends enhanced coordination with City and County law enforcement patrol units Promote and educate students regarding the Safe School Culture to eliminate the "code of silence" when • another student threatens injury to others or themselves. The Task Force recognizes that students are an important part of an effective campus security plan and that "school culture" is equally important. Continue to promote the annual safe school presentations and support crime stoppers initiatives consistently • throughout the District. Continue to monitor and stay informed of developing social media applications and notification • technology. Broaden social media use utilizing Smart Phone apps. •
Training : • Reinforce faculty and staff training and hold routine exercises to hone skills. The site specific Supplemental Vulnerability Assessments (SVAs) should be used not only to pin point specific vulnerabilities but also to develop and refine site specific training for staff on incident response and procedures. • Educate parents and guardians about security measures. Avoid revealing security information while letting them know what they can do to help with awareness. • Make parents aware of ways to help with security and consider including information in parent newsletters. • Consider establishing a Student Task Force to get information on security perceived or real vulnerabilities at each site (secondary only) from those who may know best and ensure SVA assessments include student input. Continue and consider more frequent Active Shooter Training. • • Specific “all staff” emergency procedures training every year which is uniform and consistent throughout the district. Emphasis should be for every staff member, not just instructional staff and additional consideration should be given to providing district level training on emergency procedures and incident response for substitute teachers at each school. • Consider enhancing the incident response guideline materials.
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